How did Azerbaijan triumph over Armenia? Azerbaijan placed bets on sophisticated, pricey weapons, while Armenia relied on old Moscow -made arms

[beerftw]

Yes but after Kursk they had such an advantage in me and material. In Operation Bagration, the Red Army won a stunning victory, but still managed to lose more men than Germany.

But the germans had the advantage in most of europe in defense and logistics, you need to remember spam did not cause the soviet union to win, but it saved many lives on the eastern front, farms were destroyed, mass starvation problems, and manufacturing had to move east of the urals which was a logistical nightmare to hit the frontlines. The help from america, mexico, and south america who were untouched by the war on their own lands allowed many nations to fight with less losses than what would have nmormallly happened.

Despite this the soviet union had a poor supply chain, germany was already entrenched and had their defenses laid out. Most armies would have lost to nazi germany then trying to push them out on the eastern front. Despite logistics issues the soviet union did that, against overwhelming odds, however as long pointed out their deep battle strategy was effective at destroying even the best defended military divisions, but at a high cost of human life.

This is why the soviet union abandoned the deep battle strategy, some points like combined arms and aggressive tactics remained even to this day, but the overall deep battle strategy dies after ww2, as the soviets felt it a waste of human life that should not be revisited except under extreme circumstances.

 

[Rich2018]

Despite this the soviet union had a poor supply chain, germany was already entrenched and had their defenses laid out. Most armies would have lost to nazi germany then trying to push them out on the eastern front. Despite logistics issues the soviet union did that, against overwhelming odds, however as long pointed out their deep battle strategy was effective at destroying even the best defended military divisions, but at a high cost of human life.

Why were the odd so "overwhelming" against the USSR ?

They were fighting against an enemy fighting a two (arguably three) front war, being bombed by the UK and USA, against a country with a much smaller population.

 

[beerftw]

Why were the odd so "overwhelming" against the USSR ?

They were fighting against an enemy fighting a two (arguably three) front war, being bombed by the UK and USA, against a country with a much smaller population.

The ussr hadm purged it's own military leadership prior, and was blindsided by the nazi advance, which left them at both a tactical and logistical disadvantage.

 

[Rich2018]

The ussr hadm purged it's own military leadership prior, and was blindsided by the nazi advance, which left them at both a tactical and logistical disadvantage.

Not sure how Stalin's purges left the Red Army at a logistical disadvantages. If anything the Wehrmacht was the one with such a disadvantage as its supply chains grew longer, and the had to deal with crude Russian roads plus a rail network of a different gauge.

 

[Fledermaus]

Not sure how Stalin's purges left the Red Army at a logistical disadvantages. If anything the Wehrmacht was the one with such a disadvantage as its supply chains grew longer, and the had to deal with crude Russian roads plus a rail network of a different gauge.

Wow...

Just wow.

 

[Rich2018]

The ussr hadm purged it's own military leadership prior, and was blindsided by the nazi advance, which left them at both a tactical and logistical disadvantage.

Not sure how Stalin's purges left the Red Army at a logistical disadvantages. If anything the Wehrmacht was the one with such a disadvantage as its supply chains grew longer, and the had to deal with crude Russian roads plus a rail network of a different gauge.

Perhaps you can explain ?

 

[beerftw]

Not sure how Stalin's purges left the Red Army at a logistical disadvantages. If anything the Wehrmacht was the one with such a disadvantage as its supply chains grew longer, and the had to deal with crude Russian roads plus a rail network of a different gauge.

Perhaps you can explain ?

Stalins purge left the entire red army at a disadvantage. The logistical disadvantage came after the nazi invasion, when the red army was nearly leaderless as paranoid stalin purged the ranks of experience, main roads were taken over, numerous farm lands destroyed etc making logistics a complete nightmare for the soviet union. Later in the war the soviet union did become clever by rebuilding and pushing their manufacturing east of the urals where the nazi's stood zero chance of striking, but even then their logistics were hit bad, they were often relying on food from america canada and argentina, as well as many american trucks.

The soviet union would have won with or without the wests help, but due to their extreme logistics disadvantage the soviet union would have lost vastly more lives to starvation without the help of the western hemisphere which was untouched by the war.

 

[Jredbaron96]

This is why the soviet union abandoned the deep battle strategy, some points like combined arms and aggressive tactics remained even to this day, but the overall deep battle strategy dies after ww2, as the soviets felt it a waste of human life that should not be revisited except under extreme circumstances.

