Why do historians claim Yamamoto was Japan's greatest strategist?

[Questerr]

In my opinion, the biggest difference the loss of the battleships at Pearl made was that the US was no able to respond to the Japanese attack on the Philippines.

Which was the point. The Japanese goal was a fait accompli.

 

[BahamaBob]

Which was the point. The Japanese goal was a fait accompli.

Not really taking the Philippines was reversible. It was more along the line of part of a short term strategy that allowed them to acquire their goals at a lower cost.

 

[Questerr]

Not really taking the Philippines was reversible. It was more along the line of part of a short term strategy that allowed them to acquire their goals at a lower cost.

The Japanese goals was to seize the Dutch East Indies (their primary target), alongside British Malaya and the Philippines. Then they were going to negotiate with the US and British, agreeing to give those territories back in exchange for the US and Britain recognizing the Japanese gains in Indonesia and agreeing to stay out of the conflict in China.

It all got ****ed up when their ambassador messed up his time zone calculations.

 

[BahamaBob]

The Japanese goals was to seize the Dutch East Indies (their primary target), alongside British Malaya and the Philippines. Then they were going to negotiate with the US and British, agreeing to give those territories back in exchange for the US and Britain recognizing the Japanese gains in Indonesia and agreeing to stay out of the conflict in China.

It all got ****ed up when their ambassador messed up his time zone calculations.

The same things would have occurred if the ambassador had issued the declaration of war on time. The US still would have entered WWII and the resolve would have been just as great. The propaganda would have changed and nothing else.

 

[Questerr]

The same things would have occurred if the ambassador had issued the declaration of war on time. The US still would have entered WWII and the resolve would have been just as great. The propaganda would have changed and nothing else.

I don’t know if I buy that. A lot of the resolve came from the “cowardly surprise attack” aspect.

 

[Cordelier]

You know, as a strategist, I can't fault Yamamoto. He got his forces were they needed to be, with the supplies they needed and the numbers they needed to succeed. His problem was that he was let down by his operational commanders - namely Admiral Nagumo. I've got to wonder what extent he was undercut by his arch-rival Tojo. I think if he had a free hand in choosing his subordinates, you would have seen someone like Admiral Yamaguchi in operational command.... and then battles like Pearl Harbor and Midway would probably have been very different affairs.

 

[Jredbaron96]

You know, as a strategist, I can't fault Yamamoto.

Really? I can. The entire decision to attack Pearl Harbor, and the entire strategy for the Pacific War that Yamamto helped develop, was a colossal series of mistakes that played right into America's war plans and screwed over any Japanese chance of victory.

 

[BahamaBob]

I don’t know if I buy that. A lot of the resolve came from the “cowardly surprise attack” aspect.

You need to look at the big picture. Truman was looking for an excuse to throw us into WWII. After Pearl the emphasis was the war in Europe not the Pacific. If the sneak attack was the main driver, the emphasis would have been the other way. If they had been able to deliver the declaration of war before the attack it still would have been a "cowardly surprise attack" and made no difference. If you think anyone would say, "well they gave us fair warning, so I'm not mad" you are wrong. We were attacked there were many dead Americans, we wanted pay back. A few extra minutes of warning would have made no difference.

 

[Questerr]

You need to look at the big picture. Truman was looking for an excuse to throw us into WWII. After Pearl the emphasis was the war in Europe not the Pacific. If the sneak attack was the main driver, the emphasis would have been the other way. If they had been able to deliver the declaration of war before the attack it still would have been a "cowardly surprise attack" and made no difference. If you think anyone would say, "well they gave us fair warning, so I'm not mad" you are wrong. We were attacked there were many dead Americans, we wanted pay back. A few extra minutes of warning would have made no difference.

Truman wasn’t even VP in 1941. What are you talking about?

The emphasis was on Europe because two of the three major allies (The UK and USSR) out voter the US and said the emphasis would be on Europe.

