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Ok ... so empirically, if you took the Liquid and matter out, and tested it, would it still be wine and bread?
So I wanted to expand on this thought for your sake, because I feel like I'm not giving you an adequate response whereby I'm really defining well what substance is. Today I read an excerpt from a book by Cardinal Ratzinger (now known as Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, the book is called The Celebration of the Eucharist) where he dwells on the issue of how we deal with the concept of substance in modern times.
Cardinal Ratzinger said:For classical physics, as everyone knows, substance was the last indivisible unit of corpuscular being; at first atoms were regarded as those units and, later, the elemental particles found in atoms. They appeared to be the things ultimately responsible for material reality, the "building blocks of reality" out of which the world is constructed. Thus they were considered the substances in which the different dynamics processes occurred accidentally. The demonstration that matter in principle can be transformed into energy demolished this notion of substance. Matter is not something that exists as solid clumps of reality. The ultimate particles are not some "mass" in rigid contrast to energy. Consequently, the concept of substance in classical physics and the late Middle Ages is in fact abolished.
The thirteenth-century concept of substance, however, as it was classically formulated by Thomas Aquinas, is completely different. For High Scholasticism, not only the "when" but also the "where" is an accident; that is to say, not only the process unfolding over the course of time but also the structure existing in space is an accident. In still other words: not just the quality but also the quantity is considered an accident. That is an important observation. For with that we have caught sight of the subject matter peculiar to the field of metaphysics, as the High Middle Ages understood it; at the same time, this makes evident the central element in the rearrangement of our understanding of reality that became the presupposition of the classical physics of the modern era. For the High Middle Ages, "matter," as materia prima is a pre-physical, precisely meta-physical entity; it is pure potentiality, and as such it does not become intelligible anywhere; it can only be grasped speculatively , metaphysically as the one root of physically observable material being. The same is true of "substance", which refers to the metaphysical reality of the subsistence of an existing thing, but not to the appearing thing as phenomenon.