Frequently, statutes don't clearly state whether the offenses they describe require specific or general intent.
Rather, courts determine a crime's intent element by following the general rule that terms like "knowingly" and "voluntarily" denote general intent (as in "knowingly and voluntarily use force against another"). Terms that describe something more than knowledge and voluntariness, like "purpose," tend to indicate specific intent (as in "knowingly and voluntarily use force against someone with the intent to disable him or her"). (
U.S. v. Peralta, 930 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1996).)
Some crimes require proof that the defendant not only committed an illegal act, but also with an illegal purpose.
www.nolo.com
The MPC and Mens Rea: Most states use the MPC's classification for various mentes reae. The MPC organizes and defines culpable states of mind into four hierarchical categories:
acting purposely - the defendant had an underlying conscious object to act
acting knowingly - the defendant is practically certain that the conduct will cause a particular result
acting recklessly - The defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustified risk
acting negligently - The defendant was not aware of the risk, but should have been aware of the risk
www.law.cornell.edu
In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975), the defendant was convicted of a Section 371 conspiracy to assault a federal officer while the officer was engaged in the performance of his official duties. The underlying substantive offense, 18 U.S.C. 111, did not require knowledge that the intended victim was a federal officer. The issue before the Court was whether the government was nonetheless required to prove such knowledge under the conspiracy statute. The Court held that it was not, concluding that "where a substantive offense embodies only a requirement of mens rea as to each of its elements, the general federal conspiracy statute requires no more." 420 U.S. at 692. The Court relied for that conclusion chiefly on the language of the conspiracy statute itself, observing that "nothing on the face" of that statute would require greater knowledge on the part of those conspiring to commit an offense than is required to actually commit the offense. Id. at 687.
Since Feola, the courts of appeals, in reliance on that decision, have repeatedly rejected claims that a "corrupt motive" or knowledge of the law is an element of a gambling conspiracy. See United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642-643 (10th Cir.) (conspiracy to violate Section 1084(a)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 883 (1995); United States v. Murray, 928 F.2d 1242, 1251 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 674-675 (6th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Thomas, 887 F.2d 1341, 1346-1347 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that knowledge of the law is not an element of a conspiracy to engage in "apparently innocent conduct"). No federal court of appeals has cited the Powell doctrine with approval since Feola. Nor do the standard jury instructions on conspiracy include an element of "corrupt motive." See, e.g., Edward J. Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 28.03 (4th ed. 1990). And, as the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 6a-7a), the American Law Institute rejected the Powell doctrine in its Model Penal Code. See 2 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, pt. 1, § 5.03 note on subsec. 1 & cmt. 2(c)(iii) (1985)
[see my previous posts about the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Feola]
/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/pmn/X2HBCOZPMJF3BN5HUDEALLMBMU.jpg)
Or, at least, the basis of his posts.