Why do historians claim Yamamoto was Japan's greatest strategist?

[Jredbaron96]

So Yamamoto was a blathering idiot....

No. Yamamoto was a good tactician and a brave commander. But he was a very poor strategist in a war where strategy was everything.

And to be fair to him, he was hardly alone in that. The Japanese military was riddled with men like him. It's a big part of why Japan was crushed.

 

[Cordelier]

No. Yamamoto was a good tactician and a brave commander. But he was a very poor strategist in a war where strategy was everything.

And to be fair to him, he was hardly alone in that. The Japanese military was riddled with men like him. It's a big part of why Japan was crushed.

Tactics were below his pay grade.

 

[Dayton3]

Something I don't think anyone has pointed out: Though Yamamoto's conceiving of the Pearl Harbor attack has given him the reputation as an officer who ushered in the age of naval aviation by showing the superiority of naval aircraft over battleships.

This is not true.

1) The damage to the ships at Pearl Harbor did NOT do that because the U.S. battleships were (except for the U.S.S. Nevada) fixed targets. Literal sitting ducks. Thus their damage did little to raise the status of naval aviation over battleships. It was the later sinking of the British Repulse and Prince of Wales by Japanese aircraft at the cost of only three aircraft that really changed the opinion of people regarding capital ships and aircraft.

2) While Yamamoto believed aviation was useful, he saw planes as being something you used in the early stages of major naval conflict to soften up the enemy. He still believed strongly that inevitably a large scale set piece battle between capital ships would be the decisive encounter.

 

[BahamaBob]

Fine then... I don't have a detailed Japanese Home Island Air Asset OB for late 1941 in front of me, but even if I did, I'm sure there'd be another level of weeds you'd want to go into.

So Yamamoto was a blathering idiot.... I guess it was a pretty stupid move for the US to risk exposing it's Sigint advantage to shoot him down, then, wasn't it?

If you want to have a discussion, don't get angry when someone sees things differently than you. Your assertion that the US had the capability to conduct a Naval attack on Japan in 1941 is highly flawed.

On Yamamoto, brilliant strategist win battles when they are heavy underdogs. Bull Halsey is an example of that. Yamamoto launched a surprise attack against a totally unsuspecting foe in peace time. It started a chain of events that wiped out his home country and killed millions. Hardly brilliant.

 

[Questerr]

Oh I don't recommend attacking the Philippines at all. A smarter move would have been to not attack the United States at all and focus solely on the Dutch and British holdings in south Asia. That way if the US does enter the war, they will be dragged into it by Roosevelt, not ushered in by an outraged populace.

My point was that neither action was necessary, but if the United States did declare war on Japan after Japan attacked the Dutch East Indies, then seizing the Philippines would be easy without provoking American outrage since they are already at war.

Seizing the Philippines absent a surprise attack when the US has time to rush reinforcing troops and aircraft there as well as fully mobilizing the Philippines military would not be “easy”.

 

[Closer]

Every war documentary about the war with Japan I see defines Yamamoto as Japan's greatest strategist. Why? He was a disaster for Japan!

The attack on Pearl Harbor - which he planned - was a total failure for Japan. The damage they did had virtually no negative impact on the USA militarily. No US carriers were sunk. Not destroying the fuel tanks prevented crippling the US Navy's Pacific fleet. Japan could have easily defeated our forces on Hawaii - pushing the USA back another 3,000 miles - and used Hawaii as an air base.

The only rational decision WOULD have been to invade and occupy Hawaii. Japan did massive invasions elsewhere. They stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on other island groups. Had Japan destroyed the fuel tanks our Pacific fleet would have to limp back to the West Coast. Had Japan invaded and occupied Hawaii, the USA would have been 6,000 miles away from Japan. Japan also would have had the massive fuel tanks there as well. We did not have anywhere near the military forces on Hawaii to stop Japan taking the Hawaiian Islands by surprise invasion - and quickly.

I heard one historian who claims the goal was NOT to defeat the USA, but by only attacking a military target without civilian casualties and invasion, the USA would negotiate an agreement to lift embargos on Japan and stop supplying China with weapons, aircraft and pilots. The reason is because that was commonly how major powers settled disputes, with China seeing Hawaii as a US colony, not actually part of the USA itself.

I don't see any brilliance by Yamamoto. I see someone whose miscalculation from day 1 cost Japan the war. If Japan had militarily defeated and occupied Hawaii, with Hawaii 3000 miles away from the West Coast, there would have been little we could have done about it. Sending an invasion force 3,000 miles - with Japan having Hawaii for aircraft bases - would not have been tenable and minimally would have caused horrific loses to the USA. That would be particularly so since at the start of the war Japan's aircraft was vastly superior to ours. Japan also had a larger naval fleet. We would have been in no position to even try to retake Hawaii - adding now we were at war with Germany and Italy too.

What did Yamamoto do as a military commander that was brilliant? Yamamoto was US educated. Could it be that somewhere inside him he really didn't have the stomach to actually invade and occupy US territory - and with the brutality against Americans there (mass rape and slaughter) that the Japanese Army did everywhere they went? Maybe he did not share the racism and bigotries due to his US education experience that was the practice of the Japanese Army and military in general?

