Invading other countries for the purpose of forcibly installing communist governments is counter to Soviet ideology.
The Marxist-Leninist ideology that guided the Soviet Union held that communist revolution wasn't just desired, it was inevitable. There was no need to export the revolution, because it would just happen by itself. They of course would support other communists across the world, as they did in Spain and China, and after WWII they elevated pre-existing communist parties in Eastern Europe to position's in power. Decades later they would go to war in Afghanistan to support the communist government there.
So invading other countries just for the purpose of installing communist government's is counter to what the Soviets believe, which is that they don't need to do that, because communist revolution will inevitably happen anyway. And they didn't. Finland and the Baltics had nothing to do with exporting communism. Putting communists in power in Eastern Europe was just the easiest way to ensure compliance.
The unbiased assessment, or the objective reality as the Soviets liked to call it, was that strategic concerns have always trumped moral quandaries. When faced with a dilemma of the two the strategic issues always take priority.
The UK flat out invaded Iceland during WWII after the Icelandic government refused to join the Allies. It was a completely illegal invasion by any definition, but of course no one really objected.
I don't see how. The ability to meaningfully target Soviet industry and resources is beyond the capability of the IJA.
No, it really isn't.
German planning for the invasion had been finalized by June and German forces were being put in position months before the Pact was signed. I see no evidence to suggest the invasion was contingent on the MRP when it was being planned and prepared long before the negotiations were even underway, which didn't start until August 10-12th. The invasion had been laid out in April and final operational planning concluded on June 15th, with German troops mobilizing the week after.
Invading other countries for the purpose of forcibly installing communist governments is counter to Soviet ideology.
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German planning for the invasion had been finalized by June and German forces were being put in position months before the Pact was signed. I see no evidence to suggest the invasion was contingent on the MRP when it was being planned and prepared long before the negotiations were even underway, which didn't start until August 10-12th. The invasion had been laid out in April and final operational planning concluded on June 15th, with German troops mobilizing the week after.
Cont.
Germany invaded Poland on September 3rd, on September 7th Stalin ordered all comintern members to cease criticizing Germany, and on Sept 9th he cabled Berlin that Soviet forces would militarily occupy the Soviet "sphere of influence" in eastern Poland. What followed then was a Soviet war of expansion against Finland, and the invasions of the Baltic states, as well as the occupation of Northern Bukovina, Hertza, and Bessarabia.
It is plausible, even likely, that had the Soviets stuck with the triple alliance and let it be known from the outset that an invasion of Poland would have triggered Soviet support for Poland that Hitler would have been deterred. Clearly he was very intent on securing non-intervention and willing to give the Soviets a wide "sphere of influence" to do what they wished.
I'm not trying the equate the war aims of France with that of Germany. Obviously France wasn't interested in conquering her neighbors, occupying them, and claiming them as her own. I'm just saying that they are a real threat. If you're Germany and trying to become independent of these nations that hate you, then it makes sense that you want to defend yourself from that. It doesn't justify invading France. By no means! I'm just saying that I'm not opposed in principle to defense spending in this context.
But they don't hate Germany. French and British attitudes towards Germany, especially in the 1930s up until after Munich were exceptionally forgiving. The actual threat posed by France to Germany is minimal. Poland would be seen as a bigger problem.
To the contrary, if the plans and German forces were in place months before Pact was finally negotiated and signed, then it would seem the invasion was contingent on the MRP. Why else would Hitler wait over the summer campaign season, and increasingly solicit Stalin, EXCEPT to insure a non-aggression pact?
If you're a German after experiencing WWI and the Occupation of the Ruhr, how do you view the French? Wouldn't you think that they hate you?
Not a rhetorical question. How would Germans have viewed the French at this time?
Major cope alert.
And I'm not going to defend the UK here. They were fine firebombing civilians. There's no innocent country in the entire war. But there are some that are far better than others.
Is that true if the US continues to supply oil?
Given how militaries plan ahead for lots of contingencies and scenarios, this isn't really convincing to me. Obviously they wanted to invade Poland, but having plans ahead of time doesn't mean that they're going to do it even without the pact.
It is plausible, even likely, that had the Soviets stuck with the triple alliance and let it be known from the outset that an invasion of Poland would have triggered Soviet support for Poland that Hitler would have been deterred.
The German people overall were not at all pleased with the idea of returning to war as evident by their reaction to the Czech crisis, and that didn't appear to change until after the success of the Wehrmacht between 1939-1940.
