Is Abbas Again Planning to Walk Away from Direct Negotiations?

[Tashah]

"Recognizing Israel as a Jewish state" is a somewhat tricky phrase if that is what it implies. At first hearing, it sounds like it means simply recognizing Israel's right to exist. If it also means recognizing the right, or rather the necessity, of denying remedies to non-Jews on the basis of their ethnicity, that would seem to be a whole other notion. Regardless of one's position on the right of return, it complicates any discussion of Israel's right to exist and the Palestinians' refusal to recognize it.

It recognizes and affirms that the UN explicitly created Israel to be a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people.

This is explicit in the Partition resolution... Two states, one Jewish and one Arab.

 

[Winston Smith]

It recognizes and affirms that the UN explicitly created Israel to be a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people.

This is explicit in the Partition resolution... Two states, one Jewish and one Arab.

Sure, but what does that mean exactly? Assuming that, as a statement of purpose, it even has any independent legal effect, does it mean that property in the Jewish state can't be restored to Arabs? That would be an odd position for the UN to take in light of some of its other statements. I don't claim to have the answer, but I am saying it's a whole other ball of yarn.

 

[Tashah]

Sure, but what does that mean exactly? Assuming that, as a statement of purpose, it even has any independent legal effect, does it mean that property in the Jewish state can't be restored to Arabs? That would be an odd position for the UN to take in light of some of its other statements. I don't claim to have the answer, but I am saying it's a whole other ball of yarn.

For decades, successive Palestinian governments have promised generations of Palestinian refugees that they would one day return to 1947. This is simply impossible and an agreement deal breaker.

So Abbas has a very big problem on his hands, which is possibly why he has been dragging his feet on direct negotiations. How can he possibly deliver on a narrative promise which is undeliverable? The Israeli government would perhaps accede to a monetary compensation, but no Israeli government will ever yield on the right of return as promulgated by the Palestinian narrative.

Abbas cannot obtain both things.... an accommodation with Israel and a Palestinian narrative promise fulfilled.

He knows this. What he does not know, is how to extricate himself from this dilemma.

 

[Winston Smith]

For decades, successive Palestinian governments have promised generations of Palestinian refugees that they would one day return to 1947. This is simply impossible and an agreement deal breaker.

So Abbas has a very big problem on his hands, which is possibly why he has been dragging his feet on direct negotiations. How can he possibly deliver on a narrative promise which is undeliverable? The Israeli government would perhaps accede to a monetary compensation, but no Israeli government will ever yield on the right of return as promulgated by the Palestinian narrative.

Abbas cannot obtain both things.... an accommodation with Israel and a Palestinian narrative promise fulfilled.

He knows this. What he does not know, is how to extricate himself from this dilemma.

That is a dilemma and the stuff of which difficult negotiations are made. Personally, I think the Palestinians should be prepared to accept monetary compensation. My only point is that it's not helpful to disguise that issue within the larger issue of Israel's right to exist. It only serves to make the Palestinians look more hostile than they probably are, which isn't a good place to start.

 

[Demon of Light]

Again you ignore most of my post.

As had been stated in the message to which you responded, no matter what the arrangement is, the Palestinians will certainly wind up worse off than if the Arabs had accepted the 1947 partition plan and had they not launched the 1948 war against the then newly re-established Israel.

You apparently think that somehow means the Palestinians should accept any deal the Israelis offer. If the British had never endorsed the Zionist project the Palestinians would be much better off. Essentially your position sanctions a "might makes right" stance on the Middle East. The Jews took it fair and square so therefore they get to decide what they do with it and the Palestinians should just be grateful that they're getting anything. Apparently that is what you think, though I think we would find your position elsewhere to be far less accommodating to an aggressor like Israel.

The 1948 War began with the 1947 Mandate War, which was itself a direct response to the partition plan being sanctioned by the UN. None of the major powers would even entertain the notion of a one-state solution and even awarded the largely Arab Negev to the Jewish state. What began all of this is not something the Arabs did, but rather the British Empire sanctioning the colonization of Palestine with Jews as part of a plan to form a Jewish state in the territory against the wishes of the Arab population residing there. That is the first act of aggression.

In the 1947 Mandate War itself, while there were attacks on Jews it was disorganized and sporadic at first primarily involving individual Arabs acting out of anger. However, from the beginning the Haganah and other Yishuv militant organizations coordinated devastating reprisals for every act of violence against Jews often killing people with no connection to the instigating incident. It didn't matter if it was just a random hate crime it would lead to Arabs being massacred.

To say it's all on the Arabs that this war happened is just deceitful. The Yishuv had no right to a state there and wouldn't have had a state there had it not been for the major empires encouraging it.

Even if one totally avoids the history of how things got where they are, the reality is not changed. The Palestinians cannot expect to receive as much land as would have been given to the Arabs under the 1947 partition plan. The on-the-ground situation has changed. The Palestinians do not possess the power to impose such a solution. With Egypt and Jordan at peace with Israel and Lebanon and Syria weaker than Israel, a new Arab invastion to try to bring about such an outcome is also unlikely and, if it did occur, would be turned back. The international community is also not supporting such an outcome. Hence, such an outcome is extremely remote. If you believe otherwise, I would be interested in knowing what driver or drivers you think would produce such an outcome.

I do think you are right that they are not going to get something on the order of the 1947 plan, but that is not my issue with what you said. Rather you seem to think the Palestinians should just accept whatever deal is offered them under duress. The 1947 plan was completely unjust and rewarding aggression. In 2000 Israel once more sought a reward for aggression and even in 2008 they were demanding a reward for aggression.

When you keep rewarding someone for aggression it only encourages more aggression. Can you honestly say with a straight face that a demilitarized Palestinian state with a permanent Israeli military presence, no control over its airspace, and less territory than in 1967 is favorable for anyone other than Israel?

Israel keeps demanding the sun and the moon from the Palestinians and then asks why they hate talking.

That is a dilemma and the stuff of which difficult negotiations are made. Personally, I think the Palestinians should be prepared to accept monetary compensation.

