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It's the summary of a text I read for my political science course.
I used abreviations, it's summarized a lot and there must be some mistakes, but I hope you'll understand.
The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective
by Eva Bellin
Can democracy be imposed by force from the outside?
While it has worked in Japan and Germany, those countries began with a set of endowments that favoured the democratic outcome, some anticipated by democratic theory, but others peculiar to these cases.
These endowments are not replicated in Iraq.
Although military occupation and wise policy choices increase the likelihood of democratization, the outcome is largely shaped by factors that cannot be controlled by military engineers.
The German, Japanese and Iraqi cases are non comparable.
5 starting conditions favoured democracy in J & G, irrespective of foreign intervention.
Several other factors favoured dem. but are specific to the historical context and are unlikely to be replicated in contemporary cases of occupation.
1) Different level of eco development (dem survival is linked to high GNP)
Prior to the WWII, both J & G were highly industrialized great powers, with high GNP and skilled workers. All that was needed after the WWII was an infusion of financial capital.
>< Iraq has never been eco developed, it has no industry and lacks skilled workers to absorb international aid. Even with oil rent, the dev is doomed to be slower.
2) Ethnic homogeneity (prevent the tearing of a country during the conflictual dem process)
J & G were homogeneous ethnically (& sense of nationalism) = fair degree of social solidarity
>< Iraq is deeply divided (Shia, Sunni & Kurdish). Division exacerbated by Saddam’s policies which seized upon those cleavages to solidify its own hold on power = distrust
3) Effective state institutions (state of law delivering fair & predictable order to citizen is a necessity. Order is prior to liberty)
J & G meritocratically organized, effective police force, judiciary and civil service with which to govern. Bureaucracy available, helped the Americans to run the country.
>< Iraq was patrimonially organized, corrupted. Police & judicial system have to be rebuilt.
4) A meaningful prior experience with democracy
J & G knew dem (Weimar & Taisho) => developed party structures, critical press & elections
=> both had political institutions and practices to call upon when building new dem in 1945
>< Iraq is ruled by force since 1958. There is no party institution to resurrect today.
5) Endowment of the democratic project by national leader
Hirohito & Adenauer persuaded their citizen to dem. >< Iraq’s shortage of leaders
+ factors that are not replicable today
Different psychological state: defeat, desperation misery created a critical conjuncture that broke down old conventions and made people receptive to new ideas associated with hope and liberation from death.
>< short war & limited casualties limited the sense of crisis. People are less receptive.
US association with colonial domination and its illegitimacy taint all its political projects.
Different level of commitment : in J & G, US was in it for long haul. Knew they would stay for several years and invest millions in treasure & manpower, because of a deep desire to uproot those hyper aggressive regimes & stop the URSS expansionism. In sum, idealistic commitment to spread democracy as well as realpolitik interests in containing communism
>< slimmer commitment. Rhetorically committed but does not match with interests in Iraq.
Different “dictatorial freedom of occupation”: US had free hands in imposing its policies. Wrote a new constitution, rewrote laws, postponing elections till the old guard is purged and re-established order before putting the new political system to the test.
>< no control on information anymore (internet) & in postcolonial world, there is less acceptance of unilaterally forcing people to be free.
MORE COMPARABLE CASES
1) Haiti: ineffective state institutions (incapable police force…) chaos, no experience with dem, underdeveloped, limited US commitment (stem the flow of refugees rather than democratization) = still chaos & instability today.
2) Bosnia: ethnic cleavage, no experience with democracy. But UN & local commitment (= legitimacy) + long term commitment (10 years). But still ethnic tensions.
Out of 17 cases of US occupation, only 4 gave stable democracy (J, G, Grenada & Panama)
HOW TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ?
A) The “authoritarian culture” is not an insurmountable obstacle to democracy.
B) Democracy may be imposed, as long as the innovations are seen as serving interests, and stay if the state is quickly fixed to international institutions (UN, NATO…)
C) Prosperity must be immediate, so that they associate new institutions with it.
D) The support of leaders like Sistani can be key to successful democratic transition.
Military occupation can foster transition by rectifying state institutions, kick-starting eco dev..
But it needs endowments, such as developed eco, homogeneity, strong state institutions, experience with dem as well as specific factors like the experience of devastating defeat, fear of communist threat and dictatorial freedom of occupation. These conditions are attainable only in the course of long-run occupations
Haiti and Bosnia match better with Iraq, and that is less optimistic
I used abreviations, it's summarized a lot and there must be some mistakes, but I hope you'll understand.
