Most Gifted/Able/Intelligent Politician/diplomat in history

[Jredbaron96]

WW2 French tanks - Tanks Encyclopedia

www.[B]tanks[/B]-encyclopedia.com/ww2/france/ww2_French_Tanks.php


By September 1939, and even more in May 1940, the French armored forces surpassed the Wehrmacht in quantity and often in protection.

How does that prove anything I've said wrong?

Your bolded sentence seems to come off like it's saying the poorly run French command was just a simple mistake anyone could make, but it was in fact a fundamental flaw of the French and British approach to modern warfare.

 

[Jredbaron96]

[h=3]WWII Myths – German tank strength in the Battle of France ...[/h]chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/.../wwii-myths-german-tank-strength-in....


Nov 2, 2013 - At the time no one expected that the French forces would be defeated in such a short campaign. During the interwar period the French Army ...

What does this have to do with anything? I already pointed out the Germans were in fact outnumbered and in many ways weaker on paper during the actual events of WWII.

 

[Jredbaron96]

I have at no time said a word about Czech fortifications and they have no place in my argument. My point has been that the Germans got lucky in 1938 because their forces were inferior to the French and British at that time.

No, they weren't, as I've pointed out numerous times before.

Are you just going to keep spamming links instead of actually debating me?

 

[Jack Hays]

What does this have to do with anything? I already pointed out the Germans were in fact outnumbered and in many ways weaker on paper during the actual events of WWII.

Your #39 is refuted.

 

[Jack Hays]

No, they weren't, as I've pointed out numerous times before.

Are you just going to keep spamming links instead of actually debating me?

The point has been made. Now you're just denying. I don't continue a debate when the point has been made.

 

[Jack Hays]

How does that prove anything I've said wrong?

Your bolded sentence seems to come off like it's saying the poorly run French command was just a simple mistake anyone could make, but it was in fact a fundamental flaw of the French and British approach to modern warfare.

Your #39 is refuted.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Your #39 is refuted.

My post #39?


My post stated in 1938, specifically at the Munich Crisis, the best the French could muster was two DLM on paper in 1938, and they were basically just two under strength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. They wouldn't have been able to make an effect in 1938 if they went to war over Czechoslovakia, just like the French didn't do **** when the Germans invaded Poland.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Your #39 is refuted.

Many if you say it enough times it'll come true. Make sure you tap your shoes together too.

 

[Jredbaron96]

The point has been made. Now you're just denying. I don't continue a debate when the point has been made.

If this is what you call debating, I should be recommending some classes for you.

 

[Medusa]

Atatürk ( He was rather a revolutionist though

 

[Abbazorkzog]

The RAF wouldn't have performed very well at all. The RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, and the RADAR network was not operational, severely limiting the RAF's defensive capability. Likewise, French production of the Moraine MS.406, a decent fighter and probably the best they could field, accounted to just 65 aircraft per year. In September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes. Had war broken out, the French would've been forced to reply with outdated Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938.

OK, so they still would have been all alone. But at the very least, there would have been a formidable coalition against Germany had it not been for Chamberlain *****footing around with Hitler and Nazis.

 

[Jredbaron96]

OK, so they still would have been all alone. But at the very least, there would have been a formidable coalition against Germany had it not been for Chamberlain *****footing around with Hitler and Nazis.

Not really. Germany had numerical superiority in tanks and aircraft in the Munich Crisis. They could've of rather easily swept into Czechoslovakia and then brought their considerable forces to bear against France and Britain who would've been struggling to hastily mobilize their forces.

Chamberlain's first duty as Prime Minister was to ensure the future of the British Empire. In this he did his best, and to his credit, it was he who ordered the mass armament of the British military, and was the one who declared war on Hitler. He avoided war when it would've been a disaster and tried to fight it on better terms. For that I will not fault him.

The biggest problem with Munich was in fact what effect it had on the Soviet Union. It convinced Stalin to avoid further dealings with the West and led indirectly to the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression pact.

 

[Jack Hays]

My post #39?


My post stated in 1938, specifically at the Munich Crisis, the best the French could muster was two DLM on paper in 1938, and they were basically just two under strength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. They wouldn't have been able to make an effect in 1938 if they went to war over Czechoslovakia, just like the French didn't do **** when the Germans invaded Poland.

Misleading to cite numbers of armored units because the French weren't organized that way. It was their undoing in 1940, but in the different circumstances of 1938, with the Germans focused on Czechoslovakia, French weight of numbers of tanks would have mattered.

 

[Abbazorkzog]

Not really. Germany had numerical superiority in tanks and aircraft in the Munich Crisis. They could've of rather easily swept into Czechoslovakia and then brought their considerable forces to bear against France and Britain who would've been struggling to hastily mobilize their forces.

Chamberlain's first duty as Prime Minister was to ensure the future of the British Empire. In this he did his best, and to his credit, it was he who ordered the mass armament of the British military, and was the one who declared war on Hitler. He avoided war when it would've been a disaster and tried to fight it on better terms. For that I will not fault him.

