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As could be expected, the two other threads have pretty much ignored the legal questions and focus on Flynn's alledged 'real' guilt or speculate on future judicial politics. While it may be futile, I'd like to think there are some posters that who are actually informed and interested in the ruling itself.
To that end :
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-f070-d102-a9ff-f7fb7daf0000
Some key extracts: (most citations snipped for brevity)
And:
Looks solid to me, even if it does not satisfy some posters political ends to "get Flynn".
To that end :
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-f070-d102-a9ff-f7fb7daf0000
Some key extracts: (most citations snipped for brevity)
Whatever the precise scope of Rule 48’s “leave of court” requirement, this is plainly not the rare case where further judicial inquiry is warranted. To begin with, Flynn agrees with the government’s motion to dismiss, and there has been no allegation that the motion reflects prosecutorial harassment. Additionally, the government’s motion includes an extensive discussion of newly discovered evidence casting Flynn’s guilt into doubt. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 198. ...In light of this evidence, the government maintains it cannot “prove either the relevant false statements or their materiality beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Insufficient evidence is a quintessential justification for dismissing charges. See Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 623 (explaining that a motion to dismiss should be granted “if it is explained to the judge that there was … an insufficiency of evidence … or other similar consideration”).
The government’s representations about the insufficiency of the evidence are entitled to a “presumption of regularity … in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). On the record before the district court, there is no clear evidence contrary to the government’s representations. The justifications the district court offers in support of further inquiry—for instance, that only the U.S. Attorney signed the motion, without any line prosecutors, and that the motion is longer than most Rule 48(a) motions—are insufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity to which the government is entitled.
And:
In this case, the district court’s actions will result in specific harms to the exercise of the Executive Branch’s exclusive prosecutorial power. The contemplated proceedings would likely require the Executive to reveal the internal deliberative process behind its exercise of prosecutorial discretion, interfering with the Article II charging authority. ...Thus, the district court’s appointment of the amicus and demonstrated intent to scrutinize the reasoning and motives of the Department of Justice constitute irreparable harms that cannot be remedied on appeal. See Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1140 (“interference with the internal deliberations of a Department of the Government of the United States … cannot be remedied by an appeal from the final judgment.”); see also Cheney, 542 U.S. at 382. …
... In his brief opposing the government’s motion, Gleeson asserted the government’s reasons for dismissal were “pretext” and accused the government of “gross prosecutorial abuse. He relied on news stories, tweets, and other facts outside the record to contrast the government’s grounds for dismissal here with its rationales for prosecution in other cases. ... Among other things, the government may be required to justify its charging decisions, not only in this case, but also in the past or pending cases cited in Gleeson’s brief. Moreover, Gleeson encouraged the district court to scrutinize the government’s view of the strength of its case—a core aspect of the Executive’s charging authority. (condemning district court’s failure to dismiss criminal charges based on its view that “the government has exaggerated the risk of losing at trial”). As explained above, our cases are crystal clear that the district court is without authority to do so. See Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 742; Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 623.
This is not a case about whether “a district judge may even hold a hearing on a Rule 48(a) motion.” Dissenting Op. 11 (emphasis omitted). Rather, it is about whether, after the government has explained why a prosecution is no longer in the public interest, the district judge may prolong the prosecution by appointing an amicus, encouraging public participation, and probing the government’s motives. On that, both the Constitution and cases are clear: he may not.
Looks solid to me, even if it does not satisfy some posters political ends to "get Flynn".
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