Can Iran respond to M.A.D. ? (1 Viewer)

[cascadian]

This thread is not concerned with other possible side effects of Iran possessing nuclear weapons such as nuclear proliferation, Iran's stability, etc... Nor is it an endorsement of Iran's overall nuclear stewardship. The question is simply:"Can Iran respond to Mutually Assured Destruction"?

I've seen an idea floating around for a while now, mostly it seems in certain American blogs, that a nuclear armed Iran would most likely lead to the destruction of Israel because Iran would not respond to Mutually Assured Destruction.

One major cause for this belief is a statement by Rafsanjani:

"If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. "

My first point obviously is that Rafsanjani clearly references a "standstill", which in this context would not appear to be equivalent to the destruction of Israel. He's saying that the balance of power in the ME would be shifted by the possession of a single atomic bomb by an Islamic nation because then Israel would lose its current relative imperviousness.

My second point is that he is not addressing MAD, but the consequences of one nuclear bomb. Now to be sure, even talking of such things is threatening in nature, but it does not demonstrate the will to carry it out.

Am I alone in this interpretation? Hardly.

"Hashemi Rafsanjani, president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, gave a speech on 14 December 2001 that was widely interpreted as indicating that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Israel."
~globalsecurity.org

"Despite its militant talk, however, the Iranian regime has approached its violent foreign intentions pragmatically. Understanding that it cannot defeat Israel in one aggressive step—such as in a conventional war against Israel—Iran has adopted a strategy of constant attrition, aimed at both weakening Israel militarily and undermining its international legitimacy. It has thus sought nuclear capabilities—the superconventional capability—as a means of achieving strategic supremacy, further serving as an umbrella for subconventional aggression"
~ Moshe Yaalon, Israeli Lt. Gen. (ret.) (from a speech actually proposing a military strike against Iran) bolding mine

Reuven Pedatzur an Israeli analyst for Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and former Air Force pilot argues that deterrence is the best way to approach the threat of a nuclear Iran.

The other popular notion is that because Iran blends its religion and state and supports suicide attacks that we can expect them to have no respect for the loss of an entire country through MAD. That is, they might commit some sort of state suicide. First of all notions of the behavior of individuals cannot be assumed to be mimicked by a state. They are entirely different creatures with different motivations, methodologies, rewards and punishments regardless of whether they are theological are not. This leap of faith has not been justified.

Japan regulary used suicide attacks and it's emperor reportedly ruled as a god, but they caved in at the earliest opportunity, once the US capacity and willingness was made unrefutable. In fact part of the rationalization for using the bomb was the supposed fanaticism of the Japanese and how they would fight us down to the last woman and child if we had staged a conventional invasion. Now this is not to say that the Japan in WWII are the same as Iran, rather that the use of suicide attacks or the co-mingling of religion and state are not enogh to indicate a likelihood to willingly suffer nuclear annihilation.

Second of all, if their religion is so important to them, why would they risk destroying the holy city of Jerusalem or the holy city of Qom in Iran?

 

[Simon W. Moon]

This thread is not concerned with other possible side effects of Iran possessing nuclear weapons such as nuclear proliferation, Iran's stability, etc... Nor is it an endorsement of Iran's overall nuclear stewardship. The question is simply:"Can Iran respond to Mutually Assured Destruction"?

Re the US, I think it's more merely Assured Destruction rather than a mutual thing. The US could painfully absorb a nuclear strike and still deliver 'national obliteration' to Iran quite handily.

The other popular notion is that because Iran blends its religion and state and supports suicide attacks that we can expect them to have no respect for the loss of an entire country through MAD.

This necessary fiction is accepted a priori. There're few folks who're actually capable of effectively questioning their a priori beliefs. Especially since those beliefs were not arrived at via conscious, intelectual analysis.

Consider the vast numbers of folks who held and still hold the belief that Hussein was an undeterrable 'madman.' This belief persisted despite numerous, public USIC analyses to the contrary. This persisted despite Hussein's lengthy, proven track record of being deterred.
If the voices of the US's professional Intelligence Community aren't able to make an impact on the belief, and if reality itself is unable to make an impact, I'm not sure what there is that can persuade someone who has already accepted such a fiction as fact.
As my curmudgeonly acquaintance Collounsbury noted, they are the "pre-fooled."
As to why folks find such things so eminently palatable I can only speculate. I suspect it may be explained in part by positing a phenomena called rational irrationality.

Beliefs about politics and religion often have three puzzling properties: systematic bias, high certainty, and little informational basis. ... According to the theory of rational irrationality, [irrationality] ... is a good like any other; the lower the private cost, the more agents buy. A peculiar feature of beliefs about politics, religion, etc. is that ... the private cost of irrationality [is] zero ...​

So, while the private cost of believing that Hussein [or Iran] is an undeterrable madman despite the evidence of history and the assessments of the professional Intelligence Community is nil or nearly nil there can be private rewards such as group acceptance and personal feelings of sophistication of 'toughness.' Though the private rewards may be small in some cases, they only have to outweigh negligible costs.