The biggest problem with Munich was in fact what effect it had on the Soviet Union. It convinced Stalin to avoid further dealings with the West and led indirectly to the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression pact.

What? Jack Hays already refuted your claim about Germany's numerical superiority. SEVERAL times. Did you just flat-out ignore what he cited? Germany did not have quantitative superiority in tanks to both France and Britain combined. What an asinine assertion.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Misleading to cite numbers of armored units because the French weren't organized that way.

What does that even mean. French production of tanks in 1938 accounted to just 400 tanks.

France's first real armored divisions, the DCR's, didn't even exist at that point as the first DCR was not stood up until January of 1940.

You do realize that the number of tanks the French possessed in 1939 and 1940 was more than they had in 1938 right?

It was their undoing in 1940, but in the different circumstances of 1938,

You're right, there were different circumstances. In 1940 the French actually had numerical superiority. Hell of a lot of good it did them.

with the Germans focused on Czechoslovakia,

The Germans would've swept aside the Czechs with ease.

French weight of numbers of tanks would have mattered.

The French had only two light brigades of armor at the time of the Munich Crisis. And what makes you think the French would've conducted offensive operations then, when in 1940 with numerical superiority they didn't?

 

[Jredbaron96]

What? Jack Hays already refuted your claim about Germany's numerical superiority. SEVERAL times. Did you just flat-out ignore what he cited? Germany did not have quantitative superiority in tanks to both France and Britain combined. What an asinine assertion.

Where the flying **** did he do that? All his links talk about tanks in 1939 and 1940.

My point is about 1938. When the Munich Crisis unfolded. What part of that are you missing?

 

[Jack Hays]

What does that even mean. French production of tanks in 1938 accounted to just 400 tanks.

France's first real armored divisions, the DCR's, didn't even exist at that point as the first DCR was not stood up until January of 1940.

You do realize that the number of tanks the French possessed in 1939 and 1940 was more than they had in 1938 right?




You're right, there were different circumstances. In 1940 the French actually had numerical superiority. Hell of a lot of good it did them.




The Germans would've swept aside the Czechs with ease.




The French had only two light brigades of armor at the time of the Munich Crisis. And what makes you think the French would've conducted offensive operations then, when in 1940 with numerical superiority they didn't?

French production of tanks in 1938 was low because they already had several thousand, as already shown in links already posted. Why do I think the French would have taken the offensive in 1938? because they said so, as already shown in links already posted.

 

[Jredbaron96]

French production of tanks in 1938 was low because they already had several thousand, as already shown in links already posted. Why do I think the French would have taken the offensive in 1938? because they said so, as already shown in links already posted.

French production between 1934-37 accounted to less than 1,000 tanks. That meant at around 4,000 of them had been produced by 1933 or earlier; meaning they were outdated by the time of the Munich Crisis and the second World War. In addition, many of them were stationed overseas.

Furthermore, you can't just throw tanks out on the battlefield. They need to be organized and led properly in order to be effective. The fact that the French only had two DLMs is because that's all they had organized. French armor can't defend France if it's just sitting around in a motor pool waiting for orders, or stuck out in a field waiting for orders until it's destroyed. The primary reason Germany achieved such fantastic results in the Battle of France was because of their superior understanding of armored warfare; something neither the British nor the French grasped at the start of hostilities.


And if you want to count armored vehicles that would've amounted to little more than target practice, than I pray you never are tasked with writing out armored warfare doctrine.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Well, suffice to say, this thread's been a bit derailed. That's my fault for certain.


While he's not the best in history, I think a special acknowledgement should be made to James B. Donovan. Not only did he negotiate the exchange of Rudolf Abel and Francis Gary Powers, he also got the release of ten thousand prisoners held in Cuba after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. In my book, that's a plus.

 

[Jack Hays]

French production between 1934-37 accounted to less than 1,000 tanks. That meant at around 4,000 of them had been produced by 1933 or earlier; meaning they were outdated by the time of the Munich Crisis and the second World War. In addition, many of them were stationed overseas.

Furthermore, you can't just throw tanks out on the battlefield. They need to be organized and led properly in order to be effective. The fact that the French only had two DLMs is because that's all they had organized. French armor can't defend France if it's just sitting around in a motor pool waiting for orders, or stuck out in a field waiting for orders until it's destroyed. The primary reason Germany achieved such fantastic results in the Battle of France was because of their superior understanding of armored warfare; something neither the British nor the French grasped at the start of hostilities.


And if you want to count armored vehicles that would've amounted to little more than target practice, than I pray you never are tasked with writing out armored warfare doctrine.

The discussion is about 1938, not 1940. French organizational deficiencies would not have mattered with the main German effort concentrated on Czechoslovakia. Moreover, German forces included large numbers of obsolete models as well. Since I'm 65 YOA, a historian, and retired from a multi-decade intelligence career, I doubt I will be called upon to draft armored warfare doctrine. Your concern is nonetheless noted.

 

[Jredbaron96]

The discussion is about 1938, not 1940.

I thought that was established.

French organizational deficiencies would not have mattered with the main German effort concentrated on Czechoslovakia.

