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Who Lost Turkey?

sanman

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After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?
 
After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?

The obvious answers are Reagan, Bush and Trump...with some help from Sarah Palin.
 
After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?

I would love to get Donald Sutherland's take on this.
 
After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?

There's only so much any nation can, and should, do with the internal politics of another nation.

Who Lost Turkey? The Turks did. They did it to themselves. It'll be a long and bloody period before it switches back, if it ever does.

Along the way, there'll be the inevitable decent into a medieval existence for the population and a resurgence of all the pestilence and preventable medical deaths that comes with that standard of living, and lastly, a national economy to match. All we have to do is look at the ISIS areas of control for what's going to happen to Turkey going forward (or really, significantly going backwards for Turkey).
 
After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

Carter shares a little of the blame, but we blindly poke at the guy in office when there was a history of U.S. presidents/policies pushing Iran towards revolution.
 
Carter shares a little of the blame, but we blindly poke at the guy in office when there was a history of U.S. presidents/policies pushing Iran towards revolution.

Exactly correct.

The original government of the Shah of Iran came about in the 1920's when the UK was still a major power and pushing to oppose Communist Russia.

U.S. involvement began in the early 1950's and was maintained right up through Carter as a bulwark against Russia.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Reza-Shah-Pahlavi

The same is true for Turkey, beginning after WWI with again the West throwing support behind any strong-man government in Turkey that could be used to hold back Communist expansion from the Soviet Union. With the fall of Communism during the Reagan Presidency, this viewpoint changed as Russia was not then perceived as a major threat any longer, especially after the fracturing of the Soviet into independent states.
 
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98% Muslim population.

Secular goes against everything Islam, so you know that it will go Sharia sooner or later with a growing number of Islamotards.

I am surprised that Turkey remained a secular government as long as it did.
 
After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?

To a certain extent Turkey demonstrates a risk of American withdrawal from grantor of security. Turkey was considered withing the European sphere of influence and warned of the developments we now see, should the EU offer membership and then reneg.
 
I find myself wanting to argue for an isolationist approach for the sole purpose of being able say.....


That's nobodies business but the Turks.
 
Iran will likely reap benefits from this turn of events, since Turkey's ties with the US may become more strained.

However, Iran does care about Assad, while Erdogan doesn't like Assad.

I wonder what Russia's take on this is?
 
After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?


No decade would be compete without a military coup in Turkey.:2wave:
 
There's only so much any nation can, and should, do with the internal politics of another nation.

Who Lost Turkey?

You raise a fantastic question in asking, "Who lost Turkey?"

I don't think Turkey has been "lost" just yet, though the symptoms of such an outcome have increased in recent years: increasingly illiberal government, retreat for political secularism, increasingly erratic foreign policy, and further erosions in societal cohesion.
There are no quick and easy answers here. In my view, one could make a much more clear-cut argument about "who lost Iran" when Ayatollah Khomenei seized power. What I have to say about that matter is not for the faint-hearted, so some might want to skip the next paragraph.

In the Ayatollah's writings, it was abundantly clear that he sought a repressive theocratic regime. He had no intention to put in place representative government. Given the critical U.S. strategic interests involved, I strongly believe the U.S. military should have heeded the Shah's initial calls for help to aid the Shah in quashing the uprising. The Shah had his faults, but compared to some of the other illiberal regimes in the Mideast, Iran was actually freer and more prosperous. The Iranian Revolution was a strategic disaster for the U.S. and the Mideast. More than 35 years later, Iran remains a destabilizing force with deep connections to such terrorist organizations as Hezbollah. It is also seeking regional hegemony. The benefits of putting down the uprising would vastly have outweighed the costs that have followed. Those costs include the above-mentioned geopolitical ones, the reign of terror and purges that took place in the 1980s, and Iran's dismal human rights record.

Turkey is quite different. Turkey's political and economic development has been stunted by alternating military rule and poorly-performing civilian governments. There has also been a religious reawakening underway. That reawakening is a broad secular force that is reshaping Turkish society. It is that trend that is driving Turkey's gradual but unmistakable political evolution. In other words, Turkey is not on a trajectory that can easily be checked by a policy change by the U.S. It is undergoing a slow evolution based on internal dynamics over which the U.S. has very little influence. In contrast, the Ayatollah Khomenei and his supporters sought abrupt revolutionary change when there was still a strong counterweight (the Shah's government) that could have succeeded had the U.S. tipped the balance in his favor.

