Gamble v. U.S.; a Pending SCOTUS Case where the Ruling Might Let Manafort Off the Hook.

[Captain Adverse]

There is a case pending adjudication before SCOTUS where the Petitioner Terance Martez Gamble is asking:

Whether the Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Petitioner's brief is found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/62536/20180904142141905_17-646 ts.pdf

Currently judicial precedent supports the "separate sovereigns" rule allowing citizens to be tried for the same offense in both Federal and State courts.

Here is the Government's brief:

Whether the Court should reinterpret the Double Jeopardy Clause and overturn the long-held understanding that offenses against the laws of different sovereigns are not the “same offence.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/68026/20181025142116245_17-646 Gamble.pdf

Why is this important?:



Double Jeopardy protections were incorporated as applying to States via Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

We all know that Manafort pled guilty to State crimes he has not been charged with as well as Federal crimes he was charged with in his plea agreement with Mueller.

This was done to prevent him from escaping charges in State court if Trump pardons him.

That is the loophole in current Double Jeopardy protections; a person can be tried for the same offense in both State and Federal courts. This has become a major problem as Federal law has expanded criminal codes which mirror State codes in many areas.

If the current SCOTUS should end up overruling precedent in this case, then Manafort could be pardoned by Trump and escape the prosecution trap set for him by his plea deal.

I personally agree with the petitioner's argument, not because of Manafort, but because the separate sovereigns rule does allow trial for the same crime twice, and that is a direct contradiction to the intent of the Double Jeopardy clause. No defendant should have to face the possibility of being punished twice for the same offense.

I will be watching this case closely.

 

[joko104]

Because of this and other rulings, the federal government granting immunity to a witness to force him/her to talk is invalid because the person still can be prosecuted for state offenses. Thus, neither Congress nor the FBI can actually grant anyone immunity to force the person to testify.

 

[joko104]

There is a case pending adjudication before SCOTUS where the Petitioner Terance Martez Gamble is asking:



The Petitioner's brief is found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/62536/20180904142141905_17-646 ts.pdf

Currently judicial precedent supports the "separate sovereigns" rule allowing citizens to be tried for the same offense in both Federal and State courts.

Here is the Government's brief:



https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/68026/20181025142116245_17-646 Gamble.pdf

Why is this important?:



Double Jeopardy protections were incorporated as applying to States via Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

We all know that Manafort pled guilty to State crimes he has not been charged with as well as Federal crimes he was charged with in his plea agreement with Mueller.

This was done to prevent him from escaping charges in State court if Trump pardons him.

That is the loophole in current Double Jeopardy protections; a person can be tried for the same offense in both State and Federal courts. This has become a major problem as Federal law has expanded criminal codes which mirror State codes in many areas.

If the current SCOTUS should end up overruling precedent in this case, then Manafort could be pardoned by Trump and escape the prosecution trap set for him by his plea deal.

I personally agree with the petitioner's argument, not because of Manafort, but because the separate sovereigns rule does allow trial for the same crime twice, and that is a direct contradiction to the intent of the Double Jeopardy clause. No defendant should have to face the possibility of being punished twice for the same offense.

I will be watching this case closely.

I agree with you completely.

 

[Mycroft]

There is a case pending adjudication before SCOTUS where the Petitioner Terance Martez Gamble is asking:



The Petitioner's brief is found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/62536/20180904142141905_17-646 ts.pdf

Currently judicial precedent supports the "separate sovereigns" rule allowing citizens to be tried for the same offense in both Federal and State courts.

Here is the Government's brief:



https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/68026/20181025142116245_17-646 Gamble.pdf

Why is this important?:



Double Jeopardy protections were incorporated as applying to States via Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

We all know that Manafort pled guilty to State crimes he has not been charged with as well as Federal crimes he was charged with in his plea agreement with Mueller.

This was done to prevent him from escaping charges in State court if Trump pardons him.

That is the loophole in current Double Jeopardy protections; a person can be tried for the same offense in both State and Federal courts. This has become a major problem as Federal law has expanded criminal codes which mirror State codes in many areas.