And how? What offensive operations were the French capable of with their non-mobilized, non-organized forces? They had both in 1940 and still didn't attack. What on earth would've driven them to do so in 1938?

Moreover, German forces included large numbers of obsolete models as well.

The negative connotations of obseletion are minimized when proper doctrine is employed to maximize advantages and limit the effects of weaknesses. That's basic doctrine, something the Germans employed quite effectively.

Since I'm 65 YOA, a historian, and retired from a multi-decade intelligence career, I doubt I will be called upon to draft armored warfare doctrine. Your concern is nonetheless noted.

We can always get together and write one. Just sayin'.

 

[Jack Hays]

I thought that was established.



And how? What offensive operations were the French capable of with their non-mobilized, non-organized forces? They had both in 1940 and still didn't attack. What on earth would've driven them to do so in 1938?



The negative connotations of obseletion are minimized when proper doctrine is employed to maximize advantages and limit the effects of weaknesses. That's basic doctrine, something the Germans employed quite effectively.



We can always get together and write one. Just sayin'.

From the link in my #43:

General Gamelin, the French commander-in-chief, described such a plan during a visit to London on September 26: He had no intention of sitting behind the Maginot line and waiting for a German offensive but wanted to advance immediately into Germany in view of the Germans only having eight divisions on their western frontier. He would then withdraw under the protection of the Maginot line only after he had met really serious resistance, leaving the Germans to break their strength against the permanent fortifications.[SUP][98][/SUP]
In any event, even the most vigorous French offensive could not have defeated Germany at a single blow. At best, the Germans would have been forced to transfer the bulk of their forces away from Czechoslovakia in order to deal with the French, perhaps allowing the Czechs to hold out against the reduced German attack. A recent study of the probable course of a war in 1938 concluded:
In terms of numbers of divisions, economic resources, industrial capacity, and naval forces, Germany would have faced overwhelming Allied superiority in 1938 . . . Even so, the war against Germany would not have been easy, nor would it have been quickly won.[SUP][99][/SUP]

 

[Jredbaron96]

From the link in my #43:

General Gamelin, the French commander-in-chief, described such a plan during a visit to London on September 26: He had no intention of sitting behind the Maginot line and waiting for a German offensive but wanted to advance immediately into Germany in view of the Germans only having eight divisions on their western frontier. He would then withdraw under the protection of the Maginot line only after he had met really serious resistance, leaving the Germans to break their strength against the permanent fortifications.[SUP][98][/SUP]
In any event, even the most vigorous French offensive could not have defeated Germany at a single blow. At best, the Germans would have been forced to transfer the bulk of their forces away from Czechoslovakia in order to deal with the French, perhaps allowing the Czechs to hold out against the reduced German attack. A recent study of the probable course of a war in 1938 concluded:
In terms of numbers of divisions, economic resources, industrial capacity, and naval forces, Germany would have faced overwhelming Allied superiority in 1938 . . . Even so, the war against Germany would not have been easy, nor would it have been quickly won.[SUP][99][/SUP]

Gamelin was still in charge when war did break out in 1939, and his total contributions amounted to 8 kilometers of advance, only to order his troops back behind the Maginot after they had reached the unfinished Sigfried line. He did it only to assure the Poles he was on his way, and even refused to allow bombing of the Ruhr. His long term strategy was to wait for France to be fully re-armed to launch any offensive operations, which would've required waiting to almost 1941.

I fail to see any indication he would've done any different in 1938, considering he would have had to wait for the French Army to mobilize before he conducted any major operations, which would've delayed any significant maneuvers, quite possibly until the Germans were already done in the East.

Even if he had, it wouldn't have saved Czechoslovakia. Hitler threw everything against Poland and planned to do the same against the Czechs. Had war broken out in 1938, the first few months would've looked remarkably the same; German conquest in the east and inaction in the west. Gamelin was a lot of bark and no bite.

 

[Jack Hays]

Gamelin was still in charge when war did break out in 1939, and his total contributions amounted to 8 kilometers of advance, only to order his troops back behind the Maginot after they had reached the unfinished Sigfried line. He did it only to assure the Poles he was on his way, and even refused to allow bombing of the Ruhr. His long term strategy was to wait for France to be fully re-armed to launch any offensive operations, which would've required waiting to almost 1941.

I fail to see any indication he would've done any different in 1938, considering he would have had to wait for the French Army to mobilize before he conducted any major operations, which would've delayed any significant maneuvers, quite possibly until the Germans were already done in the East.

Even if he had, it wouldn't have saved Czechoslovakia. Hitler threw everything against Poland and planned to do the same against the Czechs. Had war broken out in 1938, the first few months would've looked remarkably the same; German conquest in the east and inaction in the west. Gamelin was a lot of bark and no bite.

I quoted Gamelin. You are free to believe as you wish but the evidence is against you.

 

[Jredbaron96]

I quoted Gamelin. You are free to believe as you wish but the evidence is against you.

Talk is cheap, lies are even cheaper.


I can see you're not going to change your mind on this no matter what I say, and I'm sure you're thinking the same thing.