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I try to ensure that my posts are based upon reliable sources. I evaluate reliability on a history of accuracy, support by other reliable sources, and my experience in Operations Planning.
One of those sources is ISW, which takes a conservative view of battlefield claims, uses a variety of sources (including Russian), and identify most of their sources. They also verify claims though corroboration.
In their latest update, they posted the following:
A Ukrainian intelligence official supported ISW’s prior assessments that Russian forces are unable to conduct large-scale, simultaneous offensive campaigns on multiple axes.[8] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitsky stated on March 23 that Russian forces have demonstrated in the last year of the war that Russian forces are unable to maintain large-scale, strategic-level offensives on multiple axes of advance.[9] Skibitsky stated that Russian forces failed to achieve the expected quick or significant advances in the Donbas offensive that began in early 2023. Skibitsky stated that Ukrainian forces fixed Russian forces to multiple areas on the front line and that Russian forces in occupied Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts are on the defensive. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on March 21 that Russian forces will try to start another offensive, possibly even on multiple different axes, in the coming weeks.[10]
I had previously made the same observation in several posts. Russia - either because of doctrine or lack of resources, or both - seems incapable of identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses. This is a good thing. There has been no Russian "breakthrough" on any front since their initial attack, but a series of withdrawals along all fronts.
It also appears that their facilities for doing so have been attritted significantly. They've never been good at maneuver, to begin with, and overly dependent on rail movement - a la WWII. That is why, both in 2014 and in this invasion, the lines of contact remain largely static, and why significant assets like fuel and ammunition supply points are within striking distance of active front lines.
That is why Bakhmut has been such a bone of contention. It is one area where Russian advances have been made, if incremental. But, as I've noted before, the Russian defensive lines are broad, but not deep.
If one looks objectively at the map, Ukraine has a distinct advantage. It can concentrate forces and move them along the front as needed, because they have shorter internal lines of communication and supply. That advantage will be demonstrated when the Ukraine counteroffensive begins. They will be able to move quickly to exploit breakthroughs, as they did in Kharkiv.
Russia's disadvantages are longer lines of communication and a relative lack of resources to move assets around. Ukraine's biggest risk is overextending their lines, which could stall their advance, and, of course, not knowing where there are potential sticking points along Russia's secondary lines of defense.
Every advance creates a salient, and every salient creates a vulnerability. What wins battles is concentrating fires on relevant objectives and relative weaknesses. What wins wars is having a solid strategy. On the last, there has been no contest.
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