[Of course, there're folks like Presidential Defense Policy Advisor and war-profiteer, Richard Perle and Universal Fascist, Michael Ledeen in the pro-war crowd who stand to gain much more than small intangible benefits by promoting thess beliefs.]

That is, they might commit some sort of state suicide. First of all notions of the behavior of individuals cannot be assumed to be mimicked by a state. They are entirely different creatures with different motivations, methodologies, rewards and punishments regardless of whether they are theological are not.

An inherent flaw of argument by analogy.
Further, even analogies between different nations and different times in history are not always a reliably accurate means of analysis or prediction. As Neocon insider F.ukuyama pointed out, the prevalent current in neocon thought was that the situation in Iraq was suitably analogous to that of the parts of Europe that were behind the Iron Curtain. Hence the 'greeted as liberators' bit and the erroneous projection that the Iraq war would be over in a matter of six week to six months. Obviously that was a major and fatal mistake.
Ahh ivory tower speculation that costs the lives of thousands. Can't get enough of that.

Hopefully, the sad, sordid tales of the Iraq war will serve as an inoculation of sorts against the effectiveness of pro-war demagoguery in re Iran.

 

[oldreliable67]

The question is simply:"Can Iran respond to Mutually Assured Destruction"?

No, it really isn't can Iran respond to MAD. The better question is, will Iran respond to MAD. To answer that, we have to try to divine the reason(s) why Iran might want nukes in the first place.

Most observers believe that, in the context of Iranian intentions, the possession of nukes might well be merely the means to greater regional hegemony and furtherance of the pursuit of the new global caliphate. In the speech you cited by the former Israeli CoS, General Yaalon, he said,

Iran is pursuing military nuclear capabilities as a shield for its other actions. With nuclear capabilities, Iran will have greater leverage vis-à-vis the West, and will thus have more options for implementing its anti-Western strategy. The Iranian regime believes that by having military nuclear capabilities, it will enjoy greater freedom for operating against Western interests in the region; they believe they will have acquired the necessary cover for undermining and blackmailing moderate regimes and using terror by proxies against Israel and Western targets.

In other words, why should we be concerned about Iran's view of MAD? Is it not Iran's belief in the acceptance of MAD by Israel and the US that motivates Iran? Further quoting General Yaalon,

It therefore believes that the United States and its allies fear the price of Iranian reaction to steps taken against it. The price to the West for standing up to Iran is clear: it includes terror attacks, economic hardship for those countries trading with Iran, and consequences resulting from possible fluctuations in Iranian oil production. Indeed, the Iranian regime believes that the West—including Israel—is afraid to deal with it.

This view holds that Iran believes that the West & Israel believe that the price of taking action to prevent Iranian acquisition of nukes is simply too great - a form of MAD. The Iranians appear to believe that our acceptance of this form of MAD will be sufficient for Iranian regional hegemony and pursuit of the new global caliphate.

In this sensce, General Yaalon's comments are consistent with the "standstill" interpretation of Rafsanjani's remarks, to wit, "He's saying that the balance of power in the ME would be shifted by the possession of a single atomic bomb by an Islamic nation because then Israel would lose its current relative imperviousness."

But, all of this assumes a certain amount of pragmatism by the ruling powers in Iran - and the ruling power in Iran is not Ahmadinejad. It is the religious theocracy, expressing its power thru the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council...

"Iran’s Guardian Council is a body of twelve religious jurists: the Supreme Leader appoints six of them; the other six are nominated by the Judiciary and confirmed by parliament. The Guardian Council is the most powerful non-elected body within Iran’s system of governance and is effectively an extension of the unaccountable rule of the Supreme Leader. The Council’s sweeping powers include interpretation of the Constitution, supervision of elections and the vetting of legislation passed by the parliament."

Source.

Ahmadinejad is their currently chosen instrument. His rhetoric thus far appears to have their blessing and approval. Unfortunately.

 

[Goobieman]

"If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. "

Israel can't destory the entire islamic world -- but she could destroy Iran, or any other country that decided to nuke her.

And so, the question is: Is the Iranian leadership willing to sacrifice Iran to destory Israel?

Personally, I dont think anyone can take that chance.

 

[Tashah]

"If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world."

If you look at the bolded words, one can conjur another meaning. He could simply be saying that with the Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon:

1• Israel no longer has the edge on destructive capability. To wit, destructive capability is at a standstill (or stalemate).

However, Rafsanjani's statement in and of itself does not necessarily imply or automatically suggest that Iran is ideologically bound to submit to this MAD stasis (stalemate). In other words, standstill could be a valid statement for capability yet an invalid assumption for intent.