I have no idea where you are getting this from, because the concept of the deep battle continued to define Soviet doctrine well up until the collapse of the USSR. It was the cornerstone of their plans to defeat NATO, and they continued to refine it and plan for it well up until the Soviet Army ceased to exist as a functioning military force.

 

[Jredbaron96]

What if OKH had the resources that STAVKA had ?

They probably would have squandered it with their poor strategic planning.

 

[Litwin]

The ussr hadm purged it's own military leadership prior, and was blindsided by the nazi advance, which left them at both a tactical and logistical disadvantage.

Moscow´s empires has never had good military leadership, read about just Crimean war, A-stan or WW1

 

[Litwin]

Not sure how Stalin's purges left the Red Army at a logistical disadvantages. If anything the Wehrmacht was the one with such a disadvantage as its supply chains grew longer, and the had to deal with crude Russian roads plus a rail network of a different gauge.

+1, you are 100% right

Mark Solonin. Historian's personal webpage.Biography
www.solonin.org › biography



I, Mark Solonin, was born in 1958 in the central Russian city Kuibyshev (known ... Great Patriotic War of the USSR , was not only a history to be read in textbooks.

 

[Fledermaus]

Moscow´s empires has never had good military leadership, read about just Crimean war, A-stan or WW1

How about Kutuznov vs. Napoleon, Russia vs. Golden Horde, Russia vs. Sweden (time and again), Russia vs. Tatars, Russian partitioning of Poland, Russian defeat of Turkey time and again, WWII, etc.

 

[Jredbaron96]

As for the topic of the thread, thus far it appears a big part was Azerbaijan's ability to field larger forces and continue their operations in the face of losses. This isn't surprising, given Azerbaijan is both larger and wealthier than Armenia.

It'll be a while before we can actually have an objective view of the war and how either side performed. Did the Azeris win because they skillfully applied their technological and numerical superiority against the Armenians, or did they just keep tossing unit after unit into the fire. Likewise, did the Armenians lose because they were exhausted of manpower and material and couldn't keep up the fight anymore, or did they blunder their efforts to defend their territory and lose because of bad planning and strategy?

It took several years to get a really objective view of the Russo-Georgia War, and I suspect we'll have to wait as well for this one.

 

[beerftw]

I have no idea where you are getting this from, because the concept of the deep battle continued to define Soviet doctrine well up until the collapse of the USSR. It was the cornerstone of their plans to defeat NATO, and they continued to refine it and plan for it well up until the Soviet Army ceased to exist as a functioning military force.

The technichally abandoned deep battle post ww2, if you are talking about entire tennants of deep battle remaining you would be correct means like shock armies and combined arms stayed long after, deep battle however was a pre ww2 strategy not well refined and the soviet leadership had already been debating ending it during ww2 because the losses incurred.

What remained after was not deep battle though it kept quite a few core ideas, but the structure and concept was redone. Deep battle was crude and unrefined, yet highly effective at the large cost of manpower.

To put it simply the only records I could find of deep battle post ww2 is nato assuming the soviet union would use deep battle, and a mention that deep battle was planned against china at one point during the china/soviet war.

 

[Litwin]

How about Kutuznov vs. Napoleon,

very popular Muscovite historian is answering to your question

 

[Jredbaron96]

The technichally abandoned deep battle post ww2,

No, they did not. I suggest you read up on this because what you're claiming is not accurate at all.

The Soviets by no means abandoned deep operations, which handed them such crushing victories as Bagration and Vistula-Oder. Why you think that is beyond me, because the Soviets continued to study and expand on the concept throughout the Cold War, see Seven Days to the River Rhine, or the Operational Maneuver Group. All of these are developments of the same basic idea, updated to account for technological and political changes.



Sure, it was refined, but that doesn't mean it was abandoned, nor were the core concepts changed. The idea of focusing on breaking through into an enemy's rear echelon and driving as deep as possible remained the forefront of Soviet doctrinal study up until 1989, and I can't imagine what would make you think otherwise.

 

[Fledermaus]

very popular Muscovite historian is answering to your question

I see no "Muscovite" historian. I see a RUSSIAN historian.

How about Kutuznov vs. Napoleon, Russia vs. Golden Horde, Russia vs. Sweden (time and again), Russia vs. Tatars, Russian partitioning of Poland, Russian defeat of Turkey time and again, WWII, etc.

Look up the history of Russia at war and you see Russia winning far more than losing.

 

[Litwin]

...

