No, because that's stupid.
great argument, explains anything
" The renewed ‘CISproject’ worked out particularly well in Armenia where, unlike neighbouring Georgia, it produced significant outputs over a relatively short period of time. More precisely, Armenian and Russian Presidents came up with the so called ‘mutually beneficial’ ‘assets-for-debt’ swap that would gradually but immensely step up Russian influence in the Armenian economy since the fall of 2001 (Eurasianet, 2002). The recipe is simple: in exchange for a write-off of its around
$100 milliondebt incurred since 1991, Armenia agreed to transfer strategic state-owned assets to Russia, including six hydroelectric power plants (Eurasianet, 2003). Moreover, in 2003,
Armenia ratified an agreement that allowed Russian RAO Unified Energy Systems (UES)to take over the financial control of the Medzamor nuclear power plant, accounting for about 40 percent of Armenian electricity production (Azatutyun, 2003). Overall,
Russia took over around 90 percent of Armenia’s power generating capacities. Besides, within the ‘assets-for-debt’ swap arrangements, Kocharyan’s government handed over
Armenia’s largest cement factory to the Russian ITERA gas exporter in payment for its $10 million debt for past gas deliveries (Eurasianet, 2003). It is noteworthy that both Georgia and Ukraine similarly had huge debts to Russia,
yet Armenia was the only one to make substantial concessions for its write-off. Indeed, the tightening economic grip on Armenia gave Russia political leverage to influence the country’s behaviour. In October 2002, Armenia, alongwith Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signed the founding documents of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), thus confirming the strategic choice of the Russia-led trajectory. The Armenian-Russian military cooperation significantly intensified in the fall of 2003. On the eve of the Georgian ‘Rose’ revolution, Armenia signed a series of military agreements with Russia (Secrieru, 2006). Over time Russia has significantly tightened its economic grip on Armenia. As a single country, Russia is the main external trade partner of Armenia, being the destination for 20 per cent of Armenian exports and source of 70 per cent of remittances (Worldbank, 2015).Russia also maintains lead in the realm of foreign investments in Armenia. According to official information, there are about 1,400 enterprises with Russian capital, which is over one fourth of all economic entities with involvement of foreign capital (Sargsyan, 2017). Last but not least, Russia is home to more than 2.5 million Armenian migrants, who would be subject to harsh mistreatment in case of Armenia’s ‘non-Russian’ foreign policy options. This assumption is based on the Russian authorities’ massive crackdown on the Georgian population in Russia, following Tbilisi’s determination to sign up to the Association Agreement with the EU (Emerson and Kostanyan, 2013). It is perhaps for this reason that the President of the Union of Armenians in Russia Ara Abrahamyan has warmly welcome Armenia’s decision to join the EAEU, focusing specifically on its positive implications or at worst –the possibility to avoid repercussions for Armenian community in Russia (Panorama, 2013).It is worth noting that, prior to Armenia’s move towards the EAEU, Russia played its energy card by increasing gas prices for Armenia by 50 percent in April 2013, thus alarming possible economic repercussions of Armenia’s European aspirations. Ironically, gas price was reduced as Armenia decided to sign up to the EAEU. Armenia’s energy minister, Armen Movisisyanstated outright that the Eurasian choice shields Armenia from gas price hikes (Asbarez, 2013). Remarkably, there has been a tendency in President Sargsyan’s discourse to emphasize the hypothetical economic and political hardships that Armenia would sufferin case of deviating from strategic partnership with Russia. In legitimizing Armenia’s decision to join the EAEU, Sargsyan used the strategy of a ‘hypothetical future’
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198543/1/ceswp-v10-i2-p234-250.pdf