You are assuming that disallowing gay marriage is unfair, in order to resolve the issue of whether or not it's unfair that gays are not allowed to marry. You are not proving that it's unfair, because you can't prove that it's unfair, because "fair" and "unfair" are completely meaningless concepts. They are entirely predicated upon your own moral beliefs, which you are stubbornly hiding behind the conclusions you've already reached.
Is it fair that gays are not allowed to marry? I'd have to say that depends entirely on whether they should be allowed to marry or not. And that's a case we have to argue on grounds other than whether it's "fair" or not, because that's begging the question.
Ahh, now I have a much clearer picture of what you are trying to say (I admit to some confusion earlier, as I was reading your reply at the office - slow work day, fortunately). Allow me to demonstrate why the argument is not begging the question, as I am not assuming what I wish to prove - it's been proven.
The argument for inclusion is that gay and lesbians participate in our society by playing by the same rules the rest of us do. Their labor and taxes contribute to the social system in the same way, yet they do not recieve the same benefits. This situation presents a simple matter of fairness. Marriage is a legal status that entitles those who enter into it a range of benefits, and therefore it is not fair to deny those benefits to gays and lesbians by enacting laws to prevent them from obtaining access to that institution when they contribute equally to the system that makes those benefits possible. The argument for exclusion - usually based on religious beliefs on homosexuality - also appeals to fairness, but maintains the opposite, that denying homosexuals the right to marry is not being unfair. Regardless of which belief you subscribe to, there is always that issue of fairness.
When we were discussing qualifications, you mentioned that "this is already the case. I am not 'imposing' any kind of qualifications on marriage and all of the laws are already on the books"(page 38). This was in response to my words, that "these qualifications need to be laid out, they must be fair, and every individual regardless of sexual orientation should be held to that qualification" (page 36). Notice that 'fairness' is what both sides appeal to here - one side saying it is fair for inclusion, one side claiming it is fair for exclusion. Both sides appeal to fairness, and indeed, that is one aspect of the philosophical reasoning behind my mention of it.
Your argument is that what is 'fair' is subjective, which is true to some degree (more on this later), but your mistake comes when you attempt to rationalize this as indicative of 'question begging', or assuming what I am trying to prove. Logically, both sides of the secular debate will embrace these qualifications if they are fair, substantive, and non-arbitrary, otherwise there is no logical debate, and the side which embraces the fair, substantive, and non-arbitrary reasoning will prevail, all things being equal. In assuming that applying 'fair' to the argument therefore assumes what I am trying to prove, you've made the mistake of ignoring that BOTH sides appeal to fairness. As I mentioned, "the debate is not in why they must be fair, but are they fair?" They why of it has already been settled - both know they must be fair; the only thing to figure out is are they BEING fair? Again, your mistake comes in automatically dismissing fairness simply because it is arguably subjective. If that were the case, as I mentioned, the side which sought fairness - however subjective - would be the side with the logical (and prevailing) philosophical argument.
Notice, too, that we are talking about fairness from a legal, secular perspective. This begins shaping our argument even more as we eliminate the main adversary against gay marriage, the moral reasoning against it from a religious perspective (ie, homosexuality is a sin, therefore homosexuals shouldn't have the same rights as non-sinners, including marriage). What 'fair' may still be somewhat secularly subjective, but easier to dismiss without religious doctrination. For instance, some questions could include, "is it fair to exclude left handed people from marriage?"; "Is it fair to exclude heterosexual couples who do not wish to have or raise children?; "Is it fair to eliminate couples based on sexual orientation?", and each would require a secular justification. To be specific, each would require - as I mentioned - a morally ironclad justification for exclusion, otherwise you are left with the same unanswered objections for exclusion you started with, and therefore your reasoning is morally suspect.
And I never once mentioned religious values. Morality is not exclusively the domain of religion-- and "unfair" is still a subjective moral concept, whether it's religious or secular in origin.
True, but when you are talking about fairness from a secular perspective, you're basically talking about justice. Arguably, justice is to establish the terms of fair cooperation that should govern free and equal moral agents, if one wants to take the Rawlsian approach to fairness. Subjective or not, there are certain qualifications that must be met for exclusion, and these must be substantive, fair, and non-arbitrary. 'Fairness' can be exampled out on a case-by-case basis for sake of argument, if you wish me to paint a clearer picture here.