 

[cascadian]

No, it really isn't can Iran respond to MAD. The better question is, will Iran respond to MAD.

An acceptable reformulation of the OP.

Most observers believe that, in the context of Iranian intentions, the possession of nukes might well be merely the means to greater regional hegemony and furtherance of the pursuit of the new global caliphate.

The global caliphate part needs a little explanation. AFAIK the Iranian revolution was not based around the global caliphate and it seems to enjoy wider support amongst Sunnis who actually make up the majority of Muslims across the globe. There are some movements here and there, but in respect to the political realities in muslim countries it seems to place the global caliphate as no more than a twinkling in OBL's eyes.

Definitely, there is a tendency for Iran to act outside of its borders under the mantle of the Nation of Islam, but it seems to be concentrated on working with other Shia. Outside of Iraq where the Shia have new found power, it's hard to see them expanding their influence much farther than they have already.

In other words, why should we be concerned about Iran's view of MAD? Is it not Iran's belief in the acceptance of MAD by Israel and the US that motivates Iran?
...
This view holds that Iran believes that the West & Israel believe that the price of taking action to prevent Iranian acquisition of nukes is simply too great - a form of MAD.

They are playing a high stakes form of chicken which M.A.D. is related to. A sort of pre-nuclear brinkmanship each side waiting for the other to blink. But I'm not sure why you're connecting the two here. Ultimately, it's a much lower stakes game for the Iranians than M.A.D.

The Iranians appear to believe that our acceptance of this form of MAD will be sufficient for Iranian regional hegemony and pursuit of the new global caliphate.

As mentioned before I think they can't realistically expect much more than regional influence, which they will probably be gaining with or without nuclear weapons due to developments in Iraq. If anything, their recent brazenness is a result of the shift of power in the region not a cause.

My use of that source was in some part based upon the fact that I actually disagreed with him on some of the other points that he made. IOW, even someone advocating a preventative bombing of Iran could still see them as developing nuclear weapons without the intention of a first nuclear strike.

But, all of this assumes a certain amount of pragmatism by the ruling powers in Iran - and the ruling power in Iran is not Ahmadinejad. It is the religious theocracy, expressing its power thru the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council...

Ahmadinejad is their currently chosen instrument. His rhetoric thus far appears to have their blessing and approval. Unfortunately.

The Gaurdian Council and the Supreme Leader have considerable undemocratic power, but they do still need politicians such as Ahmadinejad in order to enjoy the support of the populace. I honestly think they might have preferred someone else, even if they attempted to make sure ahead of time that no one truly threatening to authority would come in. His defiance of the west, so far as I can tell, is very popular.

All things considered, I have to wonder if the Gaurdian Council is actually more level headed then Amadinejehad. A few years ago Ayatollah Ali Khamenei came out with a vehement stance which said that nuclear weapons were unholy and forbidden.In 2005 he issued a fatwa to that effect. Now I do view that stance with skepticism, but it stands in sharp contrast to Ahmadinejad's posturing and support from the cleric Mesbah Yazdi.

I think there is much going on out of view in the Iranian power structure, and things are not as unified as they seem on the surface.

 

[cascadian]

However, Rafsanjani's statement in and of itself does not necessarily imply or automatically suggest that Iran is ideologically bound to submit to this MAD stasis (stalemate). In other words, standstill could be a valid statement for capability yet an invalid assumption for intent.

I'm quite satisfied with the explanation of it not being a statement of intent. It's presented as an argument of my opposition.

For what it's worth, since that original quote Rafsanjani has publicly stated that he does not support the military use of nuclear technology.

 

[oldreliable67]

For what it's worth, since that original quote Rafsanjani has publicly stated that he does not support the military use of nuclear technology.

That is the most explicit denial of Iranian nuke intentions that I have seen. Thanks for the link. The big question: can we, dare we, believe him? The corollary is: does he speak for the ruling Iranian clergy? The answer, IMO: trust, but verify.

A very interesting article in today's WP concerning Iran's "eagerness for talks" with the US...

The eagerness for talks demonstrates a profound change in Iran's political orthodoxy, emphatically erasing a taboo against contact with Washington that has both defined and confined Tehran's public foreign policy for more than a quarter-century, they said.

Though the Tehran government in the past has routinely jailed its citizens on charges of contact with the country it calls the "Great Satan," Ahmadinejad's May 8 letter was implicitly endorsed by Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and lavished with praise by perhaps the most conservative ayatollah in the theocratic government.
...
...several diplomats said senior Iranian officials have asked a multitude of intermediaries to pass word to Washington making clear their appetite for direct talks. He said Ali Larijani, chairman of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, passed that message to the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, who arrived in Washington Tuesday for talks with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley.