 

[BahamaBob]

Truman wasn’t even VP in 1941. What are you talking about?

The emphasis was on Europe because two of the three major allies (The UK and USSR) out voter the US and said the emphasis would be on Europe.

Sorry, Roosevelt was pres but it is still the same. Japan was put on the back burner until the war in Europe was over. Germany did not conduct any "cowardly surprise attack" but the same amount of hate and resolve still applied. Roosevelt wanted war, this gave him the excuse. HIs priority was not Japan. The US had no treaty with Russia at that time either.

 

[Cordelier]

Really? I can. The entire decision to attack Pearl Harbor, and the entire strategy for the Pacific War that Yamamto helped develop, was a colossal series of mistakes that played right into America's war plans and screwed over any Japanese chance of victory.

Yamamoto didn't make the decision to go to war.... but once the decision was made, the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl couldn't be ignored. It had to be attacked and damaged enough to buy Japan the time it needed to take the oilfields of the Dutch East Indies. I really don't see the point of not attacking it once the decision to go to war was made.

 

[ThirdTerm]

What did Yamamoto do as a military commander that was brilliant? Yamamoto was US educated. Could it be that somewhere inside him he really didn't have the stomach to actually invade and occupy US territory - and with the brutality against Americans there (mass rape and slaughter) that the Japanese Army did everywhere they went? Maybe he did not share the racism and bigotries due to his US education experience that was the practice of the Japanese Army and military in general?

Since he actually studied at Harvard for two years, he knew that invading and occupying US territory was not an option as he knew how great America was a country. A negotiated settlement was the only viable option for Yamamoto and his country, which was why he gambled on attacking the Pacific Feet at anchor in Pearl Harbor to deal a big blow to a superior enemy, hoping that America would offer a peace deal. Yamamoto guessed that Japan would never win a protracted conflict with America and the war should end in a year or two. Yamamoto was the best educated individual in the Japanese Navy who commanded respect of his fellow countrymen and he always had the last word when it came to military strategies.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Yamamoto didn't make the decision to go to war....

But he certainly did nothing to stop it. In fact, Pearl Harbor would never have been attacked if it wasn't for Yamamoto.

When Admiral Nagano drew up his plans for the Japanese push southwards, he originally only intended to attack the Dutch. Yamamoto protested and insisted on attacking the Americans as well. When he didn't get what he wanted, he threatened to resign, which was followed by all the other seniors officers in the Combined Fleet. Nagano, despite being his superior, relented and agreed to attack Pearl Harbor.

 

[Cordelier]

But he certainly did nothing to stop it. In fact, Pearl Harbor would never have been attacked if it wasn't for Yamamoto.

When Admiral Nagano drew up his plans for the Japanese push southwards, he originally only intended to attack the Dutch. Yamamoto protested and insisted on attacking the Americans as well. When he didn't get what he wanted, he threatened to resign, which was followed by all the other seniors officers in the Combined Fleet. Nagano, despite being his superior, relented and agreed to attack Pearl Harbor.

So you wouldn't have attacked Pearl Harbor? I sure would have... because I would have interpreted the US move of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor as a sign that they were prepared to go to war if Japan struck South.... and that the supply lines for such a strike would have been vulnerable to interdiction from the Philippines.

The way I figure it, Japan's options were 1) hope the US wouldn't get involved - despite their actions and words to the contrary - if Japan struck out against the Dutch and the British; 2) accept it as a foregone conclusion that the US would become involved, and hit them preemptively at Pearl Harbor; or 3) don't strike South at all and put the Japanese military & economy entirely at the mercy of the US sanctions.

Given that option #3 would have been completely unacceptable to Tojo's Government, what other option would you have chosen? Nagano's or Yamamoto's?

 

[Jason Warfield]

Every war documentary about the war with Japan I see defines Yamamoto as Japan's greatest strategist. Why? He was a disaster for Japan!