Besides, French actions towards Germany starting in the 1930s hardly gave the impression of disdain. Doing nothing to stop the militarization of the Ruhr, forgiving reparations and trying to secure trade agreements and deals doesn't come across as a nation bent on revenge. Germany, on the other hand...
That's not what I asked. I asked what was the German view of France.
Again that's not what I asked. I'll ask it again, "How would Germans have viewed the French at this time"?
Look at the picture and tell me where the substantial reduction is.
There's no real significant drop until WWII.
Then what do you make of this quote?
You're talking about the work during the war while I'm taking about the one before the war.
Do you know what I call going from 22% unemployment, to 14% unemployment temporarily, then back up to 17% unemployment nearly a decade later? Stagnation.
Sounds like
Did you forget something?
I never said it dropped because the US entered the war. It dropped because of the war and the US supplying arms to its allies....
...in 1940 unemployment was still above 14%....
...my claim is that since the Red Army invaded Germany, occupied it, and never relinquished control, that there's a good possibility that they were always going to invade it.
The US relinquished control of Germany.
No it didn't
US unemployment was already dropping. Certainly the war was a boom time for US industry, but it wasn't necessary to pull the US economy out of depression...it was already coming out.
The UK economy was coming out of depression by 1938
What is so hard to understand ?
But falling
US manufacturing output was rising
The USSR did indeed relinquish control of East Germany...have you not seen pictures of Germans breaking down the Berlin Wall ?
Besides this is irrelevant.
You cannot make a claim that the USSR always planned to invade Germany based on the political position it took in the post war period.
The USSR didn't occupy East Germany (and the rest of Eastern Europe) just because it could, it did so to create a protective buffer against Western invasion.
As I explained to you, the USSR actually withdrew from one Eastern European country (Romania) because the Romanian communist party had such an iron grip over the country, it wasn't felt necessary to station Soviet troops there to ensure it remained in the Soviet sphere of influence.
There is no evidence that I'm aware of that the USSR ever planned to invade Germany prior to the outbreak of war.
If what you say is true, then there should be a plan or two proving it...or at the very least a few memoirs from Red Army commanders. But there isn't.
Stalin never planned to invade the West.
Yes, after war was declared AND the USSR started to win it...Stalin wanted to grab control over as much land as possible.
When Stalin was congratulated by the British official, over the performance of his armed forces in taking Berlin, he remarked that Tsar Alexander had reached the Seine.
If the German invasion is contingent on Soviet collusion then why is the start date of August 25th kept throughout negotiations? The invasion's planned start date on the 25th was quite literally cancelled at the last minute, but this was two days after the MRP had been signed.
So why doesn't the invasion date change or remain vague until the MRP has been signed? The fact that the original date was planned and kept up until after the pact had been signed leads to only two possible conclusions:
A) Hitler is so confident of Soviet agreement that it isn't a concern, which begs the question as to why your writing implies Hitler was desperate to secure an agreement.
Or
B)The invasion is not dependent on the MRP.
Or C) The invasion target date is not set in stone, and could be delayed or canceled if the diplomatic requirements were not attained in time (as demonstrated by Hitler's own quick decision to delay the date made on August 25, likely due to a new British Security Agreement with Poland).
First, I am not arguing the Polish invasion was indisputably contingent to a signed pact...
....Soviet demands if made at the last minute (Stalin demanded all of Latvia and got it).
Last, the fact that the Germans were unclear as to if and when the Soviets would occupy their spheres of influence is due to the fact that the Soviets never signaled till Sept 9th what they would do so - and that was in response to Hitler's encouragement to occupy the east of Poland (so as to eliminate the retreating poles).
So no, the Soviets were often secretive and could do the unexpected and that didn't make them reliable allies, or reliable suppliers of raw materials, but being reliable allies that was not the essential purpose of the pact. The essential purpose (for Hitler) was to secure neutrality and mutual advantage so as to preclude the possibility of serious Soviet assistance or outright military opposition.
In short, without sufficient assurances, such embodied in the MRP, Hitler may not have gambled. But he got what he thought he needed, and the rest is history.
snip
There's no real significant drop until WWII.
Then what do you make of this quote?
Do you know what I call going from 22% unemployment, to 14% unemployment temporarily, then back up to 17% unemployment nearly a decade later? Stagnation.
Except there is.
You're talking about the work during the war while I'm taking about the one before the war.
And your solution is insanely short sighted policies that will only lead to further trouble down the road. Something you continue to refuse to acknowledge despite the wealth of information revealing just how bad Germany's economy was heading as a result of Nazi planning.