If the current SCOTUS should end up overruling precedent in this case, then Manafort could be pardoned by Trump and escape the prosecution trap set for him by his plea deal.

I personally agree with the petitioner's argument, not because of Manafort, but because the separate sovereigns rule does allow trial for the same crime twice, and that is a direct contradiction to the intent of the Double Jeopardy clause. No defendant should have to face the possibility of being punished twice for the same offense.

I will be watching this case closely.

If the Supremes rule in favor of Gamble, that's going to chap a lot of Trump-hating asses.

 

[Skeptic Bob]

Yeah, should be interesting. It somehow feels wrong to me that if one jurisdiction fails to convict that another jurisdiction can then try the same thing. It wouldn’t be as much of an issue if the federal government didn’t keep legislating things that should be the domain of the states.

 

[Kal'Stang]

Due to the indoctrination doctrine that has been applied due to the 14th Amendment with the rest of the BoR's the double jeopardy clause should be applied to the States when it comes to State crimes vs Federal crimes. I can understand it not applying to the States before they started interpreting 14th Amendment as incorporating the BoR's to the States as back then the State and Federal Government were truly separate. Today however.....

 

[The Mark]

There is a case pending adjudication before SCOTUS where the Petitioner Terance Martez Gamble is asking:



The Petitioner's brief is found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/62536/20180904142141905_17-646 ts.pdf

Currently judicial precedent supports the "separate sovereigns" rule allowing citizens to be tried for the same offense in both Federal and State courts.

Here is the Government's brief:



https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/68026/20181025142116245_17-646 Gamble.pdf

Why is this important?:



Double Jeopardy protections were incorporated as applying to States via Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

We all know that Manafort pled guilty to State crimes he has not been charged with as well as Federal crimes he was charged with in his plea agreement with Mueller.

This was done to prevent him from escaping charges in State court if Trump pardons him.

That is the loophole in current Double Jeopardy protections; a person can be tried for the same offense in both State and Federal courts. This has become a major problem as Federal law has expanded criminal codes which mirror State codes in many areas.

If the current SCOTUS should end up overruling precedent in this case, then Manafort could be pardoned by Trump and escape the prosecution trap set for him by his plea deal.

I personally agree with the petitioner's argument, not because of Manafort, but because the separate sovereigns rule does allow trial for the same crime twice, and that is a direct contradiction to the intent of the Double Jeopardy clause. No defendant should have to face the possibility of being punished twice for the same offense.

I will be watching this case closely.

I think this is wrong.

It should not be possible to try someone for the same crime multiple times in different jurisdictions.

I'd rather get rid of pardons, or put in place a system that requires good justification for a pardon, not the fears of someone protecting those who might expose him.

 

[Kal'Stang]

There is a case pending adjudication before SCOTUS where the Petitioner Terance Martez Gamble is asking:



The Petitioner's brief is found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/62536/20180904142141905_17-646 ts.pdf

Currently judicial precedent supports the "separate sovereigns" rule allowing citizens to be tried for the same offense in both Federal and State courts.

After reading this docket it appears that even the 11th District Court agrees that the separate sovereigns rule should be over turned.

 

[Cordelier]

I don't have a problem with the Separate Sovereigns doctrine.... so long as time served under one level is counted against any sentence imposed by the other.

 

[TurtleDude]

There is a case pending adjudication before SCOTUS where the Petitioner Terance Martez Gamble is asking:



The Petitioner's brief is found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/62536/20180904142141905_17-646 ts.pdf

Currently judicial precedent supports the "separate sovereigns" rule allowing citizens to be tried for the same offense in both Federal and State courts.

Here is the Government's brief:



https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-646/68026/20181025142116245_17-646 Gamble.pdf

Why is this important?:



Double Jeopardy protections were incorporated as applying to States via Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

We all know that Manafort pled guilty to State crimes he has not been charged with as well as Federal crimes he was charged with in his plea agreement with Mueller.

This was done to prevent him from escaping charges in State court if Trump pardons him.

That is the loophole in current Double Jeopardy protections; a person can be tried for the same offense in both State and Federal courts. This has become a major problem as Federal law has expanded criminal codes which mirror State codes in many areas.

