Aluminum Tubes
Our investigation has found that President Bush and members of his Administration made numerous false statements that Iraq was seeking to acquire aluminum tubes in order to build a uranium centrifuge and leaked classified information to the press in order to further buttress their arguments for war. Members of the Bush Administration appear to have ignored reports and information provided by at least five agencies and foreign intelligence sources, including:
several reports by the Department of Energy which found that the tubes were “too narrow, too heavy, to long - to be of much practical use in a centrifuge.
State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], which considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose. ”
The Defense Department which found the tubes “were perfectly usable for rockets.”
British Intelligence which found the tubes would require “substantial reengineering” to serve as centrifuges.
The International Atomic Energy Agency which found “all evidence points to that this is for the rockets ” a one-page summary of National Intelligence Estimate personally delivered to President Bush in October, 2002, concluding that both the Energy and State Departments believed the aluminum tubes were “intended for conventional weapons.”
Statements by the Vice President and Ms. Rice that they knew about Iraq ’s proposed use of the tubes for centrifuges with “absolute certainty” and that the tubes were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programs” are particularly questionable, since the dispute within the Administration has been described as a “holy war” and Administration sources have stated that Ms. Rice “was aware of the differences of opinion” and that her statements were “just a lie. ”
The evidence also shows that a September 8 lead article in The New York Times and a July 29, 2002 article in The Washington Times included classified
information leaked by Administration officials. Among other things, The New York Times article quoted “anonymous” Administration officials as stating that “Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb;” and The Washington Times article stated, “U.S. intelligence agencies believe the tubing is an essential component of Iraq ’s plans to enrich radioactive uranium to the point where it could be used to fashion a nuclear bomb.” Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald has also filed documents detailing that President Bush authorized the leaking of classified information to the press in order to undermine Ambassador Wilson.
Acquisition of Uranium from Niger
We have found that President Bush and members of his Administration made numerous false statements that Iraq had sought to acquire enriched uranium from Niger. In particular, President Bush ’s statements and certifications before and to Congress may constitute Making a False Statement to Congress in violation of 18 U.S.C. Q 1001.
There is evidence that members of the Bush Administration, including the Vice
President, have elevated intelligence information which supports this claim without adequate scrutiny, and may have applied undue pressure to intelligence officials to reach these conclusions. Among other things, a former high level CIA official has stated that when CIA personnel were unable to verify these claims Cheney became dissatisfied and it “was the beginning of what turned out to be a year-long tug-of-war between the C.I.A and the Vice-President ’s office; ” another senior official reported that CIA analysts got “pounded on, day after day ” on these issues; two former CIA officials explained that information on the charge was “passed directly to Washington without vetting them in the [U.S.] Embassy ” in Rome; and former CIA agent Tyler Drumheller told 60 Minutes “[t]he war in Iraq was coming. And they [the Administration] were looking for intelligence to fit into that policy. ”
The Bush Administration ignored numerous, contrary intelligence findings making these false statements, including:
Ambassador Wilson’s finding that “no one had signed such a document.” the CIA’s warning to to Ms. Rice directly that “the evidence is weak. ” the State Department ’s finding that the charges were “highly dubious.” statements by French Intelligence authorities that the story “doesn’t make any sense.” The conclusion of the National Intelligence Council, delivered to the White House January, 2003, that the Niger uranium claim was unequivocally false.
The President’s own statement in his State of the Union that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa ” is particularly difficult to defend, given that, among other the CIA had told the President ’s staff before his October 7, 2002 speech that President should not be a fact witness on this [Niger-Uranium] issue; ” the CIA raised several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence ” before the of the Union; and after the speech his Administration informed the UN it “cannot confirm [the uranium] reports ” (which the IAEA quickly found to be “not authentic”).
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Our investigation has found that President Bush and members of his Administration have made numerous false statements regarding Iraq ’s Chemical and biological weapons capability. These include false statements regarding Iraq ’s possession of chemical weapons generally; a charge by an Iraqi defector that he had helped bury significant amounts of chemical and other weapons; the existence of mobile chemical weapons laboratories; and Iraq ’s ability to deliver such weapons using unmanned aerial vehicles.
We have found evidence that members of the Bush Administration made misleading statements regarding Iraq ’s chemical weapons capability generally, even though they were aware of contrary intelligence provide by the DIA, the CIA, and the Department. Among other things, the September 2002 DIA report found“[tlhere reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has or will establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities;” as early as 1995 the CIA had been informed that “after the gulf war, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stock; ’ and the State Department ’s INR flagged many of Secretary Powell ’s statements regarding chemical weapons as“ weak.” There is also evidence the Administration ’s September 2002 statement an Iraqi defector, Adnan lhsan Saeed al-Haeder, had secretly helped bury tons of biological and chemical weapons was also knowingly and recklessly made, as the CIA determined by December 2001 that “the intelligence officer concluded that al-Haideri made up the entire story, apparently in the hopes of securing a visa. ”
Further, there is evidence of the misleading nature of the Bush Administration ’s mis-statements regarding mobile chemical weapons laboratories by virtue of the fact they ignored numerous contrary information provided by the German and British Intelligence, as well as CIA officials. Among other things, German Intelligence informed the Administration“[tlhis [Curveball] was not substantial evidence . . . [w]e clear we could not verify the things he said; ”British Intelligence officials informed the CIA they are “not convinced that Curveball is a wholly reliable source; ” shortly before Mr. Powell ’s speech, the CIA doctor who had met with Curveball that he “was deemed a fabricator, ” only to be told by his superior that “this going to happen regardless of what Curveball said or didn ’t say.” Given the and credibility of these concerns, it is particularly difficult to defend the President’s statement in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address that as a of information provided by defectors “we know that Iraq, in the late199Os, had several mobile biological weapons labs. designed to produce germ warfare agents can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. ”
Finally in this regard, there is also evidence that then Secretary of State Powell and President Bush also made knowingly or recklessly false claims regarding Iraq ’s unmanned aerial vehicles. Contrary to their assertions, the Air Force was found to“not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents; ” while the CIA “believed that the attempted purchase of the mapping software. may have been inadvertent. ” . .
