easyt65
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Putting U.N. Sanctions, its 'successes', and how relevant the U.N. has become in perspective:
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http://www.ceip.org/programs/global/semcortrightgomez.htm
'Success of the U.N. Sanctions Era':
....contrary to popular belief, that the sanctions against Iraq have been partially effective—six of the eight propositions in UN Security Council Resolution 687 have been complied with by the Iraqi government… the authorities in Baghdad manipulated the humanitarian impacts for their own political gain… the major powers misused the sanctions instrument (Black Marketing/Oil-for-Food Scandal -- U.N. and outside officials stole Iraqi Oil money, even demanded more be used to pay for their lawyers during the investigation of them stealing the money! 12 years of secretly undermining/breaking the sanctions/resolutions they publicly passed!)
The Yugoslav example is an important case for understanding the requirements for effective enforcement and the significant role sanctions can play in bargaining dynamics. The 1991-early 1994 sanctions were weak. The 1994-1995 sanctions regime was a success because of the highly effective monitoring and enforcement procedures that were developed. In contrast, the 1998 arms embargo was limited and halfhearted in its implementation.
-- Sounds familiar!
The sanctions against Haiti are examined as a case in which hesitation, inconsistency, and a lack of enforcement undermined the political effectiveness of sanctions. The sanctions eventually failed altogether, and the decision was made to opt for a military solution.
The case of Cambodia and the UNITA areas of Angola are examples of sanctions applied against non-state actors. In Cambodia, sanctions combined with a large peacekeeping operation to isolate and weaken the Khmer Rouge and contributed to its decline.
The final three case studies of Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia are examples of ineffective arms embargoes applied against failed states in circumstances of war, genocide, and famine. These sanctions reflect the inability of the Security Council or any other international bodies to provide successful solutions to the crisis of violence and human rights abuses that have plagued sub-Saharan Africa.
Overall Findings
…the limits of the effectiveness of sanctions are due less to inherent shortcomings in the instrument itself than to flaws in the design, implementation, and enforcement… Sanctions must be perceived as a form of coercive persuasion. Sanctions require thoroughness and toughness.
Discussion
Some participants argued that sanctions need to be examined as part of an overall coercive effort—they should be exercised in conjunction with the threat or use of force. One participant referred to studies that have shown that sanctions accompanied with the threat or use of force are more effective than sanctions alone.
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces & Their Success
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/892592.stm
1956: The Middle East
The first peacekeeping force was deployed in the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, at the proposal of Canada's Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson.
However, in 1967, President Nasser of Egypt ordered the UN troops to withdraw. They had no choice but to leave, and within days war broke out again.
1992: Somalia
A year later, in 1995, the UN also withdrew, confessing failure.
1993: Bosnia
In the summer of 1995, lightly-armed peacekeepers stood by powerless as thousands of men in Srebrenica were murdered in what they had been told was a "safe haven".
Rwanda: 1994
The UN has since admitted that it failed to prevent the genocide, and ignored warnings of what was to come.
East Timor: 1999
pro-Jakarta militias managed to destroy most of the country's infrastructure, leaving the UN with an unprecedented challenge to rebuild the country almost from scratch. The UN has found itself in complete control of a country without a government - a job for which it has limited resources and no experience.
Sierra Leone: 2000
When the Nigerian-led force, Ecomog, withdrew because of domestic pressures, the peacekeeping operation descended into chaos.
The UN force was mainly drawn from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia - countries which had little experience of working together, and whose soldiers were badly organised.
Lebanon:
Lebonese Ambassadors assassinated, Iranian-supported terrorists allowed to arm and grow bigger than the Lebonese military, the country enslaved and used as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. The peacekeeping forces sent in relegated to Voyeurs who have watched all of this.
-- Latest conflict, the U.N. negotiates a ceasefire and troops to move in, consisting of Hezzbollah supporters and 200 French Engineers. The 2 Israeli soldiers kidnapped, starting this whole thing, not mandated to be freed - Hezbollah still demands prisoner exchhange, rewarding Hezbollah/hetting what they were after all along!
Up next:
NK with Nukes.
