Iran...

[Sergeant Stinger1]

This is just ignorant. In two sentences you managed to...

1) Declare that no country can be attacked without a draft, despite an entire history that clearly declares otherwise.
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Well I guess we could attack and bomb the heck out of any country, but I have not seen a war or conflict that we could win with out ground support and our ground support is stretched out alwready. Our numbers of National Guards in the U.S.A. are at a all time low.
Unless I am missunderstanding you, our entire history does NOT declare other wise. Out of our two biggest wars, WW2 was FULL of drafted men and Nam was FULL of drafted men.
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2) With all the things that this war is about, you rely on a simplified "daddy's war" mentality to exonerate a commitment to understand larger issues.
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I just can't see what ALL this war is about. According to Bushs own hand picked 911 commish there were NO WMD and Saddam-Iraq was NOT an imminent threat like Bush said. Granted, since Bushs invasion thousands of Terrorist have come into Iraq. All this "fight them on their land not on ours" is BS.
Bush 2001: We will not rest until Osama and his gang of thugs are captured.
Bush 2003: I don't know or care where Osama is. He is NOT a priority.
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3) And you are declaring that if another man was President, then people would sign up in droves to fight "Bushs personal Daddys war."

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I am NOT saying that if another man was President people would be signing up in groves.
I am saying that sign ups are at an all time LOW! What does that tell you?

 

[MSgt]

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I am NOT saying that if another man was President people would be signing up in groves.
I am saying that sign ups are at an all time LOW! What does that tell you?

That if we simply look in history we could see that an all voluntary military always suffers recruitment during war?

That since the free ride of earning college money and wearing a uniform in peace time is over, that the military isn't getting weaker individuals to sign up?


Are you aware that re-enlistment numbers are high? The military strength in the individual is at an all time high. Those that sign up, sign up for the right reasons. And those that re-enlist, re-enlist for the right reasons.

 

[EAGLE1]

This "taking a black eye for you" by fighting the Vietnamese just doesn't resonate with me at all. Early on, the French certainly didn't view themselves as fighting the Vietnamese for us; they were clearly out for themselves and their own imperial ambitions. The French viewed the retention of the Vietnamese rubber plantations, the access to far-eastern markets that the deep-water ports at Hanoi and Haiphong gave them, and other natural resources as vitally important to their recovery from WWII. There were most likely some in the US gov't that did approve of French imperial ambitions, but it is also well known that some were very much against aiding the French in those ambitions, especially when it meant opposing Ho Chi Minh and his nationalist aspirations, whom we had supported and funded when he opposed the Japanese during WWII. The question was not whether we supported French imperial ambitions, but whether we supported France -- the magnitude-of-order more important ally in WWII and whose recovery from the devastation of WWII was seen as deserving of a higher priority than that of Vietnam.

Moreover, the French were not only concerned with the Vietnamese but the Chinese as well, and recall that this was the still new Peoples Republic of China, headed by Mao. In about 1949, the Chinese ceded some areas on the Chinese/Vietnamese border to the Vietnamese and subsequently provided them with heavy weapons and supplies with which the Vietnamese were able to effectively counter the French, which was a principal reason for the French request to the US for weapons and supplies.

Roughly around this point in time, the policy of containment of communism in general and the Soviets in particular was being articulated by George Kennan at State, which was ultimately adopted by the Truman administration. Some, though, principally Gen. MacArthur, lobbied for an "Asia first" containment policy, while others, principally Gen Omar Bradley, argued for the continuation of a "Europe first" orientation. But thats a topic for another thread!

Had the US taken up the cudgel immediately after the French defeat at Dien Bein Phu in 1954, your assertion would seem more likely. But we didn't. It wasn't until Kennedy was President, long after the Geneva Accords of 1954 which divided Vietnam into North and South, that we began to provide military assistance and advisers in meaningful though still small amounts to the new South Vietnamese government. Until then, we had given the South Vietnamese equipment that was already in-country and had been destined for the French. A lot of the equipment was actually left over from WWII, and much of it was actually used.

The rest, as they say, is history. But to say that the French "took a black eye for the US" in French Indochina is simply not an accurate characterization, IMO.