If the current SCOTUS should end up overruling precedent in this case, then Manafort could be pardoned by Trump and escape the prosecution trap set for him by his plea deal.

I personally agree with the petitioner's argument, not because of Manafort, but because the separate sovereigns rule does allow trial for the same crime twice, and that is a direct contradiction to the intent of the Double Jeopardy clause. No defendant should have to face the possibility of being punished twice for the same offense.

I will be watching this case closely.

me too-under the Constitution-pre FDR mutations and using the intent of the founders, there really should be no overlapping criminal codes. Now maybe someone shooting a federal judge in his courtroom would justify federal charges and then state charges.

 

[Beaudreaux]

Yeah, should be interesting. It somehow feels wrong to me that if one jurisdiction fails to convict that another jurisdiction can then try the same thing. It wouldn’t be as much of an issue if the federal government didn’t keep legislating things that should be the domain of the states.

Well put.

 

[Cordelier]

me too-under the Constitution-pre FDR mutations and using the intent of the founders, there really should be no overlapping criminal codes. Now maybe someone shooting a federal judge in his courtroom would justify federal charges and then state charges.

That's ridiculous, Turtle... I can cite you about a dozen Supreme Court precedents supporting the Separate Sovereigns doctrine that pre-date the New Deal - and going as far back as Houston v. Moore, 18 US 1 (1820).

I'm thinking that the only reason the Court gave this case certiorari was to send a clear shot across the bow of the President that they aren't going to put up with any monkeying around where it comes to the Judiciary.

 

[TurtleDude]

That's ridiculous, Turtle... I can cite you about a dozen Supreme Court precedents supporting the Separate Sovereigns doctrine that pre-date the New Deal - and going as far back as Houston v. Moore, 18 US 1 (1820).

I'm thinking that the only reason the Court gave this case certiorari was to send a clear shot across the bow of the President that they aren't going to put up with any monkeying around where it comes to the Judiciary.

name the cases-the offense that the federal government prosecuted.

Liberals often claim that federal gun control was obviously intended since the founders knew that the states regulated firearms-which is why the leftwing argument is specious

 

[Cordelier]

name the cases-the offense that the federal government prosecuted.

Liberals often claim that federal gun control was obviously intended since the founders knew that the states regulated firearms-which is why the leftwing argument is specious

Moore v. Illinois, 55 US 13, 20 (1852)

"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an assault upon the marshal of the United States and hindering him in the execution of legal process is a high offense against the United States, for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment, and the same act may be also a gross breach of the peace of the state, a riot, assault, or a murder, and subject the same person to a punishment under the state laws for a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may if they see fit punish such an offender cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense, but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other; consequently, this Court has decided, in the case of Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 How. 432, that a state may punish the offense of uttering or passing false coin, as a cheat or fraud practiced on its citizens, and, in the case of the United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, that Congress, in the proper exercise of its authority, may punish the same act as an offense against the United States." --- Justice Robert C. Grier

---

US v. Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 550-51 (1875)

"The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two governments -- one State and the other National -- but there need be no conflict between the two. The powers which one possesses the other does not. They are established for different purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together, they make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home and abroad. True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and the same act. Thus, if a marshal of the United States is unlawfully resisted while executing the process of the courts within a State, and the resistance is accompanied by an assault on the officer, the sovereignty of the United States is violated by the resistance, and that of the State by the breach of peace in the assault. So, too, if one passes counterfeited coin of the United States within a State, it may be an offence against the United States and the State: the United States because it discredits the coin, and the State because of the fraud upon him to whom it is passed. This does not, however, necessarily imply that the two governments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with each other. It is the natural consequence of a citizenship which owes allegiance to two sovereignties and claims protection from both. The citizen cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to such a form of government. He owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and, within their respective spheres, must pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction." --- Chief Justice Morrison Waite

---

Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 US 509, 518 (1878)

"...we do not call in question the correctness of the general doctrine asserted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the same act may, in some instances, be an offense against two governments and that the transgressor may be held liable to punishment by both when the punishment is of such a character that it can be twice inflicted or by either of the two governments if the punishment, from its nature, can be only once suffered. It may well be that the satisfaction which the transgressor makes for the violated law of the United States is no atonement for the violated law of Tennessee. But here there is no case presented for the application of the doctrine." --- Justice Stephen J. Field

---

 

[Cordelier]

(Continued...)