Actually they are without prepared to accept it. I think you would find most Palestinians would be happy to accept adequate compensation and resettlement in their current countries, but Israel is like the stingy businessman who ignores the homeless man asking "buddy can you spare a dime?"

 

[donsutherland1]

You apparently think that somehow means the Palestinians should accept any deal the Israelis offer.

Personally, I believe the Palestinians received fair offers in 2000 (President Clinton's bridging proposal) and 2008 (Prime Minister Olmert's initiative). But that is beside the point. It is irrelevant to my larger point.

My larger point is that choices have consequences. The Arabs' choice not to accept the 1947 partition plan led to consequences in which no opportunity will present terms as favorable as those associated with the 1947 plan. I've already explained my reasoning in earlier messages, so I won't repeat its detail. Basically, on-the-ground developments, power disparities, and the international community's policies don't point in that direction.

Hence, if or when the Palestinians give consideration to another proposal, they seriously need to calculate whether "holding out" will allow them to gain more favorable terms or whether it will cost them another opportunity (meaning less favorable terms would be available in the future). My first guess is that Prime Minister Netanyahu would ultimately agree to terms that fall somewhere between those of the Camp David 2000 (less than Clinton's December 2000 bridging proposal) and 2008 proposals, though I could be wrong. The Palestinians will then have a strategic decision to make. In turn, their choice will have consequences. One cannot rule out a miscalculation along the lines of 1947 whereby terms that were once available are permanently lost. For starters, long-term natural growth (births less mortality) in settlements could lead to evacuation of additional settlements becoming impractical, even if no new settlements or settlement outposts are constructed. That would mean less available land.

One can complain all one wants about such a development, but the reality is that once a certain critical mass is reached and evacuation becomes impractical, the costs (financial, economic, social, etc.) of evacuation for Israel could well exceed the expected benefits. That situation has not yet arrived. Israel will probably retain 3-5 major settlement blocs. But, let's say no agreement is reached for several decades, the amount of settlements to be retained will almost certainly be larger.

In sum, if a reasonable offer is presented that approaches the Clinton or Olmert terms, the Palestinians would do well to accept it. At a minimum, they would avoid future losses from holding out over a long period of time. At a maximum, peace would also allow for rapid economic growth/standard of living improvements, not dissimilar to those that were realized in South Korea when Japan and South Korea made peace and large-scale Japanese investment flowed into South Korea.

 

[Demon of Light]

Personally, I believe the Palestinians received fair offers in 2000 (President Clinton's bridging proposal) and 2008 (Prime Minister Olmert's initiative).

That doesn't surprise me in the slightest. Naturally for you demanding that the Palestinians have no means of self-defense, surrender control of their airspace to Israel, allow a permanent Israeli military presence, and allow Israel to annex even more of their land without a fair land swap while providing no compensation to anyone for land Israel took from past Palestinians is quite fair. Hence why you even suggesting your position is anything short of extremely biased towards Israel would be a lie.

You have made it clear that you tow the party line on Israel and as such the only way you could surprise me is if you actually suggested the Palestinians have been mistreated by Israel even just a little. By that I don't mean pointing to some Hebron settlers who you will quickly dismiss as renegades.

Hence, if or when the Palestinians give consideration to another proposal, they seriously need to calculate whether "holding out" will allow them to gain more favorable terms or whether it will cost them another opportunity (meaning less favorable terms would be available in the future). My first guess is that Prime Minister Netanyahu would ultimately agree to terms that fall somewhere between those of the Camp David 2000 (less than Clinton's December 2000 bridging proposal) and 2008 proposals, though I could be wrong. The Palestinians will then have a strategic decision to make. In turn, their choice will have consequences. One cannot rule out a miscalculation along the lines of 1947 whereby terms that were once available are permanently lost. For starters, long-term natural growth (births less mortality) in settlements could lead to evacuation of additional settlements becoming impractical, even if no new settlements or settlement outposts are constructed. That would mean less available land.

This is the way of the aggressor. It is hardly a unique situation as we have seen it in countless other cases. A powerful aggressor uses its position to get rewards for its aggression that includes influence and control over the victim of aggression. This was used against Japan and China in the middle of the 19th Century and eventually used by Japan against China toward the end of the 19th Century. Unfortunately, the world keeps supporting Israel in pursuing rewards for its aggression.

People like you only encourage Israel in this sense and make it all the easier for them to abuse and oppress the Palestinians. Can anyone here honestly say Israel would or should accept such terms if the roles were reversed? If not then stop calling it "fair" or a "compromise" and call it exactly what it is: an attempt to be rewarded for aggression.

One can complain all one wants about such a development, but the reality is that once a certain critical mass is reached and evacuation becomes impractical, the costs (financial, economic, social, etc.) of evacuation for Israel could well exceed the expected benefits. That situation has not yet arrived. Israel will probably retain 3-5 major settlement blocs. But, let's say no agreement is reached for several decades, the amount of settlements to be retained will almost certainly be larger.

Except it isn't as simple as that. The Palestinians were not even opposed to such annexation, provided they are compensated with an equal amount of land from Israel. Olmert's plan at least seemed to approach them on this issue, but even then fell short.

In sum, if a reasonable offer is presented that approaches the Clinton or Olmert terms, the Palestinians would do well to accept it. At a minimum, they would avoid future losses from holding out over a long period of time. At a maximum, peace would also allow for rapid economic growth/standard of living improvements, not dissimilar to those that were realized in South Korea when Japan and South Korea made peace and large-scale Japanese investment flowed into South Korea.

I am amazed that you just don't seem to get it. There was nothing reasonable about the Clinton terms or even the Olmert terms. All it would really do is give the Palestinians official independence while continuing to deprive them of actual independence. No one reasonable would expect only symbolic independence. Some have said Israel just wants the talks to fail and I would not be surprised if this is the case because they have shown essentially no interest in a real compromise.