It's like stuffing your face full of fast food for every meal and then complaining when your health suffers. You can't finance an entire country on 90 day loans. Not forever.
I've read different accounts as to the cause of the delay, which for some remain uncertain. However, both the Italian announcement and the British-Polish announcement of a firmer alliance for war likely prompted Hitler to desire some breathing space to consider these new developments.It's interesting to note that according to Dennis Showalter and Harold C. Deutsch Hitler's cancelling was due primarily to the news from Mussolini that Italy would remain neutral in the event of a war with Poland. This both makes sense and is confusing, sensible in that Hitler's staunchest ally announcing his neutrality would give Hitler pause, confusing as to what Hitler expected his ally to actually do against Poland.
Frankly, the flurry of diplomatic activity by the German side is perplexing, especially so if the war was inevitable. Significant progress was made during those discussions, with Germany's demands being aggressive but much less than what they would attain by invasion. Whether it was last minute cold feet by Hitler to explore options, or a ruse to lull the allies into being unguarded (which it did) I am uncertain. But whatever the reason, the campaign season was at an end and choices had to be made.... I would argue that given the flurry of diplomatic activity without mention of the possibility of delaying the invasion in the event of a Soviet fallout to be indicative of more or less the inevitability the invasion of Poland. ... that for Hitler at least, the invasion of Poland took priority over the importance of a Soviet agreement. ...Hitler's private admission that the invasion of Poland was actually for the purpose of seizing living space, which to Hitler was vital.
Geoffery Roberts in his article (and later expanded into a book) "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany" gives the most detailed review that I have read. Normally I would have been very suspect of any thesis that suggested Stalin was less calculating, purposeful, and strategic on the fate of Poland than the Germans, but I admit that he has convinced me on many of his views. In his article (link below):I'm curious for the justification of this, seeing as Hitler's preferred outcome of the conflict (at least as late as September 12th) was for what remained of Poland to form a rump state, almost certainly under German control.
The foregoing evidence can also be read as demonstrating German anxiety about whether the Soviet Union would keep to its side of the partition bargain. However, and this is the third documentary clue, on 3 September Ribbentrop telegraphed the following instruction to Schulenburg:
We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish army decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the territory that was fixed at Moscow as a German sphere of interest under military occupation. We would naturally, however. for military reasons, also have to proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest. Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would not only be a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.
I'm not doubting that had overt Soviet efforts been made to indicate that they would come to the assistance of Poland that Hitler might've yielded, but I'm also not convinced that the assurances of Soviet assistance of neutrality or support were equally vital. After all, Soviet-Polish relations at this point are poor, and everything we know of Stalin's actions between 1939 until June 22, 1941 all give the impression he was very determined to avoid conflict with Germany. Absent any kind of clear Soviet intent to oppose Hitler's actions towards Poland however I find it difficult to believe the invasion would be halted or otherwise stopped.
In short, while I don't disagree with the notion that Hitler might've backed down had Stalin presented overtly his intention to support Poland and the Western Allies, given the unlikeliness of this happening I don't believe it's realistic to suggest the invasion of Poland was dependent on the signing of the MRP.
Certainly there was little reason to believe the Soviets would come to the aid of Poland out of good faith; Soviet-Polish relations were poor and up until 1938-1939 most of Poland's defensive planning was geared towards the Soviets.
In the issue of fairness it's not entirely surprising the Soviets and Western Allies weren't able to reach an agreement. The USSR in the 1930s and was viewed similar to how we view North Korea today, and given what happened to Czechoslovakia it's not shocking that Stalin didn't have much faith in French and British resolve. Their inaction after Fall Weiss, while somewhat justified, did little to validate it.
Stalin's foreign policy, and indeed for much of the Soviet Union's history, was predicated on avoiding costly conflicts after all. Despite smashing the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol the aftermath was not further campaigns in Manchuria but a non-aggression pact. Soviet support for the Communists in China ultimately never involved the full weight of Soviet intervention and ended in treaty. The Soviets, at the very least Stalin, seemed very intent on avoiding conflict with Germany. Given the state of the Red Army at the time, that doesn't seem too surprising.
Therefore given the circumstances of the time and factors at play, I see the only way that would've stopped Hitler from invading Poland to also be the least likely to occur.
And lastly, while I concur with you had an agreement between East and West been reached to save Poland, if there ever was a world leader driven/insane enough to plunge into war regardless of the imbalance of power against him, it would be Adolf Hitler. He did just that, after all.
Where is it on the graph I keep posting? Show us.
Tooze specifically "before the war started."
You actually can if you are the issuer of a currency.
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