In a battle over Taiwan, their systems would be more robust and harder to “ kill”
The US would be fighting thousands of miles from US territory, right next to China. The US would be relying on planes, ships and satellites to gather information and battlefield data. They are all among the first targets that China would focus on destroying in any conflict over Taiwan. The J20 primary role is likely to take out support aircraft like refueling planes, Radar planes etc. It will direct anti ship missiles to take out intel ships and other CnC ships
...
Overall it means that Chinese systems in a battle over Taiwan would be more likely to survive longer and be more replaceable in the battle area than US systems. Nothing to do with being better, if the battle was taking place off the US coast, the Chinese systems would be eliminated very quickly while US systems on the US mainland would likely not be touched
It is useful to recall the combat realities of WII and the battle against Japan. There were several doctrinal assumptions and controversies that were being debated then, as now.
1) The initial US Naval tactics on carrier deployments directed that task forces of only a few carriers each, so as to make it harder to be found in its entirety. However, Admiral Fletcher learned by experience and strongly recommended combined carrier task forces to maximize air protection. It was finally accepted in very late 1943 that such was more effective.
2) The initial presumption was that naval aviation, carriers and ships were very vulnerable to land based aircraft, partially because naval aircraft must be heavier and more robust for carrier operations (making them slower). By the end of WWII, save for Kamikaze attacks, the presumption had changed and US fleets routinely operated against the Japanese mainland.
3) Information then, as now, were critical to military forces. The first carrier force to find the enemy usually won.
4) Japanese plane radios were garbage and pilots had to use hand signals and disciplined tactics to overcome that deficiency. The US relied on better radar for ship defense, while the Japanese partially compensated with better night spotters and night vision equipment. Radar was great...when it worked.
5) The US had its own technology turned against it when, in bombing the Japanese mainland, the Japanese monitored IFF signals from US aircraft to obtain size and direction of an airstrike long before they reached the mainland.
5) The US used code-breaking, the Japanese used extensive traffic analysis of naval and merchant shipping to predict attacks. Both had much success.
6) All US military operations are very logistics heavy and, fortunately, the Japanese never exploited their submarines by using them in a campaign against merchant traffic. It was then, as now, the US militaries greatest material weakness.
It appears that the lessons of WWII are in need of revision. The US now has to return to dispersal of forces, and consequently less firepower in self-defense. As a consequence it will, as in WWII, require major increases in ship and fleet self defense weapons. Moreover, the enemy is quite aware of US dependence on a heavy chain of supply, and new methods of survivable transport to these groups will have to be developed (e.g. rockets and space trajectory for deliveries).
And, to my mind, the entire doctrine of I.T. as a substitute for actual firepower and performance is nonsensical. In an era of hypersonic missiles, new radar advances, and super maneuverable fighters in the final analysis one has to have better performing AND substantially increased numbers of fighting platforms.
If you can't stop a hypersonic missile unless you know its launching point, you don't just need better information, you need an effective point-defense system that doesn't need such information. THAT should be the lesson.