Ex Parte Siebold, 100 US 371, 389 (1879)

"Another objection made is that, if Congress can impose penalties for violation of State laws, the officer will be made liable to double punishment for delinquency -- at the suit of the State and at the suit of the United States. But the answer to this is that each government punishes for violation of duty to itself only. Where a person owes a duty to two sovereigns, he is amenable to both for its performance, and either may call him to account. Whether punishment inflicted by one can be pleaded in bar to a charge by the other for the same identical act need not now be decided, although considerable discussion bearing upon the subject has taken place in this court, tending to the conclusion that such a plea cannot be sustained." --- Justice Joseph P. Bradley

---

US v. Arjona, 120 US 479, 487 (1887)

"A right secured by the law of nations to a nation or its people is one the United States, as the representatives of this nation, are bound to protect. Consequently, a law which is necessary and proper to afford this protection is one that Congress may enact, because it is one that is needed to carry into execution a power conferred by the Constitution on the government of the United States exclusively. There is no authority in the United States to require the passage and enforcement of such a law by the states. Therefore, the United States must have the power to pass it and enforce it themselves, or be unable to perform a duty which they may owe to another nation, and which the law of nations has imposed on them as part of their international obligations. This, however, does not prevent a state from providing for the punishment of the same thing, for here, as in the case of counterfeiting the coin of the United of the United States, the act may be an offense against the authority of a state as well as that of the United States." --- Chief Justice Morrison Waite

---

Cross v. North Carolina, 132 US 131, 139-40 (1889)

"If it were competent for Congress to give exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the United States of the crime of falsely making or forging promissory notes purporting to be executed by individuals and made payable to or at a national bank or of the crime of uttering or publishing as true any such falsely made or forged notes, it has not done so. Its legislation does not assume to restrict the authority which the states have always exercised of punishing in their own tribunals the crime of forging promissory notes, and other commercial securities, executed by private persons, and used for purposes of private business. The forgery of such instruments is nonetheless injurious to the welfare of the people of a state because they happen to be made payable to or at banking associations which come into existence under the authority of the United States. If the punishment by the State of the crime of forgery, of which the defendants were found guilty, leaves them exposed to punishment by the United States for having made false entries upon the books of the bank of which they were officers, with the intent to deceive the agent appointed by the general government to examine its affairs, it results from the fact that they are amenable to the laws of the United States as well as of the State of North Carolina, and may be subjected to punishment for violating the laws of each government. The forgery may have been committed in order that the instrument forged might thereafter become the basis of false entries upon the books of the bank. But that circumstance cannot defeat the authority of the state, charged with the duty of protecting its own citizens, from punishing the forgery as, in itself, a distinct separate offense committed within its limits and against its laws." --- Justice John Marshall Harlan

---

Pettibone v. US, 148 US 197, 209 (1893)

"While offenses exclusively against the states are exclusively cognizable in the state courts and offenses exclusively against the United States are exclusively cognizable in the federal courts, it is also settled that the same act or series of acts may constitute an offense equally against the United States and the state, subjecting the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each government." --- Chief Justice Melville Fuller

---

Crossley v. California, 168 US 640, 641 (1898)

"...it is settled law that the same act may constitute an offense against the United States and against a state, subjecting the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each government, and may embrace two or more offenses." --- Chief Justice Melville Fuller

---

 

[Cordelier]

(Continued...)

