The JCC is vitiated by its lopsided composition, quadripartite in name only: the Georgian government, South Ossetian secessionist authorities in Tskhinvali, Russia’s North Ossetia, and Russia itself in the driver’s seat politically and deploying “peacekeeping” troops on the ground. The “3+1” membership was designed from the outset to isolate Georgia, leaving it face to face with three incarnations of Russia, in the absence of international involvement. “This is incorrect and we can not continue working in such a format,” Iakobashvili remarked. The JCC “has not brought us any closer to a settlement” and “we will no longer participate in those useless JCC meetings” (24 Saati, March 4; Civil Georgia, March 5)...
Tbilisi proposes changing the JCC’s 3+1 format to a 2+2+2 format that would include: the Georgian government, Russia, the European Union, OSCE, the Tskhinvali authorities, and the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian alternative authorities (headed since 2006 by Dmitry Sanakoyev). Georgia sees the EU and OSCE as members with full rights, not mere observers, in the new body (Civil Georgia, The Messenger, March 4-6)...
The proposed changes would, first, put an end to Russia’s triple representation, a grotesque feature of the quadripartite JCC all along. Beyond this, the proposed 2+2+2 format would reflect the changes that have occurred on the ground in South Ossetia after 2004 and whose momentum is accelerating. Such changes include: Georgia’s European integration policy; the EU’s development of a neighborhood policy, with a growing role in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction; and the emergence and successful performance of Tbilisi-backed authorities in South Ossetia, creating a duality of power there. Meanwhile the EU has become an important donor of rehabilitation funds to South Ossetia.