The attack on Pearl Harbor - which he planned - was a total failure for Japan. The damage they did had virtually no negative impact on the USA militarily. No US carriers were sunk. Not destroying the fuel tanks prevented crippling the US Navy's Pacific fleet. Japan could have easily defeated our forces on Hawaii - pushing the USA back another 3,000 miles - and used Hawaii as an air base.

The only rational decision WOULD have been to invade and occupy Hawaii. Japan did massive invasions elsewhere. They stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on other island groups. Had Japan destroyed the fuel tanks our Pacific fleet would have to limp back to the West Coast. Had Japan invaded and occupied Hawaii, the USA would have been 6,000 miles away from Japan. Japan also would have had the massive fuel tanks there as well. We did not have anywhere near the military forces on Hawaii to stop Japan taking the Hawaiian Islands by surprise invasion - and quickly.

I heard one historian who claims the goal was NOT to defeat the USA, but by only attacking a military target without civilian casualties and invasion, the USA would negotiate an agreement to lift embargos on Japan and stop supplying China with weapons, aircraft and pilots. The reason is because that was commonly how major powers settled disputes, with China seeing Hawaii as a US colony, not actually part of the USA itself.

I don't see any brilliance by Yamamoto. I see someone whose miscalculation from day 1 cost Japan the war. If Japan had militarily defeated and occupied Hawaii, with Hawaii 3000 miles away from the West Coast, there would have been little we could have done about it. Sending an invasion force 3,000 miles - with Japan having Hawaii for aircraft bases - would not have been tenable and minimally would have caused horrific loses to the USA. That would be particularly so since at the start of the war Japan's aircraft was vastly superior to ours. Japan also had a larger naval fleet. We would have been in no position to even try to retake Hawaii - adding now we were at war with Germany and Italy too.

What did Yamamoto do as a military commander that was brilliant? Yamamoto was US educated. Could it be that somewhere inside him he really didn't have the stomach to actually invade and occupy US territory - and with the brutality against Americans there (mass rape and slaughter) that the Japanese Army did everywhere they went? Maybe he did not share the racism and bigotries due to his US education experience that was the practice of the Japanese Army and military in general?

Really, it was Yamamoto who understood the folly of going to war with the US. To him, even if he were able to get the carriers, it was a matter of time before the US would use its industrial might to push out the war machine. In fact, he DID say to the Japanese government that Japan would lose the war if they fought for longer than a year. He repeated it after he came up with his surprise attack plan (which as noted by others here was botched by the Japanese embassy) in which he gave the initial attack success, but not in terms of the war itself.

 

[Jredbaron96]

So you wouldn't have attacked Pearl Harbor?

Absolutely not. Is that supposed to be a hard decision?

Prior to Pearl Harbor there was no strong American appetite for war with Japan. While most Americans, justifiably, were sickened by Japan's violent crimes in China and East Asia, this did not translate to a desire to go to war with the Empire.

Attacking Pearl Harbor removed that inhibition immediately and completely, as once incensed the American people proved perfectly willing to endure years of war if it meant revenge against Japan.

This was something American war planners had actually predicted with near 100% accuracy. They recognized that if a war with Japan broke out, they had two options; charge across the Pacific to engage the Japanese immediately, or wait back and build up a massive force then push across the Pacific in a slow, strategic effort.

The latter option was obviously the more sensible one, since it was much safer and easier (they knew Japan could never match industrial production with the United States), but it had one major flaw; it required America to commit to a long, drawn out conflict that would be difficult to justify to a population that was still strongly isolationist. They figured that there would be much clamoring for an immediate thrust to Japan; a battle that would take place with limited logistical support and right in Japan's home waters. To say that idea favored the Japanese would be an understatement. The Navy was therefore completely opposed to the idea, but they struggled to figure how they could justify an American willingness to undertake years of war that would be required for the Navy's preferred plan.

