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Let's learn a lesson from the cold war. There were competing issues: the American public were largely 'cold warriors', demanding only 'victory'. Not so good at 'understand the other side's point of view' and 'make concessions to avoid nuclear war'.
Our system is democracy, which has a lot of good, but not all good; it can put in power when the people are wrong, also, and gives us politicians who tend to do what the public wants, right or wrong (if they aren't corrupt) because if they don't, they tend to lose elections and it doesn't matter what policy they're for.
The story of JFK's presidency largely follows this contradictory set of priorities. To get elected, what worked was to look like MORE of a cold warrior than Republicans, more than Nixon.
So JFK tried to look very much like the stronger cold warrior, talking a lot about how Republicans had allowed a 'missile gap' where Russians were ahead of us, about how Republicans had let Castro take Cuba and not done enough about it.
This was all 'good politics'. No doubt it infuriated Republicans; there was no 'missile gap', the Russians had four warheads, but that was classified; Nixon was secretly leading a scheme for the US to have Cuban exiles invade Cuba he was desperately trying to get launched before the election, but couldn't say so and felt forced to defend doing less than Kennedy suggested.
The public had 'defeated evil' in WWII, defeated Hitler and Japan, and was fresh off the red scare with McCarthy wanting to defeat Russia. Some leaders felt we should have a nuclear war as soon as possible, starting one, while Russia still had few missiles and we could 'win'. An Air Force General, Thomas Power, infamously said, "At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win."
So, JFK consistently used a theme of strength and winning, language of cold warriors, in his speeches - even as he artfully used their language to advocate for peace, sneaking it in. "Let us never negotiate out of fear" - YA! SCREW THEM COMMIES! - "but let us never fear to negotiate." Ya, um, well he said don't fear so I guess that's ok.
The story of Kennedy's presidency is largely the story of the conflict of how to manage the politics of a public that demanded a cold warrior and victory, against the real danger of nuclear war and challenges to keep the peace.
Kennedy did support the idea that military strength helped peace, that when 'the enemy' saw opportunity from military weakness, it increased the chances for war. So better to be able to deter them with a strong force.
But privately, very privately, he described himself to his closest aide, Kenny O'Donnell, as "almost a peace at any price president". He constantly dealt with these competing agendas - the politics of the cold warrior and the policies of peace and ending it.
The Cuban Missile Crisis put this conflict into clear view - in hindsight, not at the time.
What was it? The US had under Eisenhower placed nuclear missiles on Russia's border in Turkey. Khrushchev wasn't a big fan; we didn't ask his opinion. So when Cuba came to him looking for an ally, and would welcome Russian nuclear missiles that would deter another US invasion after the Bay of Pigs, it was hardly unreasonable for Khrushchev to see it as entirely favor for Russia to do what the US had done to him.
In fact, had Khrushchev done it openly, making that case, as his advisors suggested he do, it's not unreasonable to think much of the world would have agreed that was fair. All our current rhetoric about 'nations having the right to choose their alliances' regarding Ukraine and NATO would have applied to Cuba's rights. We couldn't well object to their doing what we'd already done.
But US politics would hear none of that. Double standards weren't only fine, they were demanded. So Kennedy had to use the negative reaction to Russia's getting 'caught' in a lie for all it was worth.
Our system is democracy, which has a lot of good, but not all good; it can put in power when the people are wrong, also, and gives us politicians who tend to do what the public wants, right or wrong (if they aren't corrupt) because if they don't, they tend to lose elections and it doesn't matter what policy they're for.
The story of JFK's presidency largely follows this contradictory set of priorities. To get elected, what worked was to look like MORE of a cold warrior than Republicans, more than Nixon.
So JFK tried to look very much like the stronger cold warrior, talking a lot about how Republicans had allowed a 'missile gap' where Russians were ahead of us, about how Republicans had let Castro take Cuba and not done enough about it.
This was all 'good politics'. No doubt it infuriated Republicans; there was no 'missile gap', the Russians had four warheads, but that was classified; Nixon was secretly leading a scheme for the US to have Cuban exiles invade Cuba he was desperately trying to get launched before the election, but couldn't say so and felt forced to defend doing less than Kennedy suggested.
The public had 'defeated evil' in WWII, defeated Hitler and Japan, and was fresh off the red scare with McCarthy wanting to defeat Russia. Some leaders felt we should have a nuclear war as soon as possible, starting one, while Russia still had few missiles and we could 'win'. An Air Force General, Thomas Power, infamously said, "At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win."
So, JFK consistently used a theme of strength and winning, language of cold warriors, in his speeches - even as he artfully used their language to advocate for peace, sneaking it in. "Let us never negotiate out of fear" - YA! SCREW THEM COMMIES! - "but let us never fear to negotiate." Ya, um, well he said don't fear so I guess that's ok.
The story of Kennedy's presidency is largely the story of the conflict of how to manage the politics of a public that demanded a cold warrior and victory, against the real danger of nuclear war and challenges to keep the peace.
Kennedy did support the idea that military strength helped peace, that when 'the enemy' saw opportunity from military weakness, it increased the chances for war. So better to be able to deter them with a strong force.
But privately, very privately, he described himself to his closest aide, Kenny O'Donnell, as "almost a peace at any price president". He constantly dealt with these competing agendas - the politics of the cold warrior and the policies of peace and ending it.
The Cuban Missile Crisis put this conflict into clear view - in hindsight, not at the time.
What was it? The US had under Eisenhower placed nuclear missiles on Russia's border in Turkey. Khrushchev wasn't a big fan; we didn't ask his opinion. So when Cuba came to him looking for an ally, and would welcome Russian nuclear missiles that would deter another US invasion after the Bay of Pigs, it was hardly unreasonable for Khrushchev to see it as entirely favor for Russia to do what the US had done to him.
In fact, had Khrushchev done it openly, making that case, as his advisors suggested he do, it's not unreasonable to think much of the world would have agreed that was fair. All our current rhetoric about 'nations having the right to choose their alliances' regarding Ukraine and NATO would have applied to Cuba's rights. We couldn't well object to their doing what we'd already done.
But US politics would hear none of that. Double standards weren't only fine, they were demanded. So Kennedy had to use the negative reaction to Russia's getting 'caught' in a lie for all it was worth.