 

[donsutherland1]

That doesn't surprise me in the slightest. Naturally for you demanding that the Palestinians have no means of self-defense, surrender control of their airspace to Israel, allow a permanent Israeli military presence, and allow Israel to annex even more of their land without a fair land swap while providing no compensation to anyone for land Israel took from past Palestinians is quite fair.

What things boil down to is that Israel did not and will not accept the Palestinians’ maximum demands. Those maximum demands conflict with Israel’s security needs.

Hence, a civil aviation agreement in which both countries’ civil flights can use one another’s air space is feasible. An arrangement that would allow the Palestinians to build an offensive air force is not. Maybe in the future after years of cooperation and a building of trust that dynamic will change, but not now.

A mechanism that substantially reduces arms smuggling will also be needed. Possible arrangements might include joint Jordanian-Israeli-Palestinian patrols, NATO participation, or some other alternative. However, such mechanisms would need to be credible. The UNIFIL approach in Lebanon is not a viable model. But those are matters that need to be raised during the negotiations.

FWIW, the Olmert Proposal, inclusive of land swaps, would have granted the Palestinians some 99% of the West Bank. Arguing that a 1% differential is "unfair" is ridiculous. The Palestinians would have attained virtually all of the land that they desired, and far more than they can hope to gain on their own outside of negotiations.

This is the way of the aggressor. It is hardly a unique situation as we have seen it in countless other cases. A powerful aggressor uses its position to get rewards for its aggression that includes influence and control over the victim of aggression. This was used against Japan and China in the middle of the 19th Century and eventually used by Japan against China toward the end of the 19th Century. Unfortunately, the world keeps supporting Israel in pursuing rewards for its aggression.

In terms of aggression, Israel didn’t preemptively launch the 1948 War to enlarge its territory. The Arabs launched that war in a naked act of aggression aimed at quashing the then newly re-established Israel. They lost that war of aggression. Afterward, they stubbornly resisted efforts to make peace. With the passage of more than six decades since the end of that conflict, the 1947 partition boundaries are no longer relevant.

People like you only encourage Israel in this sense and make it all the easier for them to abuse and oppress the Palestinians. Can anyone here honestly say Israel would or should accept such terms if the roles were reversed? If not then stop calling it "fair" or a "compromise" and call it exactly what it is: an attempt to be rewarded for aggression.

IMO, treating the situation as a “glass is empty” approach when Palestinian maximum demands cannot be fulfilled is greatly out of step with reality. It also does the Palestinians no favors, as it only delays prospects of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state and allows time to erode the terms that might be offered down the road.

Both parties will need to compromise if an agreement is to be reached. Neither party is entitled to its maximum demands. Each party can expect its core needs to be accommodated. An offensive military capability for the Palestinians is not a core need. A framework that allows the Palestinians adequate security forces to maintain domestic order is a core need.

Of course, the Palestinians are free to pursue their maximum agenda. But the choice has consequences. Given existing power disparities, one such consequence is the squandering of good solutions and a boxing themselves into a position that winds up worse than might otherwise have been the case. The lesson of the squandered 1947 opportunity speaks eloquently for itself.

 

[Demon of Light]

What things boil down to is that Israel did not and will not accept the Palestinians’ maximum demands. Those maximum demands conflict with Israel’s security needs.

That would leave the Palestinians with no reason to engage in negotiations if Israel will only accept token independence.

Hence, a civil aviation agreement in which both countries’ civil flights can use one another’s air space is feasible. An arrangement that would allow the Palestinians to build an offensive air force is not. Maybe in the future after years of cooperation and a building of trust that dynamic will change, but not now.

It wasn't that they couldn't build an "offensive air force" but that they couldn't even build a defensive one or anything else defensive. A demilitarized state means no military whatsoever. Also, the demands would involve Israel controlling Palestinian airspace altogether.

FWIW, the Olmert Proposal, inclusive of land swaps, would have granted the Palestinians some 99% of the West Bank. Arguing that a 1% differential is "unfair" is ridiculous. The Palestinians would have attained virtually all of the land that they desired, and far more than they can hope to gain on their own outside of negotiations.

Actually it is quite unfair given that said territory was being set up for annexation right after the Palestinians had agreed to a two-state solution. In other words Israel deliberately sought to sabotage a two-state solution by effectively annexing territories. Allowing them to shrink a future Palestinian state as a reward for seeking to prevent compromise is completely unfair.

In terms of aggression, Israel didn’t preemptively launch the 1948 War to enlarge its territory. The Arabs launched that war in a naked act of aggression aimed at quashing the then newly re-established Israel. They lost that war of aggression. Afterward, they stubbornly resisted efforts to make peace. With the passage of more than six decades since the end of that conflict, the 1947 partition boundaries are no longer relevant.

Except as I have pointed out elsewhere that is not the case with 1948 War for a variety of reasons. The Jordanians had no real interest in stopping the partition and only Syria and Egypt actually invaded the territory of the Jewish state. With Egypt it was primarily the Negev that the Jewish state had no real right to in the first place since it was populated dominantly by Arabs. Also, the war began before that in 1947 and saying the Arabs launched it is really distorting the situation.

At any rate the issue here is the West Bank and Gaza today that Israel seized in a purely offensive war in 1967 and began seriously taking steps to partially annex after Palestinian leaders showed a clear commitment to compromise.

IMO, treating the situation as a “glass is empty” approach when Palestinian maximum demands cannot be fulfilled is greatly out of step with reality. It also does the Palestinians no favors, as it only delays prospects of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state and allows time to erode the terms that might be offered down the road.

The glass is empty, but the Israelis think they can paint the bottom blue and claim it's half full. Of course, you continue with your audacity by actually suggesting that somehow you have the best interests of the Palestinians at heart. You have the best interests of Israel at heart and could care less about the interests of the Palestinians.

Both parties will need to compromise if an agreement is to be reached.

Stop spreading that bull****. You keep talking about how "both parties need to compromise" as if it somehow means the Palestinians are not willing to compromise but Israel is willing when it is actually the reverse. Every proposal Israel has given essentially formalizes the status quo, meaning Israel keeps its iron grip on the Palestinians and they are denied any means to defend themselves. All the Palestinians gain is legal independence without the reality of independence.

