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I wrote this paper for a class, but I wanted to post it here as well. It desribes the need not to get rid of the electoral college, but also the need to reform it to make it a more democratic institution. Please comment if you want.
Reforming the Electoral College
Although it does not adequately address modern-day political realities such as national media campaigns, sharp regional divisions, and a strong two party system, the electoral college should not be abolished and replaced by popular voting. Rather, its basic structure should be maintained to preserve the political voice it affords small population states, and modified to ensure that it does not unnecessarily dilute the will of the majority.
The framers conceived the electoral college as a compromise between congressional selection and popular election of the president (Abbott 11). Each state was to choose electors equal to the number of senators and representatives it was allotted in the congress; the electors, in turn, were to select the president and vice president. If no candidate received a majority of the votes, the House of Representatives was to select from among the five top candidates (U.S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1). The framers did not seek the "best" system, but rather one that "command(ed) a majority of the convention," and got the issue "done with" (Abbott 11). They deemed the compromise on which they settled "if . . . not perfect, . . . at least excellent" because it allowed the general populace to have a say in election of the president, but entrusted the ultimate decision to men who possessed the information necessary to make an informed choice (Federalist 68).
Almost immediately, problems emerged. The framers did not contemplate that political parties would play a role in deciding elections (Kimberling 4), and the electoral college was not effective in addressing the competition between parties that developed (Abbott 12). Because each elector cast two votes for president, with the runner-up becoming vice president, the initial electoral college vote for president in 1800 resulted in a tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr of the Democratic-Republican Party. This led to passage of the 12th Amendment, which required that each elector cast one vote for president and a separate vote for vice president (Kimberling 4).
Tension between indirect and direct popular election remained. In each of the elections of 1824, 1876 and 1888, the winner of the popular vote lost in the electoral college (Garand/Parent 1). In this century, a series of close elections – in 1960 (Kennedy/Nixon), 1968 (Nixon/Humphrey), 1976 (Carter/Ford), 2000 (Bush/Gore) and 2004 (Bush/Kerry) – led to increased calls for electoral college reform (Hively). In 2000, the winner of the popular vote once again lost in the electoral college, fueling calls for its elimination (Turner). Shortly after the 2000 election, several senators and representatives sponsored a constitutional amendment to replace the electoral college with direct popular voting (Rakove 202). Although abolishing the electoral college and electing the president directly has frequently been proposed (Abbott 135), such an approach would deprive the country of the benefits of the electoral college system. The better approach is to retain the electoral college, but modify the method by which votes are allocated to candidates.
If the electoral college were abolished and the president directly elected, smaller states would lose virtually all voice in the election. While critics of the electoral college assert that it is a classic example of “malapportionment,” they fail to realize that historically only eight states have received a share of the electoral vote equivalent to their population (Abbott 78). The imbalance between the representation of small and large states, therefore, is far less than commonly thought. While small states are, to some extent, overrepresented (Abramson 63), the framers believed that this was the only way to insure that the president was the “leader of the whole nation, and not just a particularly densely populated region” (Cooper). What the founders did not anticipate was the emergence of a two-party system, in which candidates and campaigns expend resources in states where they have a good chance of winning, and ignore states where they do not (Turner 122). With a winner-take-all electoral college, political parties and campaigns have no incentive to campaign for votes in states where their candidate is marginal, because all of the electoral votes will be allocated to the prevailing candidate (Rakove 96). Similarly, candidates in a direct election system would campaign only in the most populous states (Abbott 136). Were the electoral college retained, however, but its procedures modified to provide for proportional voting in each state, campaigns would allocate resources differently and contest the election in a greater number of states (Turner 120). The result would be the election of a president with broader and more geographically diverse support – precisely the result the framers sought.
The current winner-take-all system and direct election of the president share an additional disadvantage: they suppress voter turnout. In a winner-take-all system, voters in non-competitive states are less likely to go to the polls because they know that their state's electoral votes will be allocated to the candidate who garners a majority, and their vote will not "count" (Abramson 90). One commentator has described this phenomenon as follows: “Depending on where a person lives, (his) vote might have enormous importance . . . or it might have no impact at all” (Abbott 95). Three-fourths of small states are not competitive; only a fourth are moderately competitive or “decided by narrow vote margins” (Abbott 81). Thus, a winner-takes-all system clearly suppresses voter turnout. Similarly, were the president to be elected directly, individual voters would appreciate that their votes counted less because they were part of one large, national electorate than if their votes were counted on a statewide basis (Hively).