The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective
by Eva Bellin
Can democracy be imposed by force from the outside?
While it has worked in Japan and Germany, those countries began with a set of endowments that favoured the democratic outcome, some anticipated by democratic theory, but others peculiar to these cases.
These endowments are not replicated in Iraq.
Although military occupation and wise policy choices increase the likelihood of democratization, the outcome is largely shaped by factors that cannot be controlled by military engineers.
The German, Japanese and Iraqi cases are non comparable.
5 starting conditions favoured democracy in J & G, irrespective of foreign intervention.
Several other factors favoured dem. but are specific to the historical context and are unlikely to be replicated in contemporary cases of occupation.
1) Different level of eco development (dem survival is linked to high GNP)
Prior to the WWII, both J & G were highly industrialized great powers, with high GNP and skilled workers. All that was needed after the WWII was an infusion of financial capital.
>< Iraq has never been eco developed, it has no industry and lacks skilled workers to absorb international aid. Even with oil rent, the dev is doomed to be slower.
2) Ethnic homogeneity (prevent the tearing of a country during the conflictual dem process)
J & G were homogeneous ethnically (& sense of nationalism) = fair degree of social solidarity
>< Iraq is deeply divided (Shia, Sunni & Kurdish). Division exacerbated by Saddam’s policies which seized upon those cleavages to solidify its own hold on power = distrust
3) Effective state institutions (state of law delivering fair & predictable order to citizen is a necessity. Order is prior to liberty)
J & G meritocratically organized, effective police force, judiciary and civil service with which to govern. Bureaucracy available, helped the Americans to run the country.
>< Iraq was patrimonially organized, corrupted. Police & judicial system have to be rebuilt.
4) A meaningful prior experience with democracy
J & G knew dem (Weimar & Taisho) => developed party structures, critical press & elections
=> both had political institutions and practices to call upon when building new dem in 1945
>< Iraq is ruled by force since 1958. There is no party institution to resurrect today.
5) Endowment of the democratic project by national leader
Hirohito & Adenauer persuaded their citizen to dem. >< Iraq’s shortage of leaders
+ factors that are not replicable today
Different psychological state: defeat, desperation misery created a critical conjuncture that broke down old conventions and made people receptive to new ideas associated with hope and liberation from death.
>< short war & limited casualties limited the sense of crisis. People are less receptive.
US association with colonial domination and its illegitimacy taint all its political projects.
Different level of commitment : in J & G, US was in it for long haul. Knew they would stay for several years and invest millions in treasure & manpower, because of a deep desire to uproot those hyper aggressive regimes & stop the URSS expansionism. In sum, idealistic commitment to spread democracy as well as realpolitik interests in containing communism
>< slimmer commitment. Rhetorically committed but does not match with interests in Iraq.
Different “dictatorial freedom of occupation”: US had free hands in imposing its policies. Wrote a new constitution, rewrote laws, postponing elections till the old guard is purged and re-established order before putting the new political system to the test.
>< no control on information anymore (internet) & in postcolonial world, there is less acceptance of unilaterally forcing people to be free.
MORE COMPARABLE CASES
1) Haiti: ineffective state institutions (incapable police force…) chaos, no experience with dem, underdeveloped, limited US commitment (stem the flow of refugees rather than democratization) = still chaos & instability today.
2) Bosnia: ethnic cleavage, no experience with democracy. But UN & local commitment (= legitimacy) + long term commitment (10 years). But still ethnic tensions.
Out of 17 cases of US occupation, only 4 gave stable democracy (J, G, Grenada & Panama)
HOW TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ?
A) The “authoritarian culture” is not an insurmountable obstacle to democracy.
B) Democracy may be imposed, as long as the innovations are seen as serving interests, and stay if the state is quickly fixed to international institutions (UN, NATO…)
C) Prosperity must be immediate, so that they associate new institutions with it.
D) The support of leaders like Sistani can be key to successful democratic transition.
Military occupation can foster transition by rectifying state institutions, kick-starting eco dev..
But it needs endowments, such as developed eco, homogeneity, strong state institutions, experience with dem as well as specific factors like the experience of devastating defeat, fear of communist threat and dictatorial freedom of occupation. These conditions are attainable only in the course of long-run occupations
Haiti and Bosnia match better with Iraq, and that is less optimistic
