Nuclear Weapons
During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration that it had no nuclear weapons facilities or unsafe guarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA uncovered and dismantled a previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research facilities, including three clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic, centrifuge, and chemical isotope separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation program. Inspectors found and dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons development program, and they found evidence of development of a radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”), which scatters nuclear material without an explosion. No radiological weapon was ever completed, but Iraq might have tested such a device. UNSCOM removed from Iraq all discovered nuclear reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. Following the defection of Hussein Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq revealed it had launched a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon as quickly as possible by diverting fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA report of December 1, 1995 said that, if Iraq had proceeded with its crash program, Iraq might have produced a nuclear weapon by December 1992.
The IAEA, before it ceased work in Iraq, said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been ended and that it had a relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers. A May 15, 1998 Security Council statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement to close the nuclear file if Iraq cleared up outstanding issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of some nuclear equipment). An IAEA report of July 1998 indicated that some questions still remained, and the United States did not agree to close the file. In January 2002, as it has in each of the past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained sealed, acting under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
In May 2000, the IAEA destroyed a nuclear centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991.
The IAEA says that the absence of an inspections program creates uncertainty about Iraqi nuclear activities. The United States believes that Iraq retains the expertise (about 7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program, and Administration officials have asserted it is doing so. Some press reports indicate Iraq has recently tried to buy equipment abroad that could be used to make weapons grade nuclear material. On September 6, 2002, the New York Times reported that IAEA/UNMOVIC inspectors have noted from commercial satellite photos construction and other alterations at some Iraqi nuclear-related sites that could suggest banned nuclear activity by Iraq. The CIA assessment, mentioned above, says that Iraq would likely not be able to produce a nuclear weapon until the latter half of the decade, unless it acquires fissile material from abroad.
Chemical Weapons
UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of production equipment items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14, 1994. However, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors, remains unknown. Iraq refused to yield an Air Force document, found in July 1998 by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq allowed UNSCOM to take notes from it. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells taken from Iraq in 1996 contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly produced. The primary remaining chemical weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which Iraq did not include in its initial postwar declarations and of which no stockpile was ever located. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to force Iraq to admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had imported enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late June 1998, UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab, contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in stabilizing the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX. About 170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997. The CIA assessment says Iraq has renewed chemical weapons production and probably stocked a few hundred tons of agent.
Biological Weapons
Biological weapons is the area with more outstanding and unresolved issues than any other weapons area, according to UNSCOM, which called Iraq’s biological declarations neither credible nor verifiable. Iraq did not initially declare any biological materials, weapons, research, or facilities, and no biological weapons stockpile was ever uncovered. UNSCOM focused its investigation initially on the major biological research and development site at Salman Pak, but Iraq partially buried that facility shortly before the first inspections began. In August 1991, Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research program. In July 1995, Iraq modified its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive biological weapons program and that it had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. In August 1995, Iraq confessed to having produced 191 biological bombs, of which 25 were missile warheads, loaded with anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin for use in the Gulf war, but Iraq claims to have destroyed the bombs after the Gulf conflict. UNSCOM monitored 86 biological sites during 1994 -1998. UNSCOM discovered and dismantled the Al Hakam facility on June 20, 1996.
According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for producing biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remain unaccounted for. UNSCOM lacked information on Iraq’s development of drop tanks and aerosol generators for biological dissemination, as well as the fate of the biological munitions. No evidence linking the October 2001 anthrax-related terrorism in the United States to Iraq has been announced.White House spokespersons said in late December 2001 that the anthrax used in the attacks appeared to be from a domestic source, such as a U.S. military laboratory. Press reports in 2002 say Iraq has been developing unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver biological or chemical weapons. The October 2002 CIA assessment said that Iraq had reactivated its biological program and that most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.
Source:
http://www.yirmeyahureview.com/archive/documents/iraq/crs_threat_compliance_sanctions.pdf