Currently, campaigns categorize states as "base," "marginal," or "battleground," consider the number of electoral votes they represent, and allocate advertising and candidate resources accordingly (Turner 122). Were electoral college votes to be allocated proportionally within a state according to the popular vote a candidate received, campaigns would have to reassess their resource allocation formula, visit more states, and expend advertising dollars in a larger number of states (Turner 122). Broader, more geographically dispersed campaigns would, in turn, generate higher levels of voter participation (Abramson 56, Dover 35). The 2000 election is instructive in this regard. Forty million votes in 2000 did not count because of they were cast in non-contested states. Had electoral college votes had been apportioned proportionally, however, these votes would have had a significant effect on the outcome of the election (McGarth).
As can be seen, the disadvantages inherent in the electoral college system can be addressed through modification of the manner in which electoral votes are apportioned within the states. Modification is preferable to abolition, since eliminating the college would deprive the country of important benefits the structure provides. One of the most critical of these is the aura of legitimacy that the electoral college vote affords a winning candidate. In this era of sharply divided electorates, the electoral college reinforces the concept of majoritarian rule, transforming small popular vote margins into "exaggerated electoral majorities," and creating a mandate for the popular vote winner (Garand/Parent 20; Dover 33; Turner; Best 14). In this way, the electoral college "serve as a catalyst for rapid policy change under certain circumstances" and "counteract some of the more incremental tendencies built into the U.S. political process" (Garand/Parent 20).
As an example, although President Clinton garnered only a plurality of the vote (49.2%) in 1996, he received a solid majority of the electoral vote (70.0%). Based on the electoral college vote, the American people concluded that his popular backing was more substantial than it actually was (Wikipedia-US Pres. Election 1996). Similarly, in 1960, although President Kennedy barely won the popular vote, his margin in the electoral college was significant (Wikipedia-US Pres. Election 1960). This phenomenon not only lends an air of legitimacy to the successful candidate, no matter how slim his margin of victory, but also avoids the specter of a national recount in close elections that would inevitably follow adoption of a direct election system (Abramson 53). Finally, the electoral college tends to prevent deadlock by ensuring that one candidate receives a majority; as a result, elections are infrequently, if ever, thrown to the House of Representatives for decision (Best 13).
Reforming the Electoral College
Although it does not adequately address modern-day political realities such as national media campaigns, sharp regional divisions, and a strong two party system, the electoral college should not be abolished and replaced by popular voting. Rather, its basic structure should be maintained to preserve the political voice it affords small population states, and modified to ensure that it does not unnecessarily dilute the will of the majority.
The framers conceived the electoral college as a compromise between congressional selection and popular election of the president (Abbott 11). Each state was to choose electors equal to the number of senators and representatives it was allotted in the congress; the electors, in turn, were to select the president and vice president. If no candidate received a majority of the votes, the House of Representatives was to select from among the five top candidates (U.S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1). The framers did not seek the "best" system, but rather one that "command(ed) a majority of the convention," and got the issue "done with" (Abbott 11). They deemed the compromise on which they settled "if . . . not perfect, . . . at least excellent" because it allowed the general populace to have a say in election of the president, but entrusted the ultimate decision to men who possessed the information necessary to make an informed choice (Federalist 68).
Almost immediately, problems emerged. The framers did not contemplate that political parties would play a role in deciding elections (Kimberling 4), and the electoral college was not effective in addressing the competition between parties that developed (Abbott 12). Because each elector cast two votes for president, with the runner-up becoming vice president, the initial electoral college vote for president in 1800 resulted in a tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr of the Democratic-Republican Party. This led to passage of the 12th Amendment, which required that each elector cast one vote for president and a separate vote for vice president (Kimberling 4).
Tension between indirect and direct popular election remained. In each of the elections of 1824, 1876 and 1888, the winner of the popular vote lost in the electoral college (Garand/Parent 1). In this century, a series of close elections – in 1960 (Kennedy/Nixon), 1968 (Nixon/Humphrey), 1976 (Carter/Ford), 2000 (Bush/Gore) and 2004 (Bush/Kerry) – led to increased calls for electoral college reform (Hively). In 2000, the winner of the popular vote once again lost in the electoral college, fueling calls for its elimination (Turner). Shortly after the 2000 election, several senators and representatives sponsored a constitutional amendment to replace the electoral college with direct popular voting (Rakove 202). Although abolishing the electoral college and electing the president directly has frequently been proposed (Abbott 135), such an approach would deprive the country of the benefits of the electoral college system. The better approach is to retain the electoral college, but modify the method by which votes are allocated to candidates.