An offensive military capability for the Palestinians is not a core need. A framework that allows the Palestinians adequate security forces to maintain domestic order is a core need.

Amazing how you completely leave out the part in between those two that is definitely a core need and definitely not allowed by Israel: a defensive military.

Of course, the Palestinians are free to pursue their maximum agenda. But the choice has consequences. Given existing power disparities, one such consequence is the squandering of good solutions and a boxing themselves into a position that winds up worse than might otherwise have been the case. The lesson of the squandered 1947 opportunity speaks eloquently for itself.

In order to squander good solutions there have to be good solutions to squander. What Israel has done is give the Palestinians demands they simply cannot accept that would preserve the status quo oppressive relationship and then blame the Palestinians for rejecting "compromise" despite the Palestinians making bigger moves for compromise than Israel has by far. What the Palestinians asked for is a country with limited arms, that has the same area as the West Bank and Gaza, and a situation where at least some agreed number of refugees can return to their proper homes if they want with the rest being compensate. None of these things would actually jeopardize Israel as the balance of military power would still be clearly in its favor, it would get the settlement blocs, and no wave of refugees creating a major demographic shift.

Yet, Israel refuses this because it wants to gain more territory than it loses, have a toothless neighbor, and does not really want to give the Palestinians any of its own money.

 

[donsutherland1]

In order to squander good solutions there have to be good solutions to squander.

As previously noted, the Palestinians cannot expect Israel to yield to their maximum demands. Furthermore, they do not possess the power to have a chance to compel Israel to yield to their maximum demands. Therefore, they will need to compromise if they expect to reach agreement, as will Israel. Compromise can lead to a reasonable settlement somewhere between the Camp David proposal of 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal.

If such an offer is available, the Palestinians will need to calculate carefully whether their holding out will yield a better solution, especially if Israel's focus shifts more and more to Iran. Considering the risk that the U.S. could also be experiencing mediation fatigue in the wake of a failure of peace talks, the Palestinians will need to be prepared to stand on their own in search of a solution should the U.S. redeploy its diplomatic resources to priorities that align to the nation's critical interests. While Palestinian pressure might yield some additional gains, such an outcome is far from assured. It is entirely possible that the Palestinians could wind up locked into one of two alternatives if they reject a reasonable final settlement offer:

1. Perpetuation of the status quo, which will lead to less generous offers in the future due to on-the-ground developments.
2. Israeli disengagement in the end. Such disengagement would probably lead to Israel's retaining perhaps up to 20% of the West Bank vs. the 1%-3% figures inclusive of land swaps that it would have retained under the Clinton and Olmert offers.

There would be more drawbacks than territory. Either outcome would likely limit Israeli investment into the Palestinian economy. There would also be no water/resource sharing, trade, or civil aviation agreements. There would also be no refugee resettlement fund. The Palestinians would be worse off in multiple areas on account of having passed up a reasonable offer. The great tragedy for the Palestinian people is that such an outcome would constitute yet another completely avoidable and wholly self-inflicted wound.

Given the 1947, 2000, and 2008 blunders, another miscalculation cannot be ruled out. IMO, if a similar offer to the Clinton or Olmert parameters becomes available, the Palestinians would do well to seize that opportunity to gain a sovereign state at the expense of any desire they might harbor to build a military force that could eventually pose a threat to Israel. They would do better to exercise pragmatism than hold fast to a rigid commitment to maximum demands that they lack the power to impose and that Israel can only reject due to its undermining Israel's needs.

 

[reefedjib]

As previously noted, the Palestinians cannot expect Israel to yield to their maximum demands. Furthermore, they do not possess the power to have a chance to compel Israel to yield to their maximum demands. Therefore, they will need to compromise if they expect to reach agreement, as will Israel. Compromise can lead to a reasonable settlement somewhere between the Camp David proposal of 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal.

If such an offer is available, the Palestinians will need to calculate carefully whether their holding out will yield a better solution, especially if Israel's focus shifts more and more to Iran. Considering the risk that the U.S. could also be experiencing mediation fatigue in the wake of a failure of peace talks, the Palestinians will need to be prepared to stand on their own in search of a solution should the U.S. redeploy its diplomatic resources to priorities that align to the nation's critical interests. While Palestinian pressure might yield some additional gains, such an outcome is far from assured. It is entirely possible that the Palestinians could wind up locked into one of two alternatives if they reject a reasonable final settlement offer:

1. Perpetuation of the status quo, which will lead to less generous offers in the future due to on-the-ground developments.
2. Israeli disengagement in the end. Such disengagement would probably lead to Israel's retaining perhaps up to 20% of the West Bank vs. the 1%-3% figures inclusive of land swaps that it would have retained under the Clinton and Olmert offers.

There would be more drawbacks than territory. Either outcome would likely limit Israeli investment into the Palestinian economy. There would also be no water/resource sharing, trade, or civil aviation agreements. There would also be no refugee resettlement fund. The Palestinians would be worse off in multiple areas on account of having passed up a reasonable offer. The great tragedy for the Palestinian people is that such an outcome would constitute yet another completely avoidable and wholly self-inflicted wound.

Given the 1947, 2000, and 2008 blunders, another miscalculation cannot be ruled out. IMO, if a similar offer to the Clinton or Olmert parameters becomes available, the Palestinians would do well to seize that opportunity to gain a sovereign state at the expense of any desire they might harbor to build a military force that could eventually pose a threat to Israel. They would do better to exercise pragmatism than hold fast to a rigid commitment to maximum demands that they lack the power to impose and that Israel can only reject due to its undermining Israel's needs.

And yet the good money is that this is precisely what the Palestinians will do.

 

[alexa]

As previously noted, the Palestinians cannot expect Israel to yield to their maximum demands. Furthermore, they do not possess the power to have a chance to compel Israel to yield to their maximum demands. Therefore, they will need to compromise if they expect to reach agreement, as will Israel. Compromise can lead to a reasonable settlement somewhere between the Camp David proposal of 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal.