Firstly for the late response, sorry.
Im sorry this interpreation of the French taking a black eye for you doesnt resonate for you because they were acting in their own interests. This is irrelevant, why? Because it is perfectly possible for a country to act both in your interests and its own.
Moreover, after Dien Ben Phu and before you had any significant men on the ground the US was actively propping up the French effort. In fact, long before that battle in 1950 the French were ambushed on a dirt road where 2000 French troops disappeared. This precursor to Diem Bien Phu was enough of psycological shock and could well have caused negotiations to begin except for the Truman administration encouraging the French to persist right up their final debacle 3/4 years later. By the time of Diem Bien Phu the American, when Eisenhower sat in the oval office the US was paying 80% of France's war costs. The 'black eye' still not resonating for you?

Id like to know why you jusitfy US actions in supporting the French because they were WW2 allies? Why not just support the side of right everywhere? Moreover do you think the French wouldve been supported if they were not white and christian?

Next Id like to counter this thing about Chinese arming Vietnamese, while this did happen much more later, the first four years of the war between France and the Vietnamese seen the V's armed by captured French, Japanese imperial, American Lend-Lease bribed from the Chinese Nationalists and improvised copies of American carbines and British sten guns. Soon after they got weapons from both China's Nationalists and Thailand. Moreover Giap had an armed and ready functioning army before the Chinese Communists reached the borders in 1949.

 

[oldreliable67]

Firstly for the late response, sorry.
Im sorry this interpreation of the French taking a black eye for you doesnt resonate for you because they were acting in their own interests. This is irrelevant, why? Because it is perfectly possible for a country to act both in your interests and its own.

But thats something of a double negative, isn't it? First you say it is irrelevant if they were acting in their own interests, then you say that it is perfectly possible for them to have acted both in their interest and our interest, simultaneously. But regardless, I think I understand your intended point.

Of course its possible to do so. In this case, though I don't recall reading any descriptions of this specific aspect of the US/French negotiations during the period, I would imagine that the French appealed as strongly as possible to the developing US concern about the perceived growing Soviet/communist threat. When trying to convince the US to support them in French-Indochina, the French were certainly likely to use every possible argument to persuade the US that supporting them was in the best interest of the US as well. Whether it in actuality was in our best interest was arguable, but it was absolutely in the best interest of the French to convince us that our best interest lay in supporting them.

Moreover, the British were also extremely concerned about the developing threat of communist expansionism. It doesn't take much of stretch to see these three countries that would later become the core of NATO, agreeing that supporting the French in Indochina was also containing communist expansion.

But that still doesn't justify saying "the French took a black eye" for the US. French self-interest governed their actions, as did the actions of the US.

Id like to know why you jusitfy US actions in supporting the French because they were WW2 allies? Why not just support the side of right everywhere? Moreover do you think the French wouldve been supported if they were not white and christian?

This is really poor. Given that the vast majority of your previous posts are quite intelligent, this bit of hindsight-grabbing, woulda-coulda-shoulda logic is disappointing. But lets see what we can make of it anyway.

You are confusing "justify" with "understanding." Nowhere did I say that-- in hindsight -- the US did the right thing. First, put yourself in the shoes of those in charge of US foreign diplomacy in the immediate post-WWII period. As noted above, the fear of Soviet expansion was very, very real, almost palpable. George Kennan's proposed policy of "containment" was beginning to make the rounds in the State Dept and was finding a lot of adherents, which is not too surprising given the atmosphere of the time. Soviet and/or communist expansion was seen as a very definite threat; in the context of the times, what could be seen as wrong about countering that threat?

Second, in the context of the times, what could have been "wrong" about helping an ally, especially one that had been devastated by WWII?

Thirdly, "not white and christian" didn't stop us from supporting Ho against the Japanese and it didn't stop some in the US gov't for coming to their defense when the question of France-vs-Vietnamese was being argued, though they didn't prevail.

Consequently, on balance, the administration, in the context of the times, did what it thought was right.

