- Joined
- Oct 17, 2007
- Messages
- 11,862
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- Location
- New York
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- Political Leaning
- Centrist
Recently, Haaretz reported:
… the frequent contacts between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not over the big arms deal or Iran's nuclear plans. The two countries have concluded that they need to reach an agreement on two other issues regarding their sphere of influence in the region: Iraq and Lebanon…
For its part, Saudi Arabia is not prepared to give Iran gifts, but it also doesn't want to lose all influence in Iraq. In Iraq as in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia realizes it's in a relatively inferior position vis-a-vis Iran; all it can do in these countries is to prevent Tehran from wielding exclusive influence. This is what the discussion between Saudi Arabia and Iran is now focusing on: deliberations during which Riyadh will try to divide its sphere of influence in Iraq and Lebanon with Iran.
The emergent Saudi-Iranian “détente” so to speak, provides a hint that Saudi Arabia has likely calculated that:
1) The U.S. is not credibly committed or able to preclude Iran’s becoming a nuclear power.
2) Iran is poised to become a great regional power, a development that will fundamentally alter the region’s balance of power.
3) The current time, ahead of those developments, will allow Saudi Arabia to obtain more favorable terms than when the former conditions are fulfilled.
A big risk for Saudi Arabia going forward will constitute how it deals with the changing balance of power. An ineffective response could greatly undermine the Kingdom’s influence. It could also open the Kingdom up to increasing Iranian pressure that could have regional and global implications.
… the frequent contacts between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not over the big arms deal or Iran's nuclear plans. The two countries have concluded that they need to reach an agreement on two other issues regarding their sphere of influence in the region: Iraq and Lebanon…
For its part, Saudi Arabia is not prepared to give Iran gifts, but it also doesn't want to lose all influence in Iraq. In Iraq as in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia realizes it's in a relatively inferior position vis-a-vis Iran; all it can do in these countries is to prevent Tehran from wielding exclusive influence. This is what the discussion between Saudi Arabia and Iran is now focusing on: deliberations during which Riyadh will try to divide its sphere of influence in Iraq and Lebanon with Iran.
The emergent Saudi-Iranian “détente” so to speak, provides a hint that Saudi Arabia has likely calculated that:
1) The U.S. is not credibly committed or able to preclude Iran’s becoming a nuclear power.
2) Iran is poised to become a great regional power, a development that will fundamentally alter the region’s balance of power.
3) The current time, ahead of those developments, will allow Saudi Arabia to obtain more favorable terms than when the former conditions are fulfilled.
A big risk for Saudi Arabia going forward will constitute how it deals with the changing balance of power. An ineffective response could greatly undermine the Kingdom’s influence. It could also open the Kingdom up to increasing Iranian pressure that could have regional and global implications.