If such an offer is available, the Palestinians will need to calculate carefully whether their holding out will yield a better solution, especially if Israel's focus shifts more and more to Iran. Considering the risk that the U.S. could also be experiencing mediation fatigue in the wake of a failure of peace talks, the Palestinians will need to be prepared to stand on their own in search of a solution should the U.S. redeploy its diplomatic resources to priorities that align to the nation's critical interests. While Palestinian pressure might yield some additional gains, such an outcome is far from assured. It is entirely possible that the Palestinians could wind up locked into one of two alternatives if they reject a reasonable final settlement offer:

1. Perpetuation of the status quo, which will lead to less generous offers in the future due to on-the-ground developments.
2. Israeli disengagement in the end. Such disengagement would probably lead to Israel's retaining perhaps up to 20% of the West Bank vs. the 1%-3% figures inclusive of land swaps that it would have retained under the Clinton and Olmert offers.

There would be more drawbacks than territory. Either outcome would likely limit Israeli investment into the Palestinian economy. There would also be no water/resource sharing, trade, or civil aviation agreements. There would also be no refugee resettlement fund. The Palestinians would be worse off in multiple areas on account of having passed up a reasonable offer. The great tragedy for the Palestinian people is that such an outcome would constitute yet another completely avoidable and wholly self-inflicted wound.

Given the 1947, 2000, and 2008 blunders, another miscalculation cannot be ruled out. IMO, if a similar offer to the Clinton or Olmert parameters becomes available, the Palestinians would do well to seize that opportunity to gain a sovereign state at the expense of any desire they might harbor to build a military force that could eventually pose a threat to Israel. They would do better to exercise pragmatism than hold fast to a rigid commitment to maximum demands that they lack the power to impose and that Israel can only reject due to its undermining Israel's needs.

I don't believe there will be any peace. The settlements already are too much for that and as you have said Israel hold's all the military power. It has no need to make peace. Even if you are right that the settlements are not too much already and I think your wrong, Palestinains are already being depored from east Jerusalem and so on.

No, I have no hope of peace here. There is not the will. Israel has nothing to gain from it that she wants.

What do you see the end result then? Dare I ask, how far into the sea will the Palestinians be pushed?

 

[Demon of Light]

As previously noted, the Palestinians cannot expect Israel to yield to their maximum demands.

Except they aren't. What they want is full right of return, no limits on their military forces, no foreign military presence, and preserving exactly those territories that currently constitute the Palestinian Territories. Those are probably their maximum demands. Yet the Palestinians are willing to agree with Israel on a limit for people who can return with compensation for others, limiting their military forces, allowing some foreign military presence provided it isn't Israeli military, and trading an equal amount of territory even if they get uninhabited territory.

Israel's maximum demands would be a demilitarized Palestinian state, no right of return or compensation, a permanent Israeli military presence, and less territory for the Palestinians than with the 1967 borders.

Now, who is more likely to have most or all of their maximum demands met by the various past proposals you've mentioned?

Furthermore, they do not possess the power to have a chance to compel Israel to yield to their maximum demands.

In other words, "might makes right" and you fully support that because currently that favors Israel.

Compromise can lead to a reasonable settlement somewhere between the Camp David proposal of 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal.

Somewhere between two terrible proposals is still a terrible proposal.

1. Perpetuation of the status quo

Also known as the Israeli peace plan.

The great tragedy for the Palestinian people is that such an outcome would constitute yet another completely avoidable and wholly self-inflicted wound.

Stop feigning concern for the Palestinians. You have made clear in just about every topic concerning Israel that you take Israel's side and are against the Palestinians.

Given the 1947, 2000, and 2008 blunders, another miscalculation cannot be ruled out. IMO, if a similar offer to the Clinton or Olmert parameters becomes available, the Palestinians would do well to seize that opportunity to gain a sovereign state at the expense of any desire they might harbor to build a military force that could eventually pose a threat to Israel.

They haven't demanded such a force. They only ask that they have some means to defend themselves. When Israel is demanding control of Palestinian airspace, a permanent military presence, and land exchange that would leave large enclaves of Palestinian territory in Israel telling the Palestinians that they cannot have a force capable of defending their country is basically telling them they're Israel's bitch.

 

[donsutherland1]

I don't believe there will be any peace. The settlements already are too much for that and as you have said Israel hold's all the military power. It has no need to make peace. Even if you are right that the settlements are not too much already and I think your wrong, Palestinains are already being depored from east Jerusalem and so on.

No, I have no hope of peace here. There is not the will. Israel has nothing to gain from it that she wants.

What do you see the end result then? Dare I ask, how far into the sea will the Palestinians be pushed?

Alexa,

I believe the Palestinians still have a chance to achieve a reasonable settlement somewhere between the parameters of the Camp David proposal of 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal. But to get there, they will need to demonstrate good faith and the kind of flexibility they have not shown in the past. They will also need to resist the temptation to walk away from talks.

What is not attainable is the Palestinian maximum position. For obvious reasons, Israel won't accept a "right of return" of Paletinian refugees and their descendants to Israel. Israel won't accept an offensive Palestinian military (competent security forces that are sufficient to maintain internal Palestinian order will be acceptable). In other words, Israel's survival and security are core needs that will have to be accommodated. In exchange, the Palestians would gain most of the West Bank (probably 95%-99% inclusive of land swaps), a refugee resettlement fund, and an ability to maintain a competent security force. Those conditions would address their core needs for territory for a state, financing to relocate refugees who wish to move to the West Bank/Gaza Strip, and a security force essential to maintaining stability. Resource sharing, civil aviation, and other economic agreements could also be available. That's hardly 'pushing the Palestinians into the sea.'