Moreover, after Dien Ben Phu and before you had any significant men on the ground the US was actively propping up the French effort. In fact, long before that battle in 1950 the French were ambushed on a dirt road where 2000 French troops disappeared. This precursor to Diem Bien Phu was enough of psycological shock and could well have caused negotiations to begin except for the Truman administration encouraging the French to persist right up their final debacle 3/4 years later. By the time of Diem Bien Phu the American, when Eisenhower sat in the oval office the US was paying 80% of France's war costs. The 'black eye' still not resonating for you?

Nope. A nice summary, but your point?

Next Id like to counter this thing about Chinese arming Vietnamese, while this did happen much more later, the first four years of the war between France and the Vietnamese seen the V's armed by captured French, Japanese imperial, American Lend-Lease bribed from the Chinese Nationalists and improvised copies of American carbines and British sten guns. Soon after they got weapons from both China's Nationalists and Thailand. Moreover Giap had an armed and ready functioning army before the Chinese Communists reached the borders in 1949.

Don't forget the American weapons that the US provided them during WWII. And yes, Giap had the manpower before the Chinese Communists got there, and did an impressive job, winning many more battles than they probably should have, considering the weaponry that they had. But it wasn't until the Chinese provided them with newer, better, heavier weapons that they were able to ultimately prevail in the manner in which they did.

Again, a nice summary, but your point?

 

[EAGLE1]

But thats something of a double negative, isn't it? First you say it is irrelevant if they were acting in their own interests, then you say that it is perfectly possible for them to have acted both in their interest and our interest, simultaneously. But regardless, I think I understand your intended point.

Eh no. The dismissal of the black eye due to them acting in their own interests is irrelevant (shall we say incorrect instead? ) BECAUSE one can act in both one's own and someone else's interests.

Of course its possible to do so. In this case, though I don't recall reading any descriptions of this specific aspect of the US/French negotiations during the period, I would imagine that the French appealed as strongly as possible to the developing US concern about the perceived growing Soviet/communist threat. When trying to convince the US to support them in French-Indochina, the French were certainly likely to use every possible argument to persuade the US that supporting them was in the best interest of the US as well. Whether it in actuality was in our best interest was arguable, but it was absolutely in the best interest of the French to convince us that our best interest lay in supporting them.

Moreover, the British were also extremely concerned about the developing threat of communist expansionism. It doesn't take much of stretch to see these three countries that would later become the core of NATO, agreeing that supporting the French in Indochina was also containing communist expansion.

This all may well be the case and probably is. You are also missing out the fact that while the French sought US assistance its also the case that the US encouraged and supported the French effort. This encouragement was not for the French interest but for the US interest. And yet you still wont give the French credit for taking a beating for you?

You are confusing "justify" with "understanding." Nowhere did I say that-- in hindsight -- the US did the right thing. First, put yourself in the shoes of those in charge of US foreign diplomacy in the immediate post-WWII period. As noted above, the fear of Soviet expansion was very, very real, almost palpable. George Kennan's proposed policy of "containment" was beginning to make the rounds in the State Dept and was finding a lot of adherents, which is not too surprising given the atmosphere of the time. Soviet and/or communist expansion was seen as a very definite threat; in the context of the times, what could be seen as wrong about countering that threat?

Second, in the context of the times, what could have been "wrong" about helping an ally, especially one that had been devastated by WWII?

Ok I'll give you that one. Youre not justifying these actions, you are instead pointing out how we can understand these actions using the context. Since I already know all this I have initially missed the point of what youre trying to say. However I see this point now.

Thirdly, "not white and christian" didn't stop us from supporting Ho against the Japanese and it didn't stop some in the US gov't for coming to their defense when the question of France-vs-Vietnamese was being argued, though they didn't prevail.

Consequently, on balance, the administration, in the context of the times, did what it thought was right.

Ho and the Japanses involved two Asian people, one of whom had attacked Pearl Harbour so its clear thats no defence. However, this thing about some in the US administration wanting to befriend Ho is a defence of sorts. Only of sorts of course because actual US policy did not reflect these sentiments.

