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Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess
The actual docs
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference, April 29, 1999[/FONT]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing After Action Report, June 28, 1999[/FONT]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing After Action Report Briefing, July 22, 1999[/FONT]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing Miscellaneous E-mails, May-August 1999[/FONT]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Joint Intelligence Center Central, "Suggested new name for CONPLAN DESERT RESOLVE," November 14, 1999[/FONT]
Very interesting info here. Sorry to see that this as well as the Future of Iraq project were scrapped in favor of more saleable projections. Pennywise and pound foolish I s'pose.
The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main war plan for Iraq – OPLAN 1003-98 – tested “worst case” and “most likely” scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam, Iraq. The After Action Report presented its recommendations for further planning regarding regime change in Iraq and was an interagency production assisted by the departments of defense and state, as well as the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others.
The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments.
The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. Role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.
This report was compiled prior to another prescient study of post-invasion Iraq, the Department of State's "Future of Iraq Project" -- see the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 198.
(Source URL: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm)The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments.
The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. Role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.
This report was compiled prior to another prescient study of post-invasion Iraq, the Department of State's "Future of Iraq Project" -- see the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 198.
The actual docs
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference, April 29, 1999[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing After Action Report, June 28, 1999[/FONT]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing After Action Report Briefing, July 22, 1999[/FONT]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing Miscellaneous E-mails, May-August 1999[/FONT]
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[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Joint Intelligence Center Central, "Suggested new name for CONPLAN DESERT RESOLVE," November 14, 1999[/FONT]
Very interesting info here. Sorry to see that this as well as the Future of Iraq project were scrapped in favor of more saleable projections. Pennywise and pound foolish I s'pose.