The Japanese provided that willingly by attacking Pearl Harbor, enraging the American people and providing the United States with the moral needs to justify a long, drawn out buildup period necessary for the Navy's plans. To make matters easier, the Japanese insisted on throwing their fleet across the Pacific, forcing the Imperial Navy to defend and support far flung island fortresses that the logistically hampered Japanese were incapable of doing.

Had the Japanese been more strategically inclined, they would have recognized the folly of such an effort and instead did what the US Navy hoped they wouldn't; hold back and keep a much smaller cordon of control near Japan and not attack the United States. Force Roosevelt to argue for a war in which America has not directly been drawn into, and then watch the Navy scramble to force a battle before America's typical mayfly attention span wears out.

As it turned out though, Japanese incompetence at strategy played right into American hands. After Pearl Harbor, Japan flung out its otherwise powerful surface fleet across the Pacific, diluting its strength and allowing the US Navy to slowly annihilate it over the course of four years. By the time the Americans reach Japan, something the Japanese had been trying to stop in the first place, the Japanese Navy was a shadow of its former self, unable to sally forth due to fuel shortages and with her best ships and crews lying dead somewhere at the bottom of the Pacific.

 

[notquiteright]

MacArthur was absolutely awful!

So your ahhh interesting hindsight aside, you asked if he was Japan's greatest strategist. If not their greatest, who was???

Some need to learn the difference between strategy and tactical implementation. A great battle plan always goes out the window when it meets the enemy. Biggest worry once the first strikes were recovered- where were the American carriers??? Were they moving to strike the rearming Japanese fleet like they latter did at Midway???

The Battle of Savo Sound was great plan and destroyed the poorly lead American Navy cruiser cover force. However failing to follow through and sink the helpless transport fleet off Guadalcanal Canal is a huge 'could have been'. Leyte Gulf was an excellent plan, Halsey bit hook line and sinker going after the bait carriers far to the north but Admiral Kurita failed to follow through and attack the vulnerable invasion fleet. Good plan, poor execution.

Now the oil tanks and dry docks- would a third wave have taken all of them out? The Japanese had already launched two waves. How important were the oil tanks with a great deal of the fleet out of commission? How long would it take to stand up oil storage???

But back to your statement- if Adm Yamamoto wasn't their best- who was??? ✌

 

[Cordelier]

Absolutely not. Is that supposed to be a hard decision?

Prior to Pearl Harbor there was no strong American appetite for war with Japan. While most Americans, justifiably, were sickened by Japan's violent crimes in China and East Asia, this did not translate to a desire to go to war with the Empire.

Attacking Pearl Harbor removed that inhibition immediately and completely, as once incensed the American people proved perfectly willing to endure years of war if it meant revenge against Japan.

This was something American war planners had actually predicted with near 100% accuracy. They recognized that if a war with Japan broke out, they had two options; charge across the Pacific to engage the Japanese immediately, or wait back and build up a massive force then push across the Pacific in a slow, strategic effort.

The latter option was obviously the more sensible one, since it was much safer and easier (they knew Japan could never match industrial production with the United States), but it had one major flaw; it required America to commit to a long, drawn out conflict that would be difficult to justify to a population that was still strongly isolationist. They figured that there would be much clamoring for an immediate thrust to Japan; a battle that would take place with limited logistical support and right in Japan's home waters. To say that idea favored the Japanese would be an understatement. The Navy was therefore completely opposed to the idea, but they struggled to figure how they could justify an American willingness to undertake years of war that would be required for the Navy's preferred plan.

The Japanese provided that willingly by attacking Pearl Harbor, enraging the American people and providing the United States with the moral needs to justify a long, drawn out buildup period necessary for the Navy's plans. To make matters easier, the Japanese insisted on throwing their fleet across the Pacific, forcing the Imperial Navy to defend and support far flung island fortresses that the logistically hampered Japanese were incapable of doing.

Had the Japanese been more strategically inclined, they would have recognized the folly of such an effort and instead did what the US Navy hoped they wouldn't; hold back and keep a much smaller cordon of control near Japan and not attack the United States. Force Roosevelt to argue for a war in which America has not directly been drawn into, and then watch the Navy scramble to force a battle before America's typical mayfly attention span wears out.