Some external policy approaches might influence Turkey's trajectory. Those events include a clarified policy related to Turkey's relationship with the EU and possible accession to EU membership. The criteria need to be specific and realistic. Continued NATO membership with that relationship serving as a means to engage Turkey's political and military leadership is another useful approach. U.S. foreign policy that is more strategic than reactive, so that Turkey can better understand U.S. goals and expect reliability, is another one.

IMO, the attempted coup was largely a counterrevolutionary reaction to the secular changes taking place within Turkish society. It lacked broad support. There is no credible evidence that it was, in fact, a liberal movement. The military faction's using force against Turkey's civilians argues that it sought power more than it sought representative government. Even if it had succeeded in the short-term, the internal secular changes underway would have left it with three distinct options: accommodate those changes (including those brought about by the religious reawakening) which would negate what it might have sought to achieve, become increasingly brutal and repressive to retain power, or to abandon power.

In sum, neither the U.S. nor Europe "lost" Turkey. They can still shape its evolution to some extent. Turkey's internal dynamics have played the leading role in its evolution.
 
Exactly correct.

The original government of the Shah of Iran came about in the 1920's when the UK was still a major power and pushing to oppose Communist Russia.

U.S. involvement began in the early 1950's and was maintained right up through Carter as a bulwark against Russia.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Reza-Shah-Pahlavi

The same is true for Turkey, beginning after WWI with again the West throwing support behind any strong-man government in Turkey that could be used to hold back Communist expansion from the Soviet Union. With the fall of Communism during the Reagan Presidency, this viewpoint changed as Russia was not then perceived as a major threat any longer, especially after the fracturing of the Soviet into independent states.

Turkey, in my opinion, is different.
Mustafa Kemal while somewhat of a strongman, implemented the ideals of a republic and individualism, in contrast to the religious beliefs of his nation.
Even after his death, when the military would intervene, they did so to reinforce those ideals and not to take power for themselves.

I see this failed coup as further strengthening of the real and toxic strongman government.
Ergodan is not a good guy, even if democratically elected.
 
The same is true for Turkey, beginning after WWI with again the West throwing support behind any strong-man government in Turkey that could be used to hold back Communist expansion from the Soviet Union.
Meaning whom? You're not suggesting that the West threw its support behind Atatürk, are you? The West was the force that Atatürk fought through a bloody war of national liberation. He fought the French, British, Italians, Armenians and Greeks to create the modern state of Turkey. The West may have been hoping to create a buffer state between them and the Soviets, but it certainly didn't have an independent Turkish state in mind or on their agenda.
 
You raise a fantastic question in asking, "Who lost Turkey?"

I don't think Turkey has been "lost" just yet, though the symptoms of such an outcome have increased in recent years: increasingly illiberal government, retreat for political secularism, increasingly erratic foreign policy, and further erosions in societal cohesion.
There are no quick and easy answers here. In my view, one could make a much more clear-cut argument about "who lost Iran" when Ayatollah Khomenei seized power. What I have to say about that matter is not for the faint-hearted, so some might want to skip the next paragraph.

In the Ayatollah's writings, it was abundantly clear that he sought a repressive theocratic regime. He had no intention to put in place representative government. Given the critical U.S. strategic interests involved, I strongly believe the U.S. military should have heeded the Shah's initial calls for help to aid the Shah in quashing the uprising. The Shah had his faults, but compared to some of the other illiberal regimes in the Mideast, Iran was actually freer and more prosperous. The Iranian Revolution was a strategic disaster for the U.S. and the Mideast. More than 35 years later, Iran remains a destabilizing force with deep connections to such terrorist organizations as Hezbollah. It is also seeking regional hegemony. The benefits of putting down the uprising would vastly have outweighed the costs that have followed. Those costs include the above-mentioned geopolitical ones, the reign of terror and purges that took place in the 1980s, and Iran's dismal human rights record.

Turkey is quite different. Turkey's political and economic development has been stunted by alternating military rule and poorly-performing civilian governments. There has also been a religious reawakening underway. That reawakening is a broad secular force that is reshaping Turkish society. It is that trend that is driving Turkey's gradual but unmistakable political evolution. In other words, Turkey is not on a trajectory that can easily be checked by a policy change by the U.S. It is undergoing a slow evolution based on internal dynamics over which the U.S. has very little influence. In contrast, the Ayatollah Khomenei and his supporters sought abrupt revolutionary change when there was still a strong counterweight (the Shah's government) that could have succeeded had the U.S. tipped the balance in his favor.