Iranians in Iraq
Hezbollah rebuilding in Lebanon, continued conflict w/Israel
Nuclear Iran
:doh
><><><><><><><><><><><
http://www.ceip.org/programs/global/semcortrightgomez.htm
'Success of the U.N. Sanctions Era':
....contrary to popular belief, that the sanctions against Iraq have been partially effective—six of the eight propositions in UN Security Council Resolution 687 have been complied with by the Iraqi government… the authorities in Baghdad manipulated the humanitarian impacts for their own political gain… the major powers misused the sanctions instrument (Black Marketing/Oil-for-Food Scandal -- U.N. and outside officials stole Iraqi Oil money, even demanded more be used to pay for their lawyers during the investigation of them stealing the money! 12 years of secretly undermining/breaking the sanctions/resolutions they publicly passed!)
The Yugoslav example is an important case for understanding the requirements for effective enforcement and the significant role sanctions can play in bargaining dynamics. The 1991-early 1994 sanctions were weak. The 1994-1995 sanctions regime was a success because of the highly effective monitoring and enforcement procedures that were developed. In contrast, the 1998 arms embargo was limited and halfhearted in its implementation.
-- Sounds familiar!
The sanctions against Haiti are examined as a case in which hesitation, inconsistency, and a lack of enforcement undermined the political effectiveness of sanctions. The sanctions eventually failed altogether, and the decision was made to opt for a military solution.
The case of Cambodia and the UNITA areas of Angola are examples of sanctions applied against non-state actors. In Cambodia, sanctions combined with a large peacekeeping operation to isolate and weaken the Khmer Rouge and contributed to its decline.
The final three case studies of Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia are examples of ineffective arms embargoes applied against failed states in circumstances of war, genocide, and famine. These sanctions reflect the inability of the Security Council or any other international bodies to provide successful solutions to the crisis of violence and human rights abuses that have plagued sub-Saharan Africa.
Overall Findings
…the limits of the effectiveness of sanctions are due less to inherent shortcomings in the instrument itself than to flaws in the design, implementation, and enforcement… Sanctions must be perceived as a form of coercive persuasion. Sanctions require thoroughness and toughness.
Discussion
Some participants argued that sanctions need to be examined as part of an overall coercive effort—they should be exercised in conjunction with the threat or use of force. One participant referred to studies that have shown that sanctions accompanied with the threat or use of force are more effective than sanctions alone.
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces & Their Success
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/892592.stm
1956: The Middle East
The first peacekeeping force was deployed in the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, at the proposal of Canada's Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson.
However, in 1967, President Nasser of Egypt ordered the UN troops to withdraw. They had no choice but to leave, and within days war broke out again.
1992: Somalia
A year later, in 1995, the UN also withdrew, confessing failure.
1993: Bosnia
In the summer of 1995, lightly-armed peacekeepers stood by powerless as thousands of men in Srebrenica were murdered in what they had been told was a "safe haven".
Rwanda: 1994
The UN has since admitted that it failed to prevent the genocide, and ignored warnings of what was to come.
East Timor: 1999
pro-Jakarta militias managed to destroy most of the country's infrastructure, leaving the UN with an unprecedented challenge to rebuild the country almost from scratch. The UN has found itself in complete control of a country without a government - a job for which it has limited resources and no experience.
Sierra Leone: 2000
When the Nigerian-led force, Ecomog, withdrew because of domestic pressures, the peacekeeping operation descended into chaos.
The UN force was mainly drawn from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia - countries which had little experience of working together, and whose soldiers were badly organised.
Lebanon:
Lebonese Ambassadors assassinated, Iranian-supported terrorists allowed to arm and grow bigger than the Lebonese military, the country enslaved and used as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. The peacekeeping forces sent in relegated to Voyeurs who have watched all of this.
-- Latest conflict, the U.N. negotiates a ceasefire and troops to move in, consisting of Hezzbollah supporters and 200 French Engineers. The 2 Israeli soldiers kidnapped, starting this whole thing, not mandated to be freed - Hezbollah still demands prisoner exchhange, rewarding Hezbollah/hetting what they were after all along!
Up next:
NK with Nukes.
Iranians in Iraq
Hezbollah rebuilding in Lebanon, continued conflict w/Israel
Nuclear Iran
:doh