Its very strange to defend an Administration as 'doing what they thought was right'. Its utterly useless in fact. Why? Because there's hardly been a government in history that wasnt 'doing what it thought was right', including Hitler, Stalin, the Japanese, the European colonial empires and the American surrogate empires. For good measure lets also throw in Napoleon, King James 2nd, Franco, Mussolini and Chairman Mao.

Quote:
Moreover, after Dien Ben Phu and before you had any significant men on the ground the US was actively propping up the French effort. In fact, long before that battle in 1950 the French were ambushed on a dirt road where 2000 French troops disappeared. This precursor to Diem Bien Phu was enough of psycological shock and could well have caused negotiations to begin except for the Truman administration encouraging the French to persist right up their final debacle 3/4 years later. By the time of Diem Bien Phu the American, when Eisenhower sat in the oval office the US was paying 80% of France's war costs. The 'black eye' still not resonating for you?

Nope. A nice summary, but your point?

Again, the summary explains in what way the US administration both encourages and supported the French war against the Vietnamese.

Quote:
Next Id like to counter this thing about Chinese arming Vietnamese, while this did happen much more later, the first four years of the war between France and the Vietnamese seen the V's armed by captured French, Japanese imperial, American Lend-Lease bribed from the Chinese Nationalists and improvised copies of American carbines and British sten guns. Soon after they got weapons from both China's Nationalists and Thailand. Moreover Giap had an armed and ready functioning army before the Chinese Communists reached the borders in 1949.

Don't forget the American weapons that the US provided them during WWII. And yes, Giap had the manpower before the Chinese Communists got there, and did an impressive job, winning many more battles than they probably should have, considering the weaponry that they had. But it wasn't until the Chinese provided them with newer, better, heavier weapons that they were able to ultimately prevail in the manner in which they did.

Again, a nice summary, but your point?

Actually I was just garnishing some more information on the general point in time hoping I could draw you out into telling me what the point of ;

Moreover, the French were not only concerned with the Vietnamese but the Chinese as well, and recall that this was the still new Peoples Republic of China, headed by Mao. In about 1949, the Chinese ceded some areas on the Chinese/Vietnamese border to the Vietnamese and subsequently provided them with heavy weapons and supplies with which the Vietnamese were able to effectively counter the French, which was a principal reason for the French request to the US for weapons and supplies.

Roughly around this point in time, the policy of containment of communism in general and the Soviets in particular was being articulated by George Kennan at State, which was ultimately adopted by the Truman administration. Some, though, principally Gen. MacArthur, lobbied for an "Asia first" containment policy, while others, principally Gen Omar Bradley, argued for the continuation of a "Europe first" orientation. But thats a topic for another thread!

was. I think we're both capable of nice summaries without emphasising the point.:lol:

 

[oldreliable67]

Ho and the Japanses involved two Asian people, one of whom had attacked Pearl Harbour so its clear thats no defence. However, this thing about some in the US administration wanting to befriend Ho is a defence of sorts. Only of sorts of course because actual US policy did not reflect these sentiments.

I'm not sure that I agree. We didn't have to support and arm Ho. In the beginning, his group was quite small and his politics still a bit murky (before he "came out", so to speak), we dithered quite a bit, but even when he did eventually unequivocally reveal his Marxist leanings, we elected to support him regardless. But maybe you're right: more than anything else, it is perhaps another demonstration of the old maxim, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Its very strange to defend an Administration as 'doing what they thought was right'. Its utterly useless in fact. Why? Because there's hardly been a government in history that wasnt 'doing what it thought was right', including Hitler, Stalin, the Japanese, the European colonial empires and the American surrogate empires. For good measure lets also throw in Napoleon, King James 2nd, Franco, Mussolini and Chairman Mao.

There are two nuances of the decision to support the French being "right". First, as I noted earlier, our decision to support the French was the result of a significant debate and discussion within the U S gov't. There were differences of opinion at State, Defense and among the Cabinet. The ultimate decision was the result of considered debate and discussion -- thus the ultimate decision was one considered at the time to be the "right" (or perhaps, correct is a better description) decision in a more pragmatic sense.

Second, as discussed earlier, the decision to support a war-devastated WWII ally was considered to be the "right" decision in a moral sense.

