It's a magic explanation in other wordsYour demonstration is making a modal error. X is proposed as self-justifying and necessary, where Z and Z1 lack this property
God’s nature as the basis for logic’s universality.
My argument is that these require a metaphysical basis for proper epistemic justification, not just observed patterns or brain matter which are insufficient.
It's clear that our universe is a highly complex system. As I've highlighted a number of times before, there are only two observed mechanisms which explain the development of highly complex systems from simple antecedents: Biological evolution based on enduring selection from genetic variation, and conscious thought based on enduring selection from 'memetic' variation. So while the highly complex and unchanging omni-god of traditional Christianity fails the parsimony test as any kind of explanation for our complex reality, extrapolating from our certainty that consciousness is real to the likelihood that reality is conscious also provides a plausible potential answer to some other enduring mysteries we face; it opens up the possibility of an observation-derived simple-to-complex mechanism that applies to reality as a whole, ironically essentially mirroring parts of Hume's "infant deity" rhetoric.
But as we've discussed at length,
-- #1 is dubious at best since - much like our language on which it heavily depends - human reason functions fine or indeed best with what we might call a more localized and flexible 'principle of identity' A≈A (which also more accurately reflects the world we experience and have come to know). More importantly
-- #2 seems pretty much incoherent, at least as far as I've been able to decipher; I don't think you've even tried to explain what it means to 'ground' a law or principle or why that is needed for the mere possibility of reason (and I suspect that you have equivocated on this point between its possibility and its intelligibility, as below, not that it's clear even the latter would be any more coherent).
-- #3 is.. not too bad really, I can kind of see why that axiom might have been created and can entertain it in terms of speculation or for the sake of argument, but it's obviously not a sound basis for building further conclusions about the Ultimate Nature of Reality.
-- #4 by this point is built on quicksand so fails already; and while imagining something to be "necessarily possible" is fun to speculate, imagining something to be necessarily actual (besides perhaps existence or reality in the vaguest sense as the baseline for a 'possible world' at all) is just mental masturbation; and as I highlighted above this makes the argument self-contradictory in any case since it makes the "necessary possibility" of reason merely contingently possible (for which your workaround seems to be equivocation between possibility and intelligibility).
-- #5 is about the best I could come up with for your massive, unsubstantiated leap between these dubious universals you've invoked and the deity you invoked to *ahem* 'ground' them, but it's not a fact or even really an argument, just a bit of word-play.
So all in all... not really even a coherent argument as you've presented it, or even as I've tried to tidy it up and fill in the blanks, and even if we went waaaay out on a limb and blindly assumed that #1 and #2 were both true and coherent, we'd still fail at #4 (to avoid self-contradiction) and #5 (with existence or reality in the vaguest sense being a plausible candidate to 'ground' universals, and the only 'thing' we can reasonably posit as necessarily existing).
How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?
#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?
#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally. If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?
#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?
#4 There’s no equivocation between possibility and intelligibility: for reason to be possible, it must be intelligible, meaning it relies on stable logical principles. Without a necessary ground, reason could fail in some worlds, but we both assume it doesn’t. The reason used in S5 here is valid and sound. If universals require a necessary ground, and only a rational, necessary intelligence (God) can account for their invariance and intelligibility, then God’s existence follows logically, not speculatively. I'm curious what your alternative is here?
#5 How is it a leap and not a reasoned conclusion? If the rest of S5 is true, then universals like the laws of logic are immaterial, invariant, and prescriptive: they don’t just exist; they govern rational thought universally. For reason to be possible, these universals must be necessary - true in all possible worlds - otherwise, logic could vary, and reason would collapse. Grounding them requires something that explains both their existence and their rational character.
#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?
#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally. If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?
#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?
#4 There’s no equivocation between possibility and intelligibility: for reason to be possible, it must be intelligible, meaning it relies on stable logical principles. Without a necessary ground, reason could fail in some worlds, but we both assume it doesn’t. The reason used in S5 here is valid and sound. If universals require a necessary ground, and only a rational, necessary intelligence (God) can account for their invariance and intelligibility, then God’s existence follows logically, not speculatively. I'm curious what your alternative is here?
