Mark F
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On the afternoon (local time) of 2 August, 1964 the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Maddox was sailing in international waters on an ELINT mission off the coast of North Vietnam when she was attacked by 3 North Vietnamese Navy P-4 or P-6 Motor Torpedo Boats. In the ensuing gun battle 2 of the North Vietnamese boats were sunk. The USS Maddox was hit by 14.5mm rounds but suffered no serious damage or casualties.
Two days later on 4 August the USS Maddox, now accompanied by the destroyer USS Turner Joy in a Freedom of Navigation excercise, believed they were once again attacked by North Vietnamese MTB's and engaged in a 4-hour gun battle with suspected radar and sonar targets in poor weather. The ships even called in air support from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.
These two incidents became known collectively as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and became the impetus for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which greatly deepened the American military effort in Vietnam.
Some conspiracy theorists have long argued that one or both incidents were deliberately faked as a pretense for increasing American involvement in Vietnam.
The first attack on 2 August definitely occurred. The Vietnamese even acknowledge this (although the boats acted without orders from Hanoi). The attack on 4 August was in doubt even shortly after it occurred. Only later was it revealed the second alleged attack of 4 August never in fact occurred, the official explanation being edgy, nervous sailors over-reacting to false contacts.
Conspiracy theorists have claimed an audio recording of a phone conversation between then President Johnson and then SecDef McNamara which occurred on 3 August at 10:30am U.S. Eastern time (after the 2 August incident but before the 4 August incident) reveal the president falsified the alleged 2nd attack and in fact nothing happened that day. This conversation is claimed to be obvious proof these two men conspired to fabricate one or both events.
The transcript of this controversial conversation follows. If anyone would like to bold the bits they think prove the premise these two men conspired to fabricate the events in the Gulf of Tonkin on either day, have at it.
Two days later on 4 August the USS Maddox, now accompanied by the destroyer USS Turner Joy in a Freedom of Navigation excercise, believed they were once again attacked by North Vietnamese MTB's and engaged in a 4-hour gun battle with suspected radar and sonar targets in poor weather. The ships even called in air support from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.
These two incidents became known collectively as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and became the impetus for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which greatly deepened the American military effort in Vietnam.
Some conspiracy theorists have long argued that one or both incidents were deliberately faked as a pretense for increasing American involvement in Vietnam.
The first attack on 2 August definitely occurred. The Vietnamese even acknowledge this (although the boats acted without orders from Hanoi). The attack on 4 August was in doubt even shortly after it occurred. Only later was it revealed the second alleged attack of 4 August never in fact occurred, the official explanation being edgy, nervous sailors over-reacting to false contacts.
Conspiracy theorists have claimed an audio recording of a phone conversation between then President Johnson and then SecDef McNamara which occurred on 3 August at 10:30am U.S. Eastern time (after the 2 August incident but before the 4 August incident) reveal the president falsified the alleged 2nd attack and in fact nothing happened that day. This conversation is claimed to be obvious proof these two men conspired to fabricate one or both events.
The transcript of this controversial conversation follows. If anyone would like to bold the bits they think prove the premise these two men conspired to fabricate the events in the Gulf of Tonkin on either day, have at it.
President Lyndon B. Johnson: Now I wonder if you don't think it'd be wise for you and Rusk to get Mac, uh, the Speaker and Mansfield to call a group of fifteen to twenty people together eh from the Armed Services and Foreign Relations to tell them what happened. A good many of them are saying to me
Secretary Robert McNamara: Right. I've been thinking about this myself, and I thought that uh
President Johnson: They're going to start an investigation
Secretary McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: if you don't.
Secretary McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: And you got Dirksen up there
Secretary McNamara: Yeah
President Johnson: and he's saying you've got to study it further, and say to Mansfield, "Now the President wants us, you, to get the proper people." And we come in and you say, "They fired at us. We responded immediately. And we took out one of their boats and put the other two running. And we kept our..., we're puttin' our boats right there, and we're not running on in."
Secretary McNamara: And it's hard to destroy.
President Johnson: That's right
Secretary McNamara: Right. And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on. And on Friday night, as you probably know, we had four TP [McNamara means PT] boats from Vietnam manned by Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two is lands. And we expended, oh, a thousand rounds of ammunition of one kind or another against them. We probably shot up a radar station and a few other miscellaneous buildings. And following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led them to connect the two events.
President Johnson: Well say that to Dirksen.
Secretary McNamara: That's what I know he'll like.
President Johnson: You notice Dirksen says this morning, that "we got to reassess the situation, do something about it." I'd tell him that we're doing what he's talking about.
Secretary McNamara: Well, I, I was, I was thinking doing this myself in personal visits. But I think your thought is better. We'll get the group together. You want us to do it at the White House or would you rather do it at State or Defense?
President Johnson: I believe it'd be better to do it uh up on the Hill.
Secretary McNamara: All right.
President Johnson: I believe it'd be better if you say to Mansfield, "You call"
Secretary McNamara: Yup
President Johnson: Foreign Relations
Secretary McNamara: Yup, OK.
President Johnson: Armed Services
Secretary McNamara: OK. OK.
President Johnson: and and get Speaker to do it over on his side [i.e., within the House of Representatives, as opposed to the Senate].
Secretary McNamara: We'll do it
President Johnson: And just say it's very, I'd tell him awfully quiet, though, so they won't go in and be making a bunch of speeches. And tell Rusk that a, that's my idea.
Secretary McNamara: Great. .
President Johnson: And he's in New York, so I don't know whether's he's got back.
Secretary McNamara: Well I just talked to George Ball a few minutes ago, and I'll have George arrange it. Or at least I'll tell him that, and then I'll call the Speaker and Mansfield himself.
President Johnson: Now I wish that uh you'd give me some guidance on what we ought to say. I want to leave an impression on the background in the people we talk to over here that we're gonna be firm as hell without saying something that's dangerous. Now what do you think? Uh, uh, the people that are calling me up, I just talked to a New York banker, I just talked to a fellow in Texas, they all feel that the Navy responded wonderfully and that's good. But they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. That's what all the country wants because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughten to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. But we sure oughta always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit.
Secretary McNamara: Well I think you would want to instruct George Reedy this morning at his news conference to say that you personally have ordered the, the Navy to carry on the routine patrols uh off the coast of North Vietnam, uh to add an additional destroyer to the one that has been carrying on the patrols, to provide an air cap, and to issue instructions to the commanders to destroy any uh force that attacks our force in international waters.
President Johnson: [speaks over McNamara] Bob, if you don't mind,
Secretary McNamara: . . . I think that's the way...
President Johnson: If you don't mind, call Walter Jenkins and tell him
Secretary McNamara: Sure
President Johnson: that you want to dictate this to me
Secretary McNamara: I'll do it right now
President Johnson: to give to my people or George Reedy because I'm over at the Mansion with some folks here
Secretary McNamara: I'll do it right now.
President Johnson: OK. Right.