As it turned out though, Japanese incompetence at strategy played right into American hands. After Pearl Harbor, Japan flung out its otherwise powerful surface fleet across the Pacific, diluting its strength and allowing the US Navy to slowly annihilate it over the course of four years. By the time the Americans reach Japan, something the Japanese had been trying to stop in the first place, the Japanese Navy was a shadow of its former self, unable to sally forth due to fuel shortages and with her best ships and crews lying dead somewhere at the bottom of the Pacific.

So you really think that despite the sanctions they imposed on Japan, despite the moving the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor and the message that all of that was intended to convey, that the US would sit idly by while Japan rampaged through the Dutch East Indies and Malaysia?

 

[joko104]

So your ahhh interesting hindsight aside, you asked if he was Japan's greatest strategist. If not their greatest, who was???

Some need to learn the difference between strategy and tactical implementation. A great battle plan always goes out the window when it meets the enemy. Biggest worry once the first strikes were recovered- where were the American carriers??? Were they moving to strike the rearming Japanese fleet like they latter did at Midway???

The Battle of Savo Sound was great plan and destroyed the poorly lead American Navy cruiser cover force. However failing to follow through and sink the helpless transport fleet off Guadalcanal Canal is a huge 'could have been'. Leyte Gulf was an excellent plan, Halsey bit hook line and sinker going after the bait carriers far to the north but Admiral Kurita failed to follow through and attack the vulnerable invasion fleet. Good plan, poor execution.

Now the oil tanks and dry docks- would a third wave have taken all of them out? The Japanese had already launched two waves. How important were the oil tanks with a great deal of the fleet out of commission? How long would it take to stand up oil storage???

But back to your statement- if Adm Yamamoto wasn't their best- who was??? ✌

The fuel tanks were probably more important than the battleships. Without fuel, ships are worthless and their fuel demands are astronomical. Can't store fuel without tanks. We could send tankers, but it takes 1 incendiary 20 mm cannon shell from an aircraft to turn a fuel tanker into a particularly terribly way for those aboard to die.

The fuel tanks would have been simplistic to take out, far more than any ship. Just 20mm incendiaries out of the Zero's wing guns. Set a few on fire and the rest would ultimate go up in flames too. Without fuel, our ships and aircraft would be worthless.

I don't know who I would say was "their best" for not remembering names. Among the best was a young officer who urged the general to continue inland resistance trying to talk the general into ordering suicidal bonzi charges - while he committed suicide. Deciding to dig in inland, fighting perpetual retreating actions, rather than trying to stop us at the beaches under massive naval bombardment was a brilliant tactic.

"Judging" Yamamoto is difficult because it was Tojo, not Yamamoto who was the top commander, and Tojo was Army, not Navy. The Japanese Army command and Naval command often butted heads.

 

[Jredbaron96]

So you really think that despite the sanctions they imposed on Japan, despite the moving the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor and the message that all of that was intended to convey, that the US would sit idly by while Japan rampaged through the Dutch East Indies and Malaysia?

Sit idly by? Did you read my post?

My point was that Japan's strategic position would have been far better had they not attacked Pearl Harbor and forced America to cross the entire Pacific to come to them. Absent Pearl Harbor the American appetite for an extended conflict would have been much smaller, which likely would have compelled the United States Navy to launch a major offensive straight away towards the home islands, a battle that the Japanese would have been much better suited to win.

 

[Cordelier]

Sit idly by? Did you read my post?

My point was that Japan's strategic position would have been far better had they not attacked Pearl Harbor and forced America to cross the entire Pacific to come to them. Absent Pearl Harbor the American appetite for an extended conflict would have been much smaller, which likely would have compelled the United States Navy to launch a major offensive straight away towards the home islands, a battle that the Japanese would have been much better suited to win.