#5 How is it a leap and not a reasoned conclusion? If the rest of S5 is true, then universals like the laws of logic are immaterial, invariant, and prescriptive: they don’t just exist; they govern rational thought universally. For reason to be possible, these universals must be necessary - true in all possible worlds - otherwise, logic could vary, and reason would collapse. Grounding them requires something that explains both their existence and their rational character.
You still haven’t defined your god very well. Is it an entity, a force, an aura, a background energy? Or is it just another figment of imagination like every other god ever constructed by humans. The latter is the most obvious choice.
I don't know what the definitions of any of these things are to you. If God exists, there's necessarily no way we would be able to deduce His nature with complete certainty. Any atheist asking for a complete description of God's nature is making a category error and any theist proposing a complete description is describing a contingent entity.
That’s fine, but the decision remains easy for the atheist to reject either kinds of those gods until some evidence for them can be presented that can be independently verified.
If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds
I'm saying that if you're calling for empirical evidence for God's existence, you're making a category error since God's existence necessarily cannot be known through empirical means
You wouldn't prove what you ate for lunch on this day 2 years ago in the same way you would prove whether or not there are crackers in your pantry. Demanding the same criteria for both is absurd.
And I’m saying that all that you are doing is presenting a definition rather than an absolute fact. Lots of others in this forum have done exactly the same. Simply defining a particular god as “cannot be known” is mostly just of excuse to avoid presenting evidence.
Why would I want to prove what I ate for lunch two years ago? By evening, I can barely remember what I ate for lunch that very same day. Perhaps some people can perform that feat, which would simply be a by-product of “memory”, which is a result of the “thought” of biological brain, just as some people can “count cards” in their brain/thought in an attempt to beat the odds At Vegas.
This is yet another strawman that has been used by most every agnostic, theist, or religionist that has ever entered this forum, the demand that atheists see themselves as pure empiricists. Still, there needs to be some way to independently verify evidence in some manner, which then dismisses the “witnessing” of most religionists or the purely philosophical claims of would-be theists.It's just a demonstration that not all evidences are gathered or presented in the same fashion and demanding that they are is incoherent.
By comparing and contrasting A to 'itself' (that is, the slightly different thing that it is from second to second and that each person differently perceives) and to other things. You may as well claim that we couldn't measure temperature unless we blindly assumed or until we discovered or an absolute zero, or that we suddenly stopped being able to determine positions in the early/mid 20th century once we realized that there is no absolute fixed point of reference.#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?
No wonder your argument came across as incoherent. Firstly, your "universals" don't exist any more than Pythagoras' theorem or Middle Earth do, which is to say in our minds and literature, and until we find another intelligent species apparently nowhere else. Secondly, on looking back to see how I had missed this absurd claim that you supposedly outlined multiple times, it seems that you have rather consistently referred to epistemic grounding rather than ontological:#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally.
I've only kept assuming that couldn't be the full story because you kept erroneously claiming that the practical success attending our use of reason did not constitute valid 'grounding' (when on the contrary, between one or the other pragmatic justification is a more valid epistemic grounding than merely rational justification, and much more valid than simply inventing things!)."I presented earlier in the thread why I believe contingent universals like the laws of logic cannot be epistemically grounded in themselves"
"You might say that epistemic justification doesn’t add additional utility to its pragmatic effect, but I’d argue the pragmatic use assumes its epistemic grounding in something reliable."
'If it can be demonstrated that there exists a possible Godless worldview which can provide a more coherent and consistent epistemic grounding for universals, then the argument is disproven."
"I didn't concede that grounding A=A epistemically is only a feature of reasoning"
"You continue to miss this and treat reason’s existence as a given that needs no deeper ground. You're arguing at the level of description, I'm arguing at the level of justification, which is prior to describing quality."
"Totally irrelevant unless you're trying to make a naturalist claim that the epistemic ground for knowledge is human brain matter."
"You're just storytelling about a state of cognition, not providing an epistemic ground for the claims and assertions you make."