Look up the history of Russia at war and you see Russia winning far more than losing.

funny, have lived in Muscovy or ussr ? its OLD, OLD Moscow´s imperial propaganda myth

 

[Fledermaus]

funny, have lived in Muscovy or ussr ? its OLD, OLD Moscow´s imperial propaganda myth

What is the "myth"?

A do I have to have lived in RUSSIA to know and understand history?

 

[beerftw]

No, they did not. I suggest you read up on this because what you're claiming is not accurate at all.

The Soviets by no means abandoned deep operations, which handed them such crushing victories as Bagration and Vistula-Oder. Why you think that is beyond me, because the Soviets continued to study and expand on the concept throughout the Cold War, see Seven Days to the River Rhine, or the Operational Maneuver Group. All of these are developments of the same basic idea, updated to account for technological and political changes.

View attachment 67315363

Sure, it was refined, but that doesn't mean it was abandoned, nor were the core concepts changed. The idea of focusing on breaking through into an enemy's rear echelon and driving as deep as possible remained the forefront of Soviet doctrinal study up until 1989, and I can't imagine what would make you think otherwise.

The deep battle was essentially abandoned, calling what they used through the cold war deep battle is like calling a 2020 f350 a model t, they still share the same basic framework, but in the end are completely different.

Original deep battle was not very heavily reliant on mechanized forces, which was already pointed out by soviet thinking heads before ww2. The deep battle also relied on the thought of older wars like ww1, even though it was effective it was already outdated, even the soviet union fought among itself over the idea of deep battle and how to implement it.

Deep battle in itself was also near worthless with deception, and this became a severe weakness if the opposing side could see through the deception. So between vastly different mechanization, changing tech, and the issues with deception being a make or break moment, the soviets changed their strategies, again post ww2 many core ideas remain, but what they had post ww2 was not the same as deep battle or deep operations.

 

[Jredbaron96]

You have no idea what you are talking about.

The deep battle was essentially abandoned, calling what they used through the cold war deep battle is like calling a 2020 f350 a model t, they still share the same basic framework, but in the end are completely different.

No, they were not. The deep battle the Soviets envisioned in the 1980s had the same principles the Soviets first thought of in the 1930s, it was merely updated with new technology and capabilities like nuclear weapons and airborne troops.

Original deep battle was not very heavily reliant on mechanized forces,

You are speaking nonsense.

Deep battle was not defined by the weapons or technology used. Deep battle was based on industrialization and conscription which created armies that the Soviets believed were too large to be destroyed in singular battles or operations, resulting in a shift towards perceiving enemy armies as "systems" which were reliant on increasingly complex webs of logistics, communication, infrastructure, and support functions. The point of the deep battle was to avoid leveraging all bets on defeating the enemy's combat power in a direct engagement and instead pursuing a breakthrough that would continue deep into enemy's rear echelon, throwing their support elements into disarray and turning their army into a confused mass of forces unable to communicate or support one another, making their destruction all the easier.

This core concept did not change from the 30s to the Cold War, and we know that for a fact because when you look at Soviet operational planning for the Cold War we see the same characteristics and sentiments expressed in their thinking.

Deep battle in itself was also near worthless with deception, and this became a severe weakness if the opposing side could see through the deception.

Any operation where the enemy learns what you're doing is compromised. This is not unique to deep battle by any means.

the soviets changed their strategies, again post ww2 many core ideas remain, but what they had post ww2 was not the same as deep battle or deep operations.

You keep saying this but you haven't produced an ounce of evidence to support it. We know the Soviets kept pursuing the deep battle long after WWII because their studies, exercises, and doctrinal developments all show they did. You either have no idea what you're talking about or you are just repeating the words of someone who is ignorant of reality.

 

[beerftw]

You have no idea what you are talking about.



No, they were not. The deep battle the Soviets envisioned in the 1980s had the same principles the Soviets first thought of in the 1930s, it was merely updated with new technology and capabilities like nuclear weapons and airborne troops.



You are speaking nonsense.

Deep battle was not defined by the weapons or technology used. Deep battle was based on industrialization and conscription which created armies that the Soviets believed were too large to be destroyed in singular battles or operations, resulting in a shift towards perceiving enemy armies as "systems" which were reliant on increasingly complex webs of logistics, communication, infrastructure, and support functions. The point of the deep battle was to avoid leveraging all bets on defeating the enemy's combat power in a direct engagement and instead pursuing a breakthrough that would continue deep into enemy's rear echelon, throwing their support elements into disarray and turning their army into a confused mass of forces unable to communicate or support one another, making their destruction all the easier.