If the electoral college were abolished and the president directly elected, smaller states would lose virtually all voice in the election. While critics of the electoral college assert that it is a classic example of “malapportionment,” they fail to realize that historically only eight states have received a share of the electoral vote equivalent to their population (Abbott 78). The imbalance between the representation of small and large states, therefore, is far less than commonly thought. While small states are, to some extent, overrepresented (Abramson 63), the framers believed that this was the only way to insure that the president was the “leader of the whole nation, and not just a particularly densely populated region” (Cooper). What the founders did not anticipate was the emergence of a two-party system, in which candidates and campaigns expend resources in states where they have a good chance of winning, and ignore states where they do not (Turner 122). With a winner-take-all electoral college, political parties and campaigns have no incentive to campaign for votes in states where their candidate is marginal, because all of the electoral votes will be allocated to the prevailing candidate (Rakove 96). Similarly, candidates in a direct election system would campaign only in the most populous states (Abbott 136). Were the electoral college retained, however, but its procedures modified to provide for proportional voting in each state, campaigns would allocate resources differently and contest the election in a greater number of states (Turner 120). The result would be the election of a president with broader and more geographically diverse support – precisely the result the framers sought.
The current winner-take-all system and direct election of the president share an additional disadvantage: they suppress voter turnout. In a winner-take-all system, voters in non-competitive states are less likely to go to the polls because they know that their state's electoral votes will be allocated to the candidate who garners a majority, and their vote will not "count" (Abramson 90). One commentator has described this phenomenon as follows: “Depending on where a person lives, (his) vote might have enormous importance . . . or it might have no impact at all” (Abbott 95). Three-fourths of small states are not competitive; only a fourth are moderately competitive or “decided by narrow vote margins” (Abbott 81). Thus, a winner-takes-all system clearly suppresses voter turnout. Similarly, were the president to be elected directly, individual voters would appreciate that their votes counted less because they were part of one large, national electorate than if their votes were counted on a statewide basis (Hively).
Currently, campaigns categorize states as "base," "marginal," or "battleground," consider the number of electoral votes they represent, and allocate advertising and candidate resources accordingly (Turner 122). Were electoral college votes to be allocated proportionally within a state according to the popular vote a candidate received, campaigns would have to reassess their resource allocation formula, visit more states, and expend advertising dollars in a larger number of states (Turner 122). Broader, more geographically dispersed campaigns would, in turn, generate higher levels of voter participation (Abramson 56, Dover 35). The 2000 election is instructive in this regard. Forty million votes in 2000 did not count because of they were cast in non-contested states. Had electoral college votes had been apportioned proportionally, however, these votes would have had a significant effect on the outcome of the election (McGarth).
As can be seen, the disadvantages inherent in the electoral college system can be addressed through modification of the manner in which electoral votes are apportioned within the states. Modification is preferable to abolition, since eliminating the college would deprive the country of important benefits the structure provides. One of the most critical of these is the aura of legitimacy that the electoral college vote affords a winning candidate. In this era of sharply divided electorates, the electoral college reinforces the concept of majoritarian rule, transforming small popular vote margins into "exaggerated electoral majorities," and creating a mandate for the popular vote winner (Garand/Parent 20; Dover 33; Turner; Best 14). In this way, the electoral college "serve
As an example, although President Clinton garnered only a plurality of the vote (49.2%) in 1996, he received a solid majority of the electoral vote (70.0%). Based on the electoral college vote, the American people concluded that his popular backing was more substantial than it actually was (Wikipedia-US Pres. Election 1996). Similarly, in 1960, although President Kennedy barely won the popular vote, his margin in the electoral college was significant (Wikipedia-US Pres. Election 1960). This phenomenon not only lends an air of legitimacy to the successful candidate, no matter how slim his margin of victory, but also avoids the specter of a national recount in close elections that would inevitably follow adoption of a direct election system (Abramson 53). Finally, the electoral college tends to prevent deadlock by ensuring that one candidate receives a majority; as a result, elections are infrequently, if ever, thrown to the House of Representatives for decision (Best 13).