Some external policy approaches might influence Turkey's trajectory. Those events include a clarified policy related to Turkey's relationship with the EU and possible accession to EU membership. The criteria need to be specific and realistic. Continued NATO membership with that relationship serving as a means to engage Turkey's political and military leadership is another useful approach. U.S. foreign policy that is more strategic than reactive, so that Turkey can better understand U.S. goals and expect reliability, is another one.

IMO, the attempted coup was largely a counterrevolutionary reaction to the secular changes taking place within Turkish society. It lacked broad support. There is no credible evidence that it was, in fact, a liberal movement. The military faction's using force against Turkey's civilians argues that it sought power more than it sought representative government. Even if it had succeeded in the short-term, the internal secular changes underway would have left it with three distinct options: accommodate those changes (including those brought about by the religious reawakening) which would negate what it might have sought to achieve, become increasingly brutal and repressive to retain power, or to abandon power.

In sum, neither the U.S. nor Europe "lost" Turkey. They can still shape its evolution to some extent. Turkey's internal dynamics have played the leading role in its evolution.

SUCH an informative post. Thank you!

Edit...just FYI, your Inbox is full.
 
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You raise a fantastic question in asking, "Who lost Turkey?"

I can't claim to be the source of the question.

After Iran fell to Khomeini's revolution, concerned voices among American policy analysts asked "Who Lost Iran?" The maladroit administration of Jimmy Carter has largely been blamed for this failure, which occurred at the height of the Cold War to the detriment American interests.

After Muslim Brotherhood's Morsy came to power in Egypt, US foreign policy analysts asked "Who Lost Egypt?" After all, Egypt was a vital lynchpin ally in the region, and its loss to Islamist forces would likely mean a dangerous destabilization of the established order upon which stability in the Middle East was based. That concern did not last however, as Egypt's army under Sisi soon ousted Morsy and quickly brought the country back into the US orbit.

This time we now see the Turkish Mamlukes under Erdogan firmly asserting themselves in a direction that is likely to break free of the Ameri-Khanate. With the failure of the military coup and the inevitable purge that is to follow, the US has no hope of turning Turkey away from its current path. This happens at a time when the US faces a dangerous threat in the rise of ISIS.

Who will ultimately be blamed for this serious blow to the US-led international order?

Who Lost Turkey?
And what will the impact of this loss be?

I don't think Turkey has been "lost" just yet, though the symptoms of such an outcome have increased in recent years: increasingly illiberal government, retreat for political secularism, increasingly erratic foreign policy, and further erosions in societal cohesion.
There are no quick and easy answers here. In my view, one could make a much more clear-cut argument about "who lost Iran" when Ayatollah Khomenei seized power. What I have to say about that matter is not for the faint-hearted, so some might want to skip the next paragraph.
. . . .
 
You raise a fantastic question in asking, "Who lost Turkey?"

I don't think Turkey has been "lost" just yet, though the symptoms of such an outcome have increased in recent years: increasingly illiberal government, retreat for political secularism, increasingly erratic foreign policy, and further erosions in societal cohesion.
There are no quick and easy answers here. In my view, one could make a much more clear-cut argument about "who lost Iran" when Ayatollah Khomenei seized power. What I have to say about that matter is not for the faint-hearted, so some might want to skip the next paragraph.

In the Ayatollah's writings, it was abundantly clear that he sought a repressive theocratic regime. He had no intention to put in place representative government. Given the critical U.S. strategic interests involved, I strongly believe the U.S. military should have heeded the Shah's initial calls for help to aid the Shah in quashing the uprising. The Shah had his faults, but compared to some of the other illiberal regimes in the Mideast, Iran was actually freer and more prosperous. The Iranian Revolution was a strategic disaster for the U.S. and the Mideast. More than 35 years later, Iran remains a destabilizing force with deep connections to such terrorist organizations as Hezbollah. It is also seeking regional hegemony. The benefits of putting down the uprising would vastly have outweighed the costs that have followed. Those costs include the above-mentioned geopolitical ones, the reign of terror and purges that took place in the 1980s, and Iran's dismal human rights record.

