The biggest problems with the German industrial effort was the use of slave labour, concentration camp labour, poor work discipline, and poor economic decisions by higher eschelons of society. Of these reasons, the most notable were: poor strategy, frittered resources, lack of application of mass production, inability to provide reliable labour (due to the overuse of slave labour) and the lack of women in the workforce. Furthermore, the United States had far more industrial capacity than the entire axis combined. The summer of 1944, however, finally led to some gains for the bombing campaign, but even these did not have the massive effect they intended.
After bombing, the majority of major factory targets were either missed completely, allowing full production, or they were hit and repaired within a couple days. Poor allied intel provided for this more fully. An example would be the ballbering plants. Full production once again resumed. The bombing was actually quite a failure when you look at the bigger picture. According to "Inside Hitler's Germany," the allied bombing only started to actually make any signfiicant impact around late 44 to mid 45, and even then, reduction of productive capacity was about 25-30%, but most of the damage was "rapidy repaired" to normal within a few days or a month at max. By this time, however, the Germans were already losing the war for myriad other reasons. Further, allied intelligence, according to IHG, was actually quite poor. They would bomb targets thinking they destroyed them, thus damaging productive capacity, whenthey really did nothing of the sort. Albert Speer mocked this as "throwing away success when it was already in their hands." Even with bombing, sacrifice and discipline allowed many german factories to fulfill orders anyway. Many factories went underground, and while this hurt expansion, like I mentioned, much production was fulfilled anyway, and it just made it harder for the allies to destroy them. As is to be noted, and mentioned previously, only in the late 44 and 45 did bombing strategy change and becomming truely effective, but once again, by then, it was too late. Finally, they lost their valuable fuel depots and production went down. This was after many, many unsuccessful raids over 4 years.
Bombing was important, but not nearly as effective, like I said. It did disrupt production to an extent and the delivery of goods, but to act as if it were the "war winner," is false by any stretch. Speer wrote: "the allied bomber campaign was the greatest lost battle of the war."
Now, you could say that bombing had more of an impact on citizen morale. It did to an extent, but that was also not as significant as you might think. The bombing didn't break the moral in Germany, and, since they weren't running the war, and a huge percentage of those in industry were slaves and concentration-camp workers anyway, it contributed little. Discipline quelled many of these problems to an extent. Morale had been reduced by 25% in industries, but that was not by bombing alone, but by a combination of bombing as well as various other elements. Absenteeism was already high in germany prior to the effects of the mass bombing campaign. Most of the production expansion was stopped, but Germany decided to expand too late anyway, instead focusing on less mass-production and more on smaller, isolated firms.
The mass bombings started having an effect so late in the war that it is patently absurd to claim that it "won" the war like some magic bullet. It was important and a part of the whole, but it my comment was that it was not the "game winner." WW2 was not won alone by massive bombing, which came late in the war.