If the Palestinian leadership has the courage and foresight to accept such generous terms, the Palestinian people will have a chance to enjoy sovereignty and to materially advance their standard of living. However, early signals from Abbas indicate that he is already planning to walk away from the talks. An absence of negotiations does not advance Palestinian interests. It does make preservation of the status quo, reduced land in a future agreement, and possibly less generous Israeli disengagement more likely in the future. Unfortunately, those in the Palestinian Authority who advocate unwavering commitment to the Palestinian maximum position don't understand that to do so and to avoid a reasonable settlement only paves the way for something less generous in the future and it also delays the Palestinian people of opportunities to live in their own state and to significantly advance their standard of living.

 

[donsutherland1]

Stop feigning concern for the Palestinians.

I would argue that the position that the Palestinians seize an opportunity for a reasonable settlement--opportunities that they have already had in the past under the Clinton bridging proposal and Olmert initiative--is vastly more compatible with the interests and welfare of the Palestinian people than unflinching advocacy of the Palestinian maximum position. In the former, the Palestinians have a chance to attain a sovereign state, receive significant funding for the relocation of refugees, and materially advance their standard of living. In the latter, peace is postponed, no funding for the resettlement of refugees is available, on-the-ground developments reduce the favorability of future terms, investment flows are limited, economic cooperation is limited, and the prospect of ultimate disengagement from a smaller area of the West Bank is increased.

 

[Degreez]

It recognizes and affirms that the UN explicitly created Israel to be a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people.

This is explicit in the Partition resolution... Two states, one Jewish and one Arab.

If the exact Partition resolution was carried out, the new Jewish state would still have had a sizeable Arab majority.

Israel can define itself. Another country's recognition of it does not define it.

 

[Degreez]

What is not attainable is the Palestinian maximum position. For obvious reasons, Israel won't accept a "right of return" of Paletinian refugees and their descendants to Israel. Israel won't accept an offensive Palestinian military (competent security forces that are sufficient to maintain internal Palestinian order will be acceptable). In other words, Israel's survival and security are core needs that will have to be accommodated. In exchange, the Palestians would gain most of the West Bank (probably 95%-99% inclusive of land swaps), a refugee resettlement fund, and an ability to maintain a competent security force. Those conditions would address their core needs for territory for a state, financing to relocate refugees who wish to move to the West Bank/Gaza Strip, and a security force essential to maintaining stability. Resource sharing, civil aviation, and other economic agreements could also be available. That's hardly 'pushing the Palestinians into the sea.'

These are all absurd demands for the Palestinians to accept. I hope you are not serious.

You are demanding that in order for Palestine to achieve statehood it must give up all claims to its own sovereignty. It may not maintain a military nor properly control its borders. Basically, you are asking the Palestinians to accept a continued Israeli military occupation.

I say the Palestinians create a list of ridiculous demands that will never be met so that they too can stall real peace talks.

In order for their to be just and lasting peace between Israel and Palestine, the Palestinians should demand that Israel completely destroy its nuclear weapons program and get rid of all nuclear warheads in its possession. How can their be just and lasting peace if you don't make note of Palestine's core survival and security needs? You seem to be only focused on Israel's security and right to self-defense. Is the security and right to self-defense of Palestine not as important as Israel's? You have shown you are nothing but hypocritical in your demands and your concept of 'fair' is ludicrous.

 

[donsutherland1]

These are all absurd demands for the Palestinians to accept. I hope you are not serious.

You misunderstand my point. I'll break it down:

- What the Palestinians won't get: Agreement that would allow them to build an offensive military capability
- What the Palestinians are assured of getting: Agreement that would allow for competent security forces sufficient to maintain internal Palestinian order

There is latitude between those two positions. If the Palestinians can provide Israel with sufficient concessions that accommodate Israel's security needs, my guess is that some military capabilities that go beyond security forces would be attainable. At the same time, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt could provide the Palestinians with additional security assurances.

Finally, one cannot pretend that power does not matter. It is the Palestinians, not Israel, who are seeking a state. To achieve the most favorable terms, they need an agreement with Israel; a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state or eventual Israeli disengagement from the West Bank will produce less favorable terms (Israel would retain a larger share of the West Bank, perhaps up to 20%; No refugee resettlement fund would be created; No trade agreement would be reached; No civil aviation agreement would be forged; No resource-sharing agreement would be developed.

At the same time, the Palestinians lack the capacity to impose their will on the region. Hence, if the Palestinians choose to take a course other than a negotiated agreement to achieve their state, they will be unable to escape the above-noted drawbacks, much less extract more favorable terms than would have been possible in an agreement. Israel, on the other hand, possesses the power to impose its will e.g., block the Palestinian maximum agenda, among other things. Hence, the Palestinians may not want to satisfy Israel's security needs, but if they fail to do so, their options will be far more limited than they would have been under a mutually agreed solution.

Ultimately, an agreement will have to accommodate both parties' core needs, not their maximum agendas. Otherwise, there will be no agreement.

Having said that, I suspect that a reasonable deal with parameters somewhere between the 2000 Camp David proposal and 2008 Olmert proposal is still very feasible. If such terms are available, the Palestinians should seize the opportunity. My guess is that if the Palestinians squander such an opportunity, the international community will play a less active role on the issue going forward, as most would probably consider such an agreement fair and reasonable and rejection of such terms a repudiation of the efforts made on behalf of the Palestinians to achieve a sovereign state. If, on the other hand, Israel offered significantly less than what was on the table at Camp David in 2000, Israel would face criticism from the international community.

 

[Demon of Light]

If, on the other hand, Israel offered significantly less than what was on the table at Camp David in 2000, Israel would face criticism from the international community.

The only way they could offer less than at Camp David is if they said "screw it we're not giving you independence."

Alexa,

I believe the Palestinians still have a chance to achieve a reasonable settlement somewhere between the parameters of the Camp David proposal of 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal. But to get there, they will need to demonstrate good faith and the kind of flexibility they have not shown in the past. They will also need to resist the temptation to walk away from talks.

They have shown nothing but flexibility. What flexibility has Israel shown?

