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Here's Why U.S. Tactical Nukes Are a Bad Idea.
US/Russia nuclear weapons aren't going to magically disappear and there are no plans to scale back further on inventories. On the contrary, both nations are in the midst of modernizing their nuclear arsenals. From my point of view, Russia's Novator missile system is in material breach of the INF and has been so since at least 2010. Besides range-violation issues, the Novator mobile launch vehicle is also in INF material breach because it can accommodate the nuclear capable Iskander-M missile. This situation makes verification impossible. Putin's military excursions into Europe since 2008 makes it clear that [forced] territorial expansion is a tenet of current Kremlin geopolitical doctrine. Thus I have few meaningful reservations concerning US tactical nukes. They could very well be that great 'unknown' that alters Putin's current calculus regarding future Russian expansionism on the European continent.
12/10/18
Policymakers in Washington are making a case for low-yield nuclear weapons. But these weapons aim to solve a problem based on major and unsubstantiated assumptions about Russian doctrine. Such weapons will not meaningfully affect Russian calculations if the Kremlin fears the existence of their state is at stake. They may, however, reinforce a view in Moscow that the United States seeks superiority across both the nuclear and conventional domains. across both the nuclear and conventional domains. U.S. policymakers worry that were Russia to begin losing a conventional conflict, it might escalate to the use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate and settle the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow. They also argue that Russian aggression against U.S. allies in Europe becomes more likely if the United States does not have low-yield nuclear warheads to symmetrically match Russia’s escalation. Having such weapons would deter the Russians from considering nuclear preemption and strengthen U.S. deterrence. Russian declaratory strategy is not one of “escalate to de-escalate” or nuclear preemption. The most conclusive evidence for a Russian strategy of limited nuclear use is its large arsenal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia continues to see value in this arsenal, and continued modernization indicates that the Russians see a role for these weapons also in their future arsenal and concepts. Russia clearly states that it would consider using nuclear weapons when “the very existence of the state is under threat.” Although that formulation may be subject to interpretation, it signifies some requirement of aggression against Russia proper.
Will a new U.S. low-yield nuclear warhead sway their calculus in that situation? Put more succinctly, will a new low-yield nuclear warhead convince Russian leaders that the war they are fighting is not worth nuclear escalation, despite their perception that the Russian state is under threat? Russian doctrine and strategy signal there are no nuclear taboos when their existence is threatened. They signal that there will be no crisis stability in a large-scale confrontation with Russia if its vital interests are threatened. The United States will not be able to convince Russia that it should accept fighting America on its own turf with conventional means only. The reason Russia has modernized the world’s largest nuclear arsenal is precisely that a conventional fight with the United States will not be fair and that they will lose. New American low-yield nuclear warheads is a strategic response based on not the most likely, but the most dangerous possible interpretation of Russian strategy, one directly at odds with Russian declaratory nuclear strategy. Russia does not have a doctrine of nuclear preemption, and it remains uncertain about the efficiency of escalating to de-escalate. But Russia will consider using nuclear weapons earlier than America in a conflict when its existence is at stake. New U.S. nuclear weapons will not persuade Russia of the reduced utility of its nuclear weapons.
US/Russia nuclear weapons aren't going to magically disappear and there are no plans to scale back further on inventories. On the contrary, both nations are in the midst of modernizing their nuclear arsenals. From my point of view, Russia's Novator missile system is in material breach of the INF and has been so since at least 2010. Besides range-violation issues, the Novator mobile launch vehicle is also in INF material breach because it can accommodate the nuclear capable Iskander-M missile. This situation makes verification impossible. Putin's military excursions into Europe since 2008 makes it clear that [forced] territorial expansion is a tenet of current Kremlin geopolitical doctrine. Thus I have few meaningful reservations concerning US tactical nukes. They could very well be that great 'unknown' that alters Putin's current calculus regarding future Russian expansionism on the European continent.