Iranian officials made similar requests through Indonesia, Kuwait and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Laylaz said. American intelligence analysts also say Larijani's urgent requests for meetings with senior officials in France and Germany appear to be part of a bid for dialogue with Washington.
...
Inside Iran, the letter effectively widened an opening toward the United States that began in March, with Larijani's unusually public acceptance of an American invitation to direct talks on the situation in neighboring Iraq. That acceptance provoked sharp criticism from hard-liners until it was publicly endorsed by Khamenei.

By contrast, Ahmadinejad's letter sparked lavish praise from perhaps the most conservative cleric in Iran's government, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who chairs the Guardian Council, which oversees Iran's electoral process. Delivering the Friday sermon on May 12 in Tehran, Jannati called it "an extraordinary letter" and "an inspiration by God."

Source.

To the extent that there has been a change in Iranian ruling clerical attitudes about talking with the "Great Satan", it must be marked as a sign of progress. However, it is our interest to consider this apparent opening with great care; such discussions and 'negotiations' are a way of political life in the ME. This 'opening' in particular may well be intended as a tactic to put a carrot out at the end of a stick and effectively delay any sanctions. Moreover, this move may play well with the Iranian public.

 

[Simon W. Moon]

Consider that in this game all Iran has to do to score a win is to not lose. That's it.
They get all the credit for their tough talk to the US and the rest of the world. They get points for talking tough re Israel and talking about their 'brotherhood' w/ their fellow ME and Muslim states. [Of course, their fellow ME states have their own sets of concerns re Iran and it's growing influence in the region.]
Whether or not Iran actually constructs a nuclear device they're scoring goals. If they were to go ahead and make one and continue to survive that's even better, of course.

Cui bono indeed
​

Consider that bellicose talk spooks the petro markets. While the cost of extracting oil has remained relatively stable, the price at which the oil sells has risen dramatically.
We've got a PotUSA Admin w/ oil ties which has defense contractors and war profiteers as policy advisors on one side, and a major oil producing nation on the other. Both sides get their bread generously buttered by tough talk.
Not to mention the less tangible domestic political benefits that both sides gain among their respective electorates. Though less tangible, these things are readily transformed by practiced politicos into more material advantages.

Oh yeah, and there may be something to the words they're telling us about security yada, yada





The closest the 'mutual' part of mutual destruction comes for the US is in the non-military impact that a major oil disruption could bring about. Al-Qaida's already made some attempts on the SA oil supply.
Blocking Hormuz and several key attacks on critical petro infra-structure site would put the industrialized world into a little tizzy searching for short term alternatives. [Maybe a big opening for energy independent Brazil?] Cetainly would be felt by us regular folks.
Sure Iran has covert teams who can conduct terrorist attacks on the US etc, but the effect of such, as great as they would be, wouldn't be as great as the atacks conducted on our global supply chains.

 

[oldreliable67]

Consider that in this game all Iran has to do to score a win is to not lose. That's it.
They get all the credit for their tough talk to the US and the rest of the world. They get points for talking tough re Israel and talking about their 'brotherhood' w/ their fellow ME and Muslim states. [Of course, their fellow ME states have their own sets of concerns re Iran and it's growing influence in the region.]
Whether or not Iran actually constructs a nuclear device they're scoring goals. If they were to go ahead and make one and continue to survive that's even better, of course.

Cui bono indeed
​

Consider that bellicose talk spooks the petro markets. While the cost of extracting oil has remained relatively stable, the price at which the oil sells has risen dramatically.
We've got a PotUSA Admin w/ oil ties which has defense contractors and war profiteers as policy advisors on one side, and a major oil producing nation on the other. Both sides get their bread generously buttered by tough talk.
Not to mention the less tangible domestic political benefits that both sides gain among their respective electorates. Though less tangible, these things are readily transformed by practiced politicos into more material advantages.

Oh yeah, and there may be something to the words they're telling us about security yada, yada

The closest the 'mutual' part of mutual destruction comes for the US is in the non-military impact that a major oil disruption could bring about. Al-Qaida's already made some attempts on the SA oil supply.
Blocking Hormuz and several key attacks on critical petro infra-structure site would put the industrialized world into a little tizzy searching for short term alternatives. [Maybe a big opening for energy independent Brazil?] Cetainly would be felt by us regular folks.
Sure Iran has covert teams who can conduct terrorist attacks on the US etc, but the effect of such, as great as they would be, wouldn't be as great as the atacks conducted on our global supply chains.

All good points. Not only do they get points "for talking tough re Israel and talking about their 'brotherhood' w/ their fellow ME and Muslim states", they also get points with the more moderate ME states (if their really and truly are any) for their recent seeming attempts to open a dialog with the US.

How does Iran lose? How does the US win?