By Dr. Albert B. Wolf
9.20.25
Deterrence depends on capability, not drama. Ukraine faces the same problem. US President Donald Trump suggested the US could guarantee Kyiv security with air support. But low-capability tripwires rarely stop a militarily powerful adversary. Offshore, high-capability deployments are more credible – but costly and risky. A less conventional, but potentially more effective, path is nuclear latency: giving Ukraine the ability to assemble nuclear weapons quickly if needed, without fully deploying them. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has indicated that if NATO membership remains out of reach, Ukraine should explore a nuclear option. Latency signals that future conquest carries unacceptable risk. History supports this grim logic. Since 1945, no nuclear-armed state has been conquered. Nuclear weapons did not prevent all conflicts – Israel fought Egypt and Syria in 1973, India and Pakistan have clashed repeatedly – but they have reliably prevented all-out wars between nuclear powers. The United States and the Soviet Union never confronted each other directly, and the catastrophic potential of retaliation has restrained other major states.
Nuclear latency offers Kyiv a middle path. It avoids permanent US deployments while providing credible deterrence. A latent program could include secure storage of fissile material and delivery systems designed to signal capability rather than immediate threat. Conventional alliances, economic resilience, and diplomatic support can reinforce the deterrent. Risks are real. Latency must be credible: half-measures or poorly secured programs invite miscalculation. Proliferation concerns could arise, and Moscow might misread the program as an imminent threat. Compared with low-capability tripwires or temporary NATO guarantees, nuclear latency directly addresses the commitment problem: assuring Kyiv without pulling the US into a prolonged conventional conflict. It also reframes negotiations: a latent arsenal reduces the importance of territorial concessions, giving Kyiv leverage while signaling that further aggression carries catastrophic consequences. No solution is perfect. Nuclear latency cannot reclaim territory or coerce Russia into changing behavior. But in a world where conventional deterrence has often failed, it may be the least-worst option. The logic is stark: credible nuclear potential makes conquest irrational. In the long run, it may be the clearest path to peace and sovereignty: a deterrent so potent that Moscow has no rational choice but to respect Ukraine’s independence.