Sexton v. California, 189 US 319, 322-23 (1903)

"The case of counterfeiting the money of the United States is excepted by statute from the law giving exclusive jurisdiction to the United States courts of offenses against the laws of the United States. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 26. It has also been held that the United States could punish the crime of counterfeiting coin under the federal statute. The same act may be an offense both against the state and the United States, punishable in each jurisdiction under its laws." --- Justice Rufus W. Peckham

---

Matter of Heff, 197 US 488, 507 (1905)

"It is true the same act may often be a violation of both the state and federal law, but it is only when those laws occupy different planes. Thus, a sale of liquor may be a violation of both the state and federal law in that it was made by one who had not paid the revenue tax and received from the United States a license to sell, and also had not complied with the state law in reference to the matter of state license. But in that case, the two laws occupy different planes -- one that of revenue and the other that of police regulation." --- Justice David J. Brewer

---

Grafton v. US, 206 US 333, 353-54 (1907)

"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an assault upon the marshal of the United States, and hindering him in the execution of legal process, is a high offense against the United States for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment, and the same act may be also a gross breach of the peace of the state -- a riot, assault, or a murder -- and subject the same person to a punishment, under the state laws, for a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender cannot be doubted.

Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense, but only that, by one act, he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other; consequently, this Court has decided, in the case of Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 432, that a state may punish the offense of uttering or passing false coin, as a cheat or fraud practiced on its citizens, and in the case of the United States v. Marigold, supra, that Congress, in the proper exercise of its authority, may punish the same act as an offense against the United States." --- Justice John Marshall Harlan

---

Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 US 439, 445-46 (1915)

"The defendant in error insists, however, that the railroad company was also liable for the penalty imposed by the Indiana statute. In support of this position, numerous cases are cited which, like Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, hold that the same act may constitute a criminal offense against two sovereignties, and that punishment by one does not prevent punishment by the other. That doctrine is thoroughly established. But, upon an analysis of the principle on which it is founded, it will be found to relate only to cases where the act sought to be punished is one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction. This concurrent jurisdiction may be either because the nature of the act is such that at the same time it produces effects respectively within the sphere of state and federal regulation, and thus violates the laws of both, or where there is this double effect in a matter of which one can exercise control, but an authoritative declaration that the paramount jurisdiction of one shall not exclude that of the other." --- Justice Joseph R. Lamar

---

 

[Cordelier]

(Continued...)

McKelvey v. US, 260 US 353, 358 (1922)

"It also is contended that § 3, when construed as we construe it, transcends the power of Congress and encroaches on the police power of the states. This contention proceeds on the assumption that the section, so construed, deals with acts of personal violence which do not affect the public lands or the rights of the United States in them. But this is a mistaken assumption. The section, in terms and as we construe it, deals with the obstruction by unlawful means of free passage over the public lands. It makes no attempt at dealing with acts of personal violence as such. Only when and as they are made the means -- resorted to for the purpose -- of effecting the prohibited obstruction does it take any account of them. The power of the state to deal with and punish them is not affected. Such acts may be an ingredient of an offense against the United States and also, in themselves, as an offense against the state." --- Justice Willis Van Devanter

---

US v. Lanza, 260 US 377, 382 (1922)

"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment. Each government, in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity, is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.

It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both, and may be punished by each." --- Chief Justice William H. Taft

---

Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 US 312, 314 (1926)

"The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution contemplates that the manufacture of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes may be denounced as a criminal offense both by the federal law and by the state law, and that these laws may not only coexist, but be given full operation, each independently of the other. Where such manufacture is thus doubly denounced, one who engages therein commits two distinct offenses, one against the United States and one against the state, and may be subjected to prosecution and punishment in the federal courts for one, and in the state courts for the other, without any infraction of the constitutional rule against double jeopardy, it being limited to repeated prosecutions "for the same offense." --- Justice Willis Van Devanter

---

Westfall v. US, 274 US 256, 258 (1927)

""The argument is that Congress has no power to punish offenses against the property rights of state banks. It is said that the state is so broad that it covers such offenses when they could not result in any loss to the Federal Reserve Banks, and it is suggested that, if upheld, the Act will invalidate similar statutes of the states. This argument is well answered by Hiatt v. United States, 4 F.2d 374, 377, cert. denied, 268 U.S. 704. Of course, an act may be criminal under the laws of both jurisdictions. United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 260 U. S. 382. And if a state bank chooses to come into the system created by the United States, the United States may punish acts injurious to the system, although done to a corporation that the state also is entitled to protect. The general proposition is too plain to need more than statement." --- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

---

Those are just the cases that pre-date the New Deal... I can keep going if you want.