Well, for one being 'The Best' in the Japanese Navy isn't the same as saying he was the 'best' in the world, after all; he was just the best the Japanese had. I think the propagandists like him because he knew the Japanese couldn't win against the U.S., hardly rocket science but far more intelligent than the current racial superiority delusions of the right wingers controlling the military and govt. policies at the time.

 

[Closer]

MacArthur was absolutely awful!

On his own, yes; his staff was always top notch, and he listened to them once in a while, but in any case Halsey was more influential on WW II Pacific strategy and planning, so it's mostly a moot issue.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Seizing the Philippines absent a surprise attack when the US has time to rush reinforcing troops and aircraft

Based on what? The USN did not have major plans for a reinforcement of the Philippines, and simple geography means the Japanese would find it easier to get to than the United Statrs.

Furthermore, based on the leadership MacArthur demonstrated its hard to imagine he would have made good use of any reinforcements he would have received.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Tactics were below his pay grade.

And?

So was Rommel. If you're argument was that he got promoted out of his forte, then sure I'd agree with that.

 

[Questerr]

Based on what? The USN did not have major plans for a reinforcement of the Philippines, and simple geography means the Japanese would find it easier to get to than the United Statrs.

Furthermore, based on the leadership MacArthur demonstrated its hard to imagine he would have made good use of any reinforcements he would have received.

Dude, War Plan Orange called for major reinforcement for the Philippines. There were troops in transit to the Philippines on December 7th in preparation for a possible war that were turned back because of Pearl Harbor. You are flat wrong when you claim “the US did not have major plans for a reinforcement of the Philippines”.

 

[Jredbaron96]

You are flat wrong when you claim “the US did not have major plans for a reinforcement of the Philippines”.

If you read that again you'll see I said "USN" not "US".

Because the Navy *absolutely* did not want to, and in fact the Chief of Naval Operations forbade movement beyond 155th East.

Supporting the Philippines was always the demand of the Army, and the Navy never wanted to do it after their wargaming found that doing so would have been a disaster.

The outline of tasks for the Pacific Fleet very clearly contains no mention of relieving the Philippines: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Rainbow5-USN.html

The Navy Basic War Plan (RAINBOW FIVE) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U.S. Pacific Fleet:

1. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
   
   
2. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
   
   
3. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
   
   
4. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155 east;
   
   
5. Defend Samoa in category "D";
   
   
6. Defend Guam in category "F";
   
   
7. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;
   
   
8. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
   
   
9. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
   
   
10. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;
    
    
11. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

 

[Questerr]

If you read that again you'll see I said "USN" not "US".

Because the Navy *absolutely* did not want to, and in fact the Chief of Naval Operations forbade movement beyond 155th East.

Supporting the Philippines was always the demand of the Army, and the Navy never wanted to do it after their wargaming found that doing so would have been a disaster.

The outline of tasks for the Pacific Fleet very clearly contains no mention of relieving the Philippines: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Rainbow5-USN.html

I guess you think the Philippines is not the “Pacific territory of an associated power” to the USN. I guess the USN was not associated with the United States in you mind.

 

[Jredbaron96]

I guess you think the Philippines is not the “Pacific territory of an associated power” to the USN. I guess the USN was not associated with the United States in you mind.

"Associated power" within the context of the USN referred to the British Commonwealth and the Dutch, not the US.

Regardless, the conclusion the Navy reached in War Plan Orange was very much that a rush towards the Philippines was suicidal and they were opposed to the idea. They were opposed by the Army, who insisted on defending the islands despite the perils of attempting to do so.

 

[Cordelier]

And?

So was Rommel. If you're argument was that he got promoted out of his forte, then sure I'd agree with that.

I don't understand where why you say he was a great tactican? When, exactly? The Battle of Tsushima?

Rommel at least took over operational command during Battles during the war. When did you ever see Yamamoto do that? He was a purely strategic commander... and he was damn good at it. Look how many times he managed to place forces where they were able to maximize surprise - not just Pearl, but Savo Island... and almost Midway. It was only by the skin of his teeth that Nimitz decided to stick his neck out and gamble everything on Rochefort's assessment.... most of the upper brass thought the main Japanese effort was going to come further South.

 

[Jredbaron96]

I don't understand where why you say he was a great tactican?

I didn't say he was great, I said he was good. He certainly grasped the importance of the placement of individual ships and how to employ them while in combat, as some of his planning and training exercises showed.

He was a purely strategic commander... and he was damn good at it.

What the hell are you basing that one? Virtually every single major strategic decision he made ended up being a complete failure that cost Japan dearly.

He insisted on attacking the Americans and threw a temper tantrum when he was denied, and then when he and the other officers of the Combined Fleet threatened to resign it convinced his superior to change his mind and agree to attack the United States.

His attack at Pearl Harbor failed to destroy the Pacific Fleet while guaranteeing American resolve to see Japan destroyed would last for many years.

He then gambled his fleet away at Midway, losing four carriers, while because of his poor planning the Combined Fleet wasn't in position to do anything.

You keep saying and insisting he was a brilliant strategist, but you haven't actually cited anything to support that claim. In fact, when we look back on history we can see that most of his decisions ended up backfiring and he compounded them by making more bad decisions.