This core concept did not change from the 30s to the Cold War, and we know that for a fact because when you look at Soviet operational planning for the Cold War we see the same characteristics and sentiments expressed in their thinking.



Any operation where the enemy learns what you're doing is compromised. This is not unique to deep battle by any means.



You keep saying this but you haven't produced an ounce of evidence to support it. We know the Soviets kept pursuing the deep battle long after WWII because their studies, exercises, and doctrinal developments all show they did. You either have no idea what you're talking about or you are just repeating the words of someone who is ignorant of reality.

The deep battle strategy had a core tenet of using shock troops to attack the enemy head on often in their most guarded areas(also usually the most unexpected as the enemy usually never thinks their enemy is going to be stupid enough to charge head on) while using combined arms and reserve troops to circle the battlefield and attack deep within enemy lines.

Many of the cold war battle plans did not work that way, many had the soviet union using shock troops but often progressing fast and avoiding fights while at the same time tearing up infrastructure. Much of the post ww2 doctrine involved progressing as fast as possible to avoid nuclear fallout and also have troops in place, which contradicts the deep battle strategy of attacking head on and using reserve troops and mechanized infantry to circle the enemy and also attack the rear echelon.

The later soviet plans did not put too much into attacking the rear echelon or attacking head on, but rather advancing fast and avoiding any conflict that was unnecesary to ensure the advance went as fast as possible to deny nato from being re enforced to counter their move. To me this is a major difference from deep battle as entire strategies are different, the shock troops and maskerovka are there but how they are used was vastly different from the core principle of deep battle.

 

[BahamaBob]

You have no idea what you are talking about.



No, they were not. The deep battle the Soviets envisioned in the 1980s had the same principles the Soviets first thought of in the 1930s, it was merely updated with new technology and capabilities like nuclear weapons and airborne troops.



You are speaking nonsense.

Deep battle was not defined by the weapons or technology used. Deep battle was based on industrialization and conscription which created armies that the Soviets believed were too large to be destroyed in singular battles or operations, resulting in a shift towards perceiving enemy armies as "systems" which were reliant on increasingly complex webs of logistics, communication, infrastructure, and support functions. The point of the deep battle was to avoid leveraging all bets on defeating the enemy's combat power in a direct engagement and instead pursuing a breakthrough that would continue deep into enemy's rear echelon, throwing their support elements into disarray and turning their army into a confused mass of forces unable to communicate or support one another, making their destruction all the easier.

This core concept did not change from the 30s to the Cold War, and we know that for a fact because when you look at Soviet operational planning for the Cold War we see the same characteristics and sentiments expressed in their thinking.



Any operation where the enemy learns what you're doing is compromised. This is not unique to deep battle by any means.



You keep saying this but you haven't produced an ounce of evidence to support it. We know the Soviets kept pursuing the deep battle long after WWII because their studies, exercises, and doctrinal developments all show they did. You either have no idea what you're talking about or you are just repeating the words of someone who is ignorant of reality.

While this is true, you are missing part of the equation. Stalin wanted to control as much land as possible when the war ended. He was more than willing to sacrifice his people to reach that goal.

 

[Jredbaron96]

The deep battle strategy had a core tenet of using shock troops to attack the enemy head on often in their most guarded areas

No, it wasn't. Soviet troops were supposed to assault weak points in the line to exploit them and breakthrough, not go directly for them. I have no idea why you think the Soviet's thought it was a good idea to attack the strongest enemy hardpoint head on, when they're behavior both during WWII and the Cold War clearly demonstrated they did not.

To me this is a major difference from deep battle as entire strategies are different, the shock troops and maskerovka are there but how they are used was vastly different from the core principle of deep battle.

To me this clearly indicates you don't understand the subject at all.

Soviet troops were trained to advance as deep as possible in order to destroy lines of supply, communication, and to seize vital areas and locations. They were not told to do so as part of a competition to see who could go the farthest, they did so because they had specific objectives to accomplish. In WWII this had been bridges across the Oder, and in WWIII it would have been bridges across the Rhine. The Soviets *absolutely* emphasized attacking the rear echelon, to suggest otherwise is nonsensical because we can see from their plans they intended to do so, often with nuclear and conventional weapons, and with both airborne, heliborne, and mechanized forces.

 

[Jredbaron96]

While this is true, you are missing part of the equation. Stalin wanted to control as much land as possible when the war ended. He was more than willing to sacrifice his people to reach that goal.

Yes that is true, but that was a political geostrategic goal, not an indication of the Red Army's doctrinal development.