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In statements that may foreshadow an intent to withdraw from direct negotiations, the Palestinian government planted a landmine to talks in the form of a precondition for continuing talks: linking continuation of the talks to extension of Israel’s West Bank settlement construction pause, which is slated to expire on September 26. The Jerusalem Post reported:
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas asked the PLO Executive Committee to allow a one month trial period for direct peace negotiations with Israel before deciding what further action to take, Palestinian sources said, according to a Monday report in the London-based Arab language daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi.
The appropriate time to raise such issues is during talks, not in advance of them. Moreover, the Palestinians may well need to offer some reciprocity to achieve their objective. The big question concerns whether the Palestinians are, rather than seeking to aggressively pursue negotiations, creating a framework for exiting the unconditional direct talks.
It should be noted that the U.S. invitation, for which little advance notice was given, was likely issued as a means to shatter the Palestinian boycott of direct negotiations. The invitation was issued to provide the Palestinian leadership with having to choose between two options: (1) Abandon its self-inflicted road block (preconditions) to direct talks or, (2) Risk offending the U.S. by rebuffing the invitation.
The first option would make the Palestinian leadership appear weak on account of its having to abandon its repeatedly expressed preconditions. The latter would risk creating an outcome under which the U.S. would downgrade its role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. With Abbas recognizing that the latter scenario could have been more damaging for Palestinian interests and aspirations, he chose the first option, but perhaps only temporarily. In a bid to limit fresh perceptions of weakness, he resurrected one of his major preconditions, this time in a fashion that could blow up the talks.
Whether he is bluffing or not remains to be seen. But in the absence of reciprocity or some significant early progress in the direct talks that would give Israel incentive for making the unilateral concession Abbas is seeking, his new demand likely will not be achieved. If not, Abbas would see perceptions about his weakness reinforced if he maintains the direct talks—a self-inflicted wound given his making his precondition for continuing negotiations public—or terminating direct negotiations. The latter course, even if the Abbas government tries to pin blame on Israel, as it most certainly would attempt, could wind up leading the U.S. government to review its current willingness to play a highly active role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Depending on its calculations, it could well take a lower profile and shift its diplomatic resources to other major problems e.g., issues concerning Iran. Israel, in the meantime, could have its worries about the lack of a viable partner for diplomacy renewed. Such a move could actually strengthen the hand of hardline elements within Israel’s government, undercutting prospects for moderation.
In stark contrast to Abbas’ threat, Israel has communicated a more appropriate message with respect to the start of negotiations, even as the challenges to a rapid agreement remain formidable. Prime Minister Netanyahu declared, "Reaching an agreement is a difficult challenge but is possible. We are coming to the talks with a genuine desire to reach a peace agreement between the two peoples that will protect Israel's national security interests, foremost of which is security,”
Hamas, remaining steadfast to its Charter, rejected the talks. The Hamas Charter declares, “Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.” The Islamic Jihad terrorist group also rejected the start of negotiations.
In sum, the early dynamics, not to mention substantial differences between the parties, suggest that a final settlement agreement within a year (Secretary Clinton’s goal) is not likely. Whether meaningful progress is made remains to be seen.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas asked the PLO Executive Committee to allow a one month trial period for direct peace negotiations with Israel before deciding what further action to take, Palestinian sources said, according to a Monday report in the London-based Arab language daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi.
The appropriate time to raise such issues is during talks, not in advance of them. Moreover, the Palestinians may well need to offer some reciprocity to achieve their objective. The big question concerns whether the Palestinians are, rather than seeking to aggressively pursue negotiations, creating a framework for exiting the unconditional direct talks.
It should be noted that the U.S. invitation, for which little advance notice was given, was likely issued as a means to shatter the Palestinian boycott of direct negotiations. The invitation was issued to provide the Palestinian leadership with having to choose between two options: (1) Abandon its self-inflicted road block (preconditions) to direct talks or, (2) Risk offending the U.S. by rebuffing the invitation.
The first option would make the Palestinian leadership appear weak on account of its having to abandon its repeatedly expressed preconditions. The latter would risk creating an outcome under which the U.S. would downgrade its role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. With Abbas recognizing that the latter scenario could have been more damaging for Palestinian interests and aspirations, he chose the first option, but perhaps only temporarily. In a bid to limit fresh perceptions of weakness, he resurrected one of his major preconditions, this time in a fashion that could blow up the talks.
Whether he is bluffing or not remains to be seen. But in the absence of reciprocity or some significant early progress in the direct talks that would give Israel incentive for making the unilateral concession Abbas is seeking, his new demand likely will not be achieved. If not, Abbas would see perceptions about his weakness reinforced if he maintains the direct talks—a self-inflicted wound given his making his precondition for continuing negotiations public—or terminating direct negotiations. The latter course, even if the Abbas government tries to pin blame on Israel, as it most certainly would attempt, could wind up leading the U.S. government to review its current willingness to play a highly active role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Depending on its calculations, it could well take a lower profile and shift its diplomatic resources to other major problems e.g., issues concerning Iran. Israel, in the meantime, could have its worries about the lack of a viable partner for diplomacy renewed. Such a move could actually strengthen the hand of hardline elements within Israel’s government, undercutting prospects for moderation.
In stark contrast to Abbas’ threat, Israel has communicated a more appropriate message with respect to the start of negotiations, even as the challenges to a rapid agreement remain formidable. Prime Minister Netanyahu declared, "Reaching an agreement is a difficult challenge but is possible. We are coming to the talks with a genuine desire to reach a peace agreement between the two peoples that will protect Israel's national security interests, foremost of which is security,”
Hamas, remaining steadfast to its Charter, rejected the talks. The Hamas Charter declares, “Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.” The Islamic Jihad terrorist group also rejected the start of negotiations.
In sum, the early dynamics, not to mention substantial differences between the parties, suggest that a final settlement agreement within a year (Secretary Clinton’s goal) is not likely. Whether meaningful progress is made remains to be seen.