If the Palestinian leadership has the courage and foresight to accept such generous terms, the Palestinian people will have a chance to enjoy sovereignty and to materially advance their standard of living. However, early signals from Abbas indicate that he is already planning to walk away from the talks. An absence of negotiations does not advance Palestinian interests.

What sovereignty? I looked a little more into the Camp David proposal and it is even worse than I thought. In your "resource-sharing" comment you fail to mention the resources they're sharing would be in the Palestinian state. Israel would manage Palestine's water and allow them to have some of it. So to review Israel's past proposal, which you said the Palestinians should have accepted as a "compromise" would:

1. Give Israel control over Palestinian airspace including allowing military flight whenever they want.
2. Give Israel a permanent military presence.
3. Give Israel control of the Jordan Valley for several decades.
4. Give Israel control over Palestinian water.
5. Give Israel control of a road bisecting the West Bank that it can close whenever it feels necessary.
6. Give Israel control over Palestinian foreign policy (it required any alliance to be approved by Israel).
7. Deny the Palestinians a defensive military force.
8. Deny the Palestinians a fair land trade.
9. Deny the Palestinians most of East Jerusalem with only representation in the Israel municipal government.
10. Deny the Palestinians any role in East Jerusalem construction or planning.

Yet you insist this is a "compromise" the Palestinians should have accepted and once more showing that audacity in claiming you are saying this in their interest. You're living in the land of Oz don. It's bull**** to say the Palestinians were being unreasonable in rejecting that plan let alone blaming them for the failure of negotiations.

Also, I am once more noting how you have ignored most of my points again.

 

[donsutherland1]

What sovereignty? I looked a little more into the Camp David proposal and it is even worse than I thought. In your "resource-sharing" comment you fail to mention the resources they're sharing would be in the Palestinian state. Israel would manage Palestine's water and allow them to have some of it. So to review Israel's past proposal, which you said the Palestinians should have accepted...

One small problem. In Message #31, I stated:

Personally, I believe the Palestinians received fair offers in 2000 (President Clinton's bridging proposal) and 2008 (Prime Minister Olmert's initiative).

The 2000 Camp David proposal is relevant only because it offers what I believe is a floor for any serious Israeli proposal. As noted in Message #31, I believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu would ultimately agree to terms that fall somewhere between those of the Camp David 2000 (less than Clinton's December 2000 bridging proposal) proposal and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal. Probably the terms would be more generous than the Camp David idea but more restrictive than the 2008 one.

 

[Demon of Light]

One small problem. In Message #31, I stated:

Personally, I believe the Palestinians received fair offers in 2000 (President Clinton's bridging proposal) and 2008 (Prime Minister Olmert's initiative).

The 2000 Camp David proposal is relevant only because it offers what I believe is a floor for any serious Israeli proposal. As noted in Message #31, I believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu would ultimately agree to terms that fall somewhere between those of the Camp David 2000 (less than Clinton's December 2000 bridging proposal) proposal and Prime Minister Olmert's 2008 proposal. Probably the terms would be more generous than the Camp David idea but more restrictive than the 2008 one.

Unfortunately all that we have about Olmert's proposal is that there was some more land exchanged and aside from the demand for a demilitarized state (meaning not only that they have no offensive military, but not means of self-defense whatsoever) very little is mentioned about demands tied to "security needs" of Israel. Also, I can easily point out to everyone that you in fact said they should have accepted the terms in any of the proposals, including the Camp David proposal not just the Clinton Parameters, not that you felt they were a good starting position.

Also, you are the one who keeps bringing up these proposals and saying the Palestinians should have accepted these "reasonable" proposals, implying that it is all the fault of the Palestinians. Let met give you a little lesson on diplomacy. When discussing independence, a proposal where independence exists only on paper is generally not considered a reasonable proposal and should the party presenting that proposal refuse to compromise it is on them if talks fail.

 

[donsutherland1]

Unfortunately all that we have about Olmert's proposal is that there was some more land exchanged and aside from the demand for a demilitarized state (meaning not only that they have no offensive military, but not means of self-defense whatsoever) very little is mentioned about demands tied to "security needs" of Israel. Also, I can easily point out to everyone that you in fact said they should have accepted the terms in any of the proposals, including the Camp David proposal not just the Clinton Parameters, not that you felt they were a good starting position.

Also, you are the one who keeps bringing up these proposals and saying the Palestinians should have accepted these "reasonable" proposals, implying that it is all the fault of the Palestinians. Let met give you a little lesson on diplomacy. When discussing independence, a proposal where independence exists only on paper is generally not considered a reasonable proposal and should the party presenting that proposal refuse to compromise it is on them if talks fail.

Both the Clinton and Olmert proposals were eminently reasonable. The Palestinians should have accepted either proposal. Had they done so, they would be in a better position than they are today, economically, socially, politically, and in terms of security.

It is the Palestinian maximum demands, particularly the demand that Israel accept a "right of return" for the refugees and their descendants to Israel that is anything but reasonable.The Palestinians are not entitled to fulfillment of their maximum demands. Due to its security needs, Israel can and should insist that the Palestinians agree not to build an offensive military. Moreover, I highly doubt that the U.S. or Madrid Quartet would condemn Israel for attempting to deny the Palestinians an offensive military capability.

Of course, the Palestinians remain free to choose when it comes to proposals. But if they turn down additional reasonable proposals and choose either to resume a boycott of negotiations or attempt a unilateral declaration, they cannot reasonably expect that Israel or other neighboring states will perpetually put their affairs on ice to spare the Palestinians of adverse consequences for turning down those proposals. Freezing the peace process will lead to on-the-ground developments that will reduce future land that will be available to the Palestinians, perhaps culminating in an Israeli disengagement from the West Bank (with Israel perhaps retaining around 20% of the West Bank). A unilateral declaration on the part of the Palestinians will lead Israel to make its own unilateral declarations, and unlike with Israel, the Palestinians lack the power to impose their unilateral solution. Assuming the Palestinian leadership makes a rational calculation of its interests and costs-benefits associated with various options, it will understand that engaging in a prolonged diplomatic freeze or attempting a unilateral solution will produce markedly worse outcomes than what would be available via diplomacy.