 

[Grizzly Adams]

I believe he was asking for the crimes committed, in order to ascertain the extent of criminal creep in the US Code over time. Where perhaps only counterfeiting was counted twice in 1790, but by 2000 there was using a toilet that wasn't low-flow.

 

[PirateMk1]

I think this is wrong.

It should not be possible to try someone for the same crime multiple times in different jurisdictions.

I'd rather get rid of pardons, or put in place a system that requires good justification for a pardon, not the fears of someone protecting those who might expose him.

Pardons serve multiple purposes, besides the common purpose of righting and obvious wrong, it is also there in case the executive needs to color a bit outside the lines and do a dirty deed or two that needs doing.

 

[Cordelier]

I believe he was asking for the crimes committed, in order to ascertain the extent of criminal creep in the US Code over time. Where perhaps only counterfeiting was counted twice in 1790, but by 2000 there was using a toilet that wasn't low-flow.

The laws change with the times... in those cases I cited, there are also ones that no longer apply - like harboring escaped slaves (eg, Moore), or violations of the Volstead Act (eq, Lanza & Hebert). The laws may change, but the principle stays the same... the Separate Sovereigns doctrine is a legitimate exception to the double jeopardy prohibition.

 

[TurtleDude]

Moore v. Illinois, 55 US 13, 20 (1852)

"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an assault upon the marshal of the United States and hindering him in the execution of legal process is a high offense against the United States, for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment, and the same act may be also a gross breach of the peace of the state, a riot, assault, or a murder, and subject the same person to a punishment under the state laws for a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may if they see fit punish such an offender cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense, but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other; consequently, this Court has decided, in the case of Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 How. 432, that a state may punish the offense of uttering or passing false coin, as a cheat or fraud practiced on its citizens, and, in the case of the United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, that Congress, in the proper exercise of its authority, may punish the same act as an offense against the United States." --- Justice Robert C. Grier

---

US v. Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 550-51 (1875)

"The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two governments -- one State and the other National -- but there need be no conflict between the two. The powers which one possesses the other does not. They are established for different purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together, they make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home and abroad. True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and the same act. Thus, if a marshal of the United States is unlawfully resisted while executing the process of the courts within a State, and the resistance is accompanied by an assault on the officer, the sovereignty of the United States is violated by the resistance, and that of the State by the breach of peace in the assault. So, too, if one passes counterfeited coin of the United States within a State, it may be an offence against the United States and the State: the United States because it discredits the coin, and the State because of the fraud upon him to whom it is passed. This does not, however, necessarily imply that the two governments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with each other. It is the natural consequence of a citizenship which owes allegiance to two sovereignties and claims protection from both. The citizen cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to such a form of government. He owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and, within their respective spheres, must pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction." --- Chief Justice Morrison Waite

---

Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 US 509, 518 (1878)

"...we do not call in question the correctness of the general doctrine asserted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the same act may, in some instances, be an offense against two governments and that the transgressor may be held liable to punishment by both when the punishment is of such a character that it can be twice inflicted or by either of the two governments if the punishment, from its nature, can be only once suffered. It may well be that the satisfaction which the transgressor makes for the violated law of the United States is no atonement for the violated law of Tennessee. But here there is no case presented for the application of the doctrine." --- Justice Stephen J. Field

---

exactly

 

[Cordelier]

exactly

Nobody disputes that... the principle is elucidated even more succinctly in the 1905 Heff decision.

 

[TurtleDude]

Nobody disputes that... the principle is elucidated even more succinctly in the 1905 Heff decision.

much of the war on drugs and gun control laws stand contrary to that doctrine noted in Cruikshank

how do you think the court will rule?

 

[Rexedgar]

If the Supremes rule in favor of Gamble, that's going to chap a lot of Trump-hating asses.

.....and chapping liberal asses is what it’s all about, right?

 

[Mycroft]

.....and chapping liberal asses is what it’s all about, right?

No. They set themselves up for that kind of thing.