"I'm not denying reasoning's useful. I'm saying that grounding truth in that utility is absurd, ad-hoc, and circular. I'm sure we'd both agree that humans do not always reason truths, so if we're talking about the epistemic value of grounding truth in a contingent (apparently fallible) biological story, how could it possibly serve as an epistemic justification?"
"You're assuming universal categories and making logical leaps to conclude 'facts' without a proper epistemic grounding, which is the entire point of my argument."
If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?
#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?
Of course not, it's merely a balance of probability, the best available theory.Still no God.
Of course not, it's merely a balance of probability, the best available theory.
By comparing and contrasting A to 'itself' (that is, the slightly different thing that it is from second to second and that each person differently perceives) and to other things. You may as well claim that we couldn't measure temperature unless we blindly assumed or until we discovered or an absolute zero, or that we suddenly stopped being able to determine positions in the early/mid 20th century once we realized that there is no absolute fixed point of reference.
No wonder your argument came across as incoherent. Firstly, your "universals" don't exist any more than Pythagoras' theorem or Middle Earth do, which is to say in our minds and literature, and until we find another intelligent species apparently nowhere else. Secondly, on looking back to see how I had missed this absurd claim that you supposedly outlined multiple times, it seems that you have rather consistently referred to epistemic grounding rather than ontological:
- If Mithrae does not exist, then Mithrae's forum posts are impossible
- Since my forum posts do exist, they must be possible in all possible worlds (via S5’s axiom 5)
- Therefore I must exist in all possible worlds - I am a necessary being
No. It's a valid argument following the same format as yours. It's unsound, but not for either of those reasons; if and when you work out why it's unsound you'll have found yet another reason (as if we needed any more) why yours doesn't work.This immediately fails because you equivocate on 'possibility' and 'necessity'. I posit reason’s possibility (◊Y) as tied to universal, invariant truths (A=A), requiring a necessary ground (X). Your posts are contingent - dependent on forums, devices, and their own existence - not universal or necessary.
And more broadly a misuse of S5. Premise 1 wrongly leaps from your non-existence to posts’ impossibility without justifying why posts are necessarily possible across all worlds.
Much ado over nothing. Agnosticism contends with knowledge regarding God's existence.....not belief.The only real question then is whether you 'believe' there is a god(s), in which case you are a theist or believer or whether you don't, in which case you're an atheist. The term 'agnostic' is just some weird combination of intellectual laziness and cowardice.
No-one's holding a gun to your head to say "yes" or "no"It’s binary. There either is a God or there isn’t.
No-one's holding a gun to your head to say "yes" or "no"As I've noted again and again, that's just a relic of Christian binary thinking which many atheists have for some reason (more effective proselytizing?) chosen to adopt as their own dogma.
But if someone were to go around holding a gun to people's head, evidently the rational folk would say yes there is a god simply because that is where the balance of probabilities lie, with the most parsimonious and closest-to-observation theory of reality.
If "no onus, no evidence, no belief" atheists were consistent in their approach and rhetoric they would be adamant that reality must be based in some kind of cosmic mind/s and ridicule speculation to the contrary as being on par with Santa or the Tooth Fairy because, obviously, there is "no evidence" for non-conscious stuff at all. Kind of sad that the mere probability of theism is so threatening to them that they need to apply a special pleading standard against it
The balance of probability that a human can describe an unknowable being to another human is zero. Same probability that my dog can explain humans to the cats.No-one's holding a gun to your head to say "yes" or "no"As I've noted again and again, that's just a relic of Christian binary thinking which many atheists have for some reason (more effective proselytizing?) chosen to adopt as their own dogma.
But if someone were to go around holding a gun to people's head, evidently the rational folk would say yes there is a god simply because that is where the balance of probabilities lie, with the most parsimonious and closest-to-observation theory of reality.
If "no onus, no evidence, no belief" atheists were consistent in their approach and rhetoric they would be adamant that reality must be based in some kind of cosmic mind/s and ridicule speculation to the contrary as being on par with Santa or the Tooth Fairy because, obviously, there is "no evidence" for non-conscious stuff at all. Kind of sad that the mere probability of theism is so threatening to them that they need to apply a special pleading standard against it
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