"Constitutional Review Of Abortion"
At the inception of the constitution, when natural freedoms are exchanged for wrights of citizenship, the citizen is the sole, primary, principle and exclusive recipient of protections as constructed through the legalism of its doctrine.
The 14th amendment directly implies that a citizen receives wrights at birth; thus, the point of inception whereby the state concerns itself with an obligation to reprise a violation to a wright to life begins for a citizen at birth.
According to the 14th amendment, the extension of equal protection to any other being, whether it be described as a person, a non-citizen, or otherwise, cannot have any greater rights than that of a citizen.
Since a citizen must be born to receive protected wrights, any other being must also be born to receive protected wrights, else that other would be receiving greater wrights rather than those received by that of a citizen.
The premise for equal protection, as being based upon a requirement of birth, was clearly understood and forwarded within the opinion of Blackmun, Roe V. Wade, in the statement, "Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth."
Ultimately, through judicial activism, Roe V Wade modified the meaning of birth from parturition to viability, which was estimated to begin at the end of the second trimester.
Viability is consistent on a time line with the onset of foetal pain as evidenced from the JAMA, which concludes a necessary presence for thalamocortical radiations.
Pain implies the onset of sentience, and sentience is a prerequisite for sapience, as a minimum prerequisite for conscientious objection by a foetus, which is a philosophical birth, whereby a foetus may initially qualify as a legal victim that may be represented by legal proxy.
Otherwise, by constitution and philosophical reason, prior to birth, the foetus is the private property of the mother, by intrinsic possession, for which privacy protections of the constitution apply.
Unborn foetal protection laws must be consistent with the constitution, and any law must define violations and penalties as consequences to actions against the mother, which may include elevated penalties for special circumstances.
At the inception of the constitution, when natural freedoms are exchanged for wrights of citizenship, the citizen is the sole, primary, principle and exclusive recipient of protections as constructed through the legalism of its doctrine.
The 14th amendment directly implies that a citizen receives wrights at birth; thus, the point of inception whereby the state concerns itself with an obligation to reprise a violation to a wright to life begins for a citizen at birth.
According to the 14th amendment, the extension of equal protection to any other being, whether it be described as a person, a non-citizen, or otherwise, cannot have any greater rights than that of a citizen.
Since a citizen must be born to receive protected wrights, any other being must also be born to receive protected wrights, else that other would be receiving greater wrights rather than those received by that of a citizen.
The premise for equal protection, as being based upon a requirement of birth, was clearly understood and forwarded within the opinion of Blackmun, Roe V. Wade, in the statement, "Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth."
Ultimately, through judicial activism, Roe V Wade modified the meaning of birth from parturition to viability, which was estimated to begin at the end of the second trimester.
Viability is consistent on a time line with the onset of foetal pain as evidenced from the JAMA, which concludes a necessary presence for thalamocortical radiations.
Pain implies the onset of sentience, and sentience is a prerequisite for sapience, as a minimum prerequisite for conscientious objection by a foetus, which is a philosophical birth, whereby a foetus may initially qualify as a legal victim that may be represented by legal proxy.
Otherwise, by constitution and philosophical reason, prior to birth, the foetus is the private property of the mother, by intrinsic possession, for which privacy protections of the constitution apply.
Unborn foetal protection laws must be consistent with the constitution, and any law must define violations and penalties as consequences to actions against the mother, which may include elevated penalties for special circumstances.
