Rumsfeld, in an interview with Fox News Channel, said he had not anticipated the strength of the insurgency "because no one has a perfect view into the future."
Administration critics have offered a different explanation: "In the planning phase, officials played down potential postwar problems partly in order to garner support for launching the war," writes Dominic Johnson in a forthcoming book, Overconfidence and War. Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says U.S. policymakers weren't interested in intelligence warnings about postwar difficulties and "may sometimes have discouraged such analysis."
The intelligence warnings of guerrilla war in Iraq came as a result of questions being raised by analysts at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Army and National Ground Intelligence Center, according to Army documents and a senior U.S. intelligence official with access to the prewar warnings. The official declined to speak publicly because he was discussing classified material.
Two reports by the National Intelligence Council, a group of senior analysts that pools assessments from across the nation's intelligence community, warned Bush in January 2003, two months before the invasion, that the conflict could spark factional violence and an anti-U.S. insurgency, the official said. One of the reports said the U.S.-led occupation could "increase popular sympathy for terrorist objectives." Similarly sober warnings by the CIA went to senior administration officials and Congress as part of daily intelligence summaries, the intelligence official said.