The others that you list as "doing what they thought was right" were no doubt doing exactly that. But we aren't discussing them, are we?

Last thought: "taking a black eye for the US" suggests that the French did something that they did not want to do, but did it anyway, that they were being altruistic. They didn't. They were not doing us a favor that they didn't have to do. They wanted very badly to retain their colonial empire in French-Indochina.

BTW, I'll be away for a few days, and will have quite limited internet access. This has been an interesting exchange, hope you have found it interesting as well. Hope to resume it on my return.

 

[EAGLE1]

I'm not sure that I agree. We didn't have to support and arm Ho. In the beginning, his group was quite small and his politics still a bit murky (before he "came out", so to speak), we dithered quite a bit, but even when he did eventually unequivocally reveal his Marxist leanings, we elected to support him regardless. But maybe you're right: more than anything else, it is perhaps another demonstration of the old maxim, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Well at the time of WW2 actually, in the light of the war against Japan, you did have to support Ho and his national movement - as you said, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Just like you had to support the Soviets against Germany.

There are two nuances of the decision to support the French being "right". First, as I noted earlier, our decision to support the French was the result of a significant debate and discussion within the U S gov't. There were differences of opinion at State, Defense and among the Cabinet. The ultimate decision was the result of considered debate and discussion -- thus the ultimate decision was one considered at the time to be the "right" (or perhaps, correct is a better description) decision in a more pragmatic sense.

Second, as discussed earlier, the decision to support a war-devastated WWII ally was considered to be the "right" decision in a moral sense.

Quite right, Im sure there were nuances and debate, not that it matters. However, it seems the final decision was made by those who had the authority to make it on the basis of a simple intellectual laziness. More specifically an unwillingness to look at the world as a complicated place. Instead Dean Acheson, Truman and others like them in both parties assumed that all communist movements were pawns of a centralized superstate directed from the Kremlin under a Joe Stalin who was another Hitler bent on world conquest.

Despite the evidence of Tito's behaviour they could not believe that a communist leader might have his basic goal as the independence of his country. They helped Tito but always thought of him as an aberration.

At least part of the explanation for the failure to take seriously the existence of national communism seems to lie in the fact that they did not want to see the world as a complicated place. If Tito and Ho and Mao Tse-Tung were nationalists as well as communists, leading their countries into developing along different lines then the world was far more complex than these Americans imagined it to be. It was much easier to draw the world as areas of good and evil.

Im not sure why youre saying they seen supporting France as a right decision in a 'moral' sense.

Your right, we're not discussing others. However their example's are most relevant. Why? Because doing what you think is right is not an excuse for getting it wrong as these other examples point out - Hitler wanted to protect his German people from the Jewish 'parasites' and the Bolshevik menace, that's not an excuse for his actions though is it? Though it does explain them.

Last thought: "taking a black eye for the US" suggests that the French did something that they did not want to do, but did it anyway, that they were being altruistic. They didn't. They were not doing us a favor that they didn't have to do. They wanted very badly to retain their colonial empire in French-Indochina.

Th expression above can suggest that. But it also suggests a country being urged to continue fighting when it has a chance to make an honourable peace.
In 1952, the US exerted strong pressure on France to reject peace feelers extended by the Vietminh, and a French delegation scheduled to meet with the Vietminh in Burma was hastily recalled. (Bernard Fall, a renowned French scholar on Indochina, believed that the canceled negotiations "could perhaps have brought about a cease-fire on a far more acceptable basis" for the French "than the one obtained two years in the shadow of a crushing military defeat."

In April 1954, when the French military defeat was obvious and negotiations were scheduled at Geneva, the National Security Council urged President Eisenhower to "inform Paris that French acquiescence in a Communist takeover of Indochina would bear on its status as one of the Big Three" and that "US aid to France would automatically cease."

BTW, I'll be away for a few days, and will have quite limited internet access. This has been an interesting exchange, hope you have found it interesting as well. Hope to resume it on my return.

Fair enough. Id rather wait for the intelligent response that I tend to get from Oldreliable than the quick dumb responses I tend to get from others.