Do you have scientific evidence that left-handed people are as qualified for marriage-- by whatever terms you are willing and capable of establishing as being a sound basis for marriage-- as right-handed people? Why are right-handed people allowed to get married in the first place, and how are left-handed people different?
No, and this reinforces my position, namely that such criteria are arbitrary, unfair, and non-substantive, which is why I mentioned the examples to begin with. Unless, of course, there have been any scientific breakthroughs regarding the predeliction of using one hand over the other versus marriage success and family stability, in which case that qualification becomes non-arbitrary and substantive.
Every specific person belongs to several specific classes of people. How is being forbidden from marrying a person of a specific sex different than being forbidden from marrying a person of a specific nationality, or a specific degree of consanguinity with yourself? Forbidding a woman from marrying another woman may rule out 51% of eligible candidates, but forbidding an American from marrying anyone who doesn't live in America rules out 96%.
Of course, turning a non-American resident into an American resident is a lot cheaper and easier than turning a woman into a man, but they're both still dependent upon the willingness of the other party.
It's just as arbitrary. After all, a person can't help where they're born, and there's no evidence that non-Americans are less suited to marriage-- again, by whatever means you use to determine this-- than Americans are.
You agree with me here from what i'm reading, and this seems to reinforce what I am saying, that heterosexuals and homosexuals generally want the same thing - to marry into a specific group of people. Heterosexuals wish to marry heterosexuals. Homosexuals wish to marry homosexuals. The fact that, say, one may be a different nationality or race is what's arbitrary, which seems to be the point you're making, and that I agree with.
You always end up with moral objections, and nobody can agree on what "fair" means or prove how any position is more fair than another, except on the basis of shared moral principles-- and noone's willing to actually present their moral principles for debate. Everyone just assumes their moral principles into the definitions of meaningless words like "fair" or "moral", and then berates the other side for not knowing the exact meaning of a subjective term that they refuse to define.
That's not true. 'Fair' can be subjective at times, but not at others. For instance, is it fair that I slaughter your family in cold-blooded murder then not get punished for it? No logically sane person would say 'yes' to that, because then they'd have to prove why (and it isn't enough to simply say 'because fair is subjective'. You must prove why me acting as a moral agent is justified for doing so). In the context of what constitutes 'fair' for marriage, I touched on this briefly above. When we speak of fairness, often we are speaking of what is just. Consider your statement:
"Fair" is I get what I want and everyone who opposes me suffers and dies.
This is untrue because one cannot imagine logically believing in this should this be applied to society at large. If we had a society full of folks who thought it was fair (and therefore just) to bring about the death of those who opposed you on whatever issue, then that society would exist for, oh, a few minutes at best before complete anarchy reigned.
Except that the marriage "contract" is not written by either of the supposed parties to that, the individual people who make up the married couple. In fact, not only is it written by the State, it can be amended by the State without input from any of the signatories to the various marriage "contracts" that couples have signed. And if the State's amendment to the marriage "contract" is unacceptable to the signatories, their only option is to have it voided on the State's terms-- the process of which may also be amended at any time.
The closest thing to an actual marriage contract is a pre-nuptial agreement. And even those can typically be overridden in a court of law.
And because it is a legal contract which confers benefits from the state, it must be fair to all, or there must be secular, ironclad moral reasoning behind such exclusions like sexual orientation, race, etc.
Okay, then. For what purposes do you believe marriage should be legally recognized, and in what fashion do those purposes benefit society?
I believe that marriage should be legally recognized simply on the basis of the choice situation being fair to ALL autonomous, rational participants. My hypothetical marriage contract would be where participants are constrained in knowledge and motivations in specific ways where each would choose the fairest method for everyone to engage in the institution. I believe that under these constraints, the automous, rational contractors participating in the institution would choose inclusion criteria guaranteeing equality.
The benefits to secular society would be obvious. There would be little argument over the institution being unfair from a secular perspective in such a case, as everyone has the opportunity to decide what's best, and only what they can all logically agree on from behind this constrained knowledge and motivational perspective constitutes the contract. The benefits to those who operate from a religious perspective would obviously suffer, as it seems that most arguments against inclusion stem from that perspective (my conjecture, of course. Take that as mere opinion).