When I put myself if Yamamoto's shoes, and I make the determination that war with the US is inevitable, then I'd rather start it on my terms than their's. A surprise attack on the Philippines would have enraged US public opinion every bit as much as one on Pearl Harbor. If you're going to go in, go all in.

 

[craig]

Every war documentary about the war with Japan I see defines Yamamoto as Japan's greatest strategist. Why? He was a disaster for Japan!

The attack on Pearl Harbor - which he planned - was a total failure for Japan. The damage they did had virtually no negative impact on the USA militarily. No US carriers were sunk. Not destroying the fuel tanks prevented crippling the US Navy's Pacific fleet. Japan could have easily defeated our forces on Hawaii - pushing the USA back another 3,000 miles - and used Hawaii as an air base.

The only rational decision WOULD have been to invade and occupy Hawaii. Japan did massive invasions elsewhere. They stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on other island groups. Had Japan destroyed the fuel tanks our Pacific fleet would have to limp back to the West Coast. Had Japan invaded and occupied Hawaii, the USA would have been 6,000 miles away from Japan. Japan also would have had the massive fuel tanks there as well. We did not have anywhere near the military forces on Hawaii to stop Japan taking the Hawaiian Islands by surprise invasion - and quickly.

I heard one historian who claims the goal was NOT to defeat the USA, but by only attacking a military target without civilian casualties and invasion, the USA would negotiate an agreement to lift embargos on Japan and stop supplying China with weapons, aircraft and pilots. The reason is because that was commonly how major powers settled disputes, with China seeing Hawaii as a US colony, not actually part of the USA itself.

I don't see any brilliance by Yamamoto. I see someone whose miscalculation from day 1 cost Japan the war. If Japan had militarily defeated and occupied Hawaii, with Hawaii 3000 miles away from the West Coast, there would have been little we could have done about it. Sending an invasion force 3,000 miles - with Japan having Hawaii for aircraft bases - would not have been tenable and minimally would have caused horrific loses to the USA. That would be particularly so since at the start of the war Japan's aircraft was vastly superior to ours. Japan also had a larger naval fleet. We would have been in no position to even try to retake Hawaii - adding now we were at war with Germany and Italy too.

What did Yamamoto do as a military commander that was brilliant? Yamamoto was US educated. Could it be that somewhere inside him he really didn't have the stomach to actually invade and occupy US territory - and with the brutality against Americans there (mass rape and slaughter) that the Japanese Army did everywhere they went? Maybe he did not share the racism and bigotries due to his US education experience that was the practice of the Japanese Army and military in general?

It is because raising the stature of historical enemies we defeat makes us look even greater in hindsight. Rome did it with Hannibal.

 

[Jredbaron96]

A surprise attack on the Philippines would have enraged US public opinion every bit as much as one on Pearl Harbor. If you're going to go in, go all in.

That's a rather large claim. The Philippines is a lot farther away from the US and the American presence there was much smaller and less significant; by 1941 the Philippines was well on the way to becoming independent from the United States.

Furthermore, the Japanese didn't need to attack the Philippines either. Tokyo sweat bullets worrying about it, but it was never really a thread. The naval and air forces at the Philippines were paltry and no real threat to Japan.

 

[Questerr]

That's a rather large claim. The Philippines is a lot farther away from the US and the American presence there was much smaller and less significant; by 1941 the Philippines was well on the way to becoming independent from the United States.

Furthermore, the Japanese didn't need to attack the Philippines either. Tokyo sweat bullets worrying about it, but it was never really a thread. The naval and air forces at the Philippines were paltry and no real threat to Japan.

Until the Pacific Fleet sorties from Pearl Harbor and sets up shop in the Philippines in response to a Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, when they can then sail out and obliterate the Japanese lines of supply at any time.

 

[swing_voter]

Pearl Harbor is shallow.

A lot of those battleships were patched, pumped dry and were good to go.

It was not a good place to sink ships.