Turkey is quite different. Turkey's political and economic development has been stunted by alternating military rule and poorly-performing civilian governments. There has also been a religious reawakening underway. That reawakening is a broad secular force that is reshaping Turkish society. It is that trend that is driving Turkey's gradual but unmistakable political evolution. In other words, Turkey is not on a trajectory that can easily be checked by a policy change by the U.S. It is undergoing a slow evolution based on internal dynamics over which the U.S. has very little influence. In contrast, the Ayatollah Khomenei and his supporters sought abrupt revolutionary change when there was still a strong counterweight (the Shah's government) that could have succeeded had the U.S. tipped the balance in his favor.

Some external policy approaches might influence Turkey's trajectory. Those events include a clarified policy related to Turkey's relationship with the EU and possible accession to EU membership. The criteria need to be specific and realistic. Continued NATO membership with that relationship serving as a means to engage Turkey's political and military leadership is another useful approach. U.S. foreign policy that is more strategic than reactive, so that Turkey can better understand U.S. goals and expect reliability, is another one.

IMO, the attempted coup was largely a counterrevolutionary reaction to the secular changes taking place within Turkish society. It lacked broad support. There is no credible evidence that it was, in fact, a liberal movement. The military faction's using force against Turkey's civilians argues that it sought power more than it sought representative government. Even if it had succeeded in the short-term, the internal secular changes underway would have left it with three distinct options: accommodate those changes (including those brought about by the religious reawakening) which would negate what it might have sought to achieve, become increasingly brutal and repressive to retain power, or to abandon power.

In sum, neither the U.S. nor Europe "lost" Turkey. They can still shape its evolution to some extent. Turkey's internal dynamics have played the leading role in its evolution.

Hey Don, whatcha your thoughts on the Brexit vote making it harder for Turkey entering the EU? My thoughts are it will make it EASIER not harder for them to getting into the EU. Well…that thought is predicated with how this so-called coup turns out.:2wave:
 
Hey Don, whatcha your thoughts on the Brexit vote making it harder for Turkey entering the EU? My thoughts are it will make it EASIER not harder for them to getting into the EU. Well…that thought is predicated with how this so-called coup turns out.:2wave:

I believe Brexit creates both opportunities and risks for Turkish entry. If Brexit leads the EU to develop a more flexible policy framework, that outcome could increase Turkey's prospects of joining. If, on the other hand, Brexit leads the EU to intensify political integration efforts, which would narrow the overall focus, that could make it more difficult for Turkey to join. I don't think the direction of EU policy is very clear on which direction the EU will go. In part, that might depend on how Brexit negotiations proceed.

The coup attempt undermines Turkey's political stability and that outcome could weaken its ability to join in the near-term.
 
Meaning whom? You're not suggesting that the West threw its support behind Atatürk, are you? The West was the force that Atatürk fought through a bloody war of national liberation. He fought the French, British, Italians, Armenians and Greeks to create the modern state of Turkey. The West may have been hoping to create a buffer state between them and the Soviets, but it certainly didn't have an independent Turkish state in mind or on their agenda.

Sorry I misspoke. The correct timeline for western support would have occurred after WWII not WWI, with western attempts to curtail the expansion of Soviet Russia by including Turkey in NATO. Thanks for the correction.
 
I believe Brexit creates both opportunities and risks for Turkish entry. If Brexit leads the EU to develop a more flexible policy framework, that outcome could increase Turkey's prospects of joining. If, on the other hand, Brexit leads the EU to intensify political integration efforts, which would narrow the overall focus, that could make it more difficult for Turkey to join. I don't think the direction of EU policy is very clear on which direction the EU will go. In part, that might depend on how Brexit negotiations proceed.

The coup attempt undermines Turkey's political stability and that outcome could weaken its ability to join in the near-term.

Then you have that "Republic of Cyprus" thingy hanging around since 1974/1983.:(
 
Clearly, Erdogan is using the coup attempt events as a Reichstag Fire - ie. as an opportunity to facilitate his already-planned purge of political opponents in the Turkish state. How far will Erdogan be able to go before someone somewhere pushes back? Will it be domestic forces within Turkey that push back first, or will it be the international community which calls for Erdogan to ease up? Who will dare to oppose Erdogan now?
 
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