As noted earlier, it is their choice. The Arabs blundered in 1947. Arafat squandered a historic opportunity in December 2000. Abbas missed one big chance for peace in late 2008.

Finally, I fully realize, that the 2000 and 2008 initiatives fall short of the Palestinian maximum position and that those adhering to that maximum position almost certainly find the idea that the Palestinians may have to compromise unacceptable. But that is reality. They will need to compromise. Diplomacy will give them much more than they can hope to achieve through unilateralism.

 

[Apocalypse]

Unfortunately all that we have about Olmert's proposal is that there was some more land exchanged and aside from the demand for a demilitarized state (meaning not only that they have no offensive military, but not means of self-defense whatsoever) very little is mentioned about demands tied to "security needs" of Israel. Also, I can easily point out to everyone that you in fact said they should have accepted the terms in any of the proposals, including the Camp David proposal not just the Clinton Parameters, not that you felt they were a good starting position.

Also, you are the one who keeps bringing up these proposals and saying the Palestinians should have accepted these "reasonable" proposals, implying that it is all the fault of the Palestinians. Let met give you a little lesson on diplomacy. When discussing independence, a proposal where independence exists only on paper is generally not considered a reasonable proposal and should the party presenting that proposal refuse to compromise it is on them if talks fail.

They'd be independent, not only on paper, but independent on the ground as well.
There are enough examples of demilitarized independent states in this world for you to educate yourself about it.

 

[Demon of Light]

Both the Clinton and Olmert proposals were eminently reasonable. The Palestinians should have accepted either proposal. Had they done so, they would be in a better position than they are today, economically, socially, politically, and in terms of security.

It is the Palestinian maximum demands, particularly the demand that Israel accept a "right of return" for the refugees and their descendants to Israel that is anything but reasonable.The Palestinians are not entitled to fulfillment of their maximum demands. Due to its security needs, Israel can and should insist that the Palestinians agree not to build an offensive military. Moreover, I highly doubt that the U.S. or Madrid Quartet would condemn Israel for attempting to deny the Palestinians an offensive military capability.

Of course, the Palestinians remain free to choose when it comes to proposals. But if they turn down additional reasonable proposals and choose either to resume a boycott of negotiations or attempt a unilateral declaration, they cannot reasonably expect that Israel or other neighboring states will perpetually put their affairs on ice to spare the Palestinians of adverse consequences for turning down those proposals. Freezing the peace process will lead to on-the-ground developments that will reduce future land that will be available to the Palestinians, perhaps culminating in an Israeli disengagement from the West Bank (with Israel perhaps retaining around 20% of the West Bank). A unilateral declaration on the part of the Palestinians will lead Israel to make its own unilateral declarations, and unlike with Israel, the Palestinians lack the power to impose their unilateral solution. Assuming the Palestinian leadership makes a rational calculation of its interests and costs-benefits associated with various options, it will understand that engaging in a prolonged diplomatic freeze or attempting a unilateral solution will produce markedly worse outcomes than what would be available via diplomacy.

As noted earlier, it is their choice. The Arabs blundered in 1947. Arafat squandered a historic opportunity in December 2000. Abbas missed one big chance for peace in late 2008.

Finally, I fully realize, that the 2000 and 2008 initiatives fall short of the Palestinian maximum position and that those adhering to that maximum position almost certainly find the idea that the Palestinians may have to compromise unacceptable. But that is reality. They will need to compromise. Diplomacy will give them much more than they can hope to achieve through unilateralism.

It is clear you are just ignoring points I have made and preferring to stick to your own repetitive distortion of my argument. Let us be clear, the Palestinians have not been expecting their maximum demands to be met. They have offered that the vast majority of Palestinians not return to any part of Israel including allowing a limit that would be agreed with Israel. No doubt the Palestinians want to build an offensive military, but they have instead asked only that they have a limited military meaning a force only sufficient for self-defense. The Palestinians have also not made the maximum demand of preserving all territory of the West Bank and only asked to be compensated with an equivalent amount of territory.

Ultimately there is so little information on Olmert's proposal but what information we have indicates it also included a demilitarized state, meaning no means of self-defense. What I have read about the offers on refugees it seems it was even less than what was offered at Camp David.

Let us consider your behavior in this debate so far:

1. You keep talking about the "maximum demands" of the Palestinians after I have made a point of saying several times that in fact they were not seeking to have their maximum demands satisfied.
2. Several points I have made about the various restrictions past Israeli proposals have put on Palestinian sovereignty that essentially deprive them of anything but symbolic independence have been ignored completely.
3. Despite putting forward a front of reason and objectivity you are essentially regurgitating all the pro-Israeli propaganda spouted by others on this forum and making it clear with phrases like "the newly re-established Israel" that you have no interest in neutrality.
4. While avoiding the inflammatory rhetoric of others your posts still implicitly push the same attacks against Palestinians. You assign the failure of past talks to the Palestinians refusing to compromise and desiring their maximum demands. Part of that includes the right of return, which you naturally cite as a threat to the Jews of Israel, playing into the paranoid claims of the Palestinians actually seeking a second Holocaust.

So far your argument has been nothing but a series of deflections, strawman arguments, slander against Palestinians, and parroting of the typical pro-Israeli rhetoric. The only difference between you and a poster like Apocalypse is you seek to conceal all this under a veil of intellectuality. When you're willing to have a real discussion of the facts and merits of the dispute I might be interested in continuing, but until then this is clearly nothing more than me banging my head against a brick wall.

 

[donsutherland1]

Let us be clear, the Palestinians have not been expecting their maximum demands to be met.

The demand that Israel accept a "right of return" for Palestinian refugees and their descendants to Israel is, in fact, a maximum demand. It would undermine the original intent of the partition plan.

...making it clear with phrases like "the newly re-established Israel" that you have no interest in neutrality...

Israel was re-established on May 14, 1948. That, again, is fact. It has absolutely nothing to do with neutrality or lack thereof.