"Alloparenting"

[Jredbaron96]

As we know, the result was widespread misery. Russian birth rates dropped to among the lowest on Earth, the Russian populace grew bitter, detached, and uncaring (a condition which persists until today), alcoholism became rampant, and the USSR eventually collapsed. The old Soviet bloc nations still haven't recovered.

The decline in Russian fertility rate matches the rest of the industrialized world.

 

[Lisa]

Pretty much.

It's an idea which has been in place since before we were humans I imagine.

Exactly. This is how we developed stable settled communities and agriculture instead of foraging for food. Societies are groups of people who work together for the betterment of all. The US constitution creates an interdependent country and that document is a statement of the rights of the people, but also of their responsibilities to others and how that society is to be both governed and defended.

 

[COTO]

The decline in Russian fertility rate matches the rest of the industrialized world.

I already demonstrated that the decline was 67% greater than in America over the same time period, and the birth rates remain significantly lower today. Do you have something to add to this, or to Visbek's criticisms?

 

[Jredbaron96]

I already demonstrated that the decline was 67% greater than in America over the same time period, and the birth rates remain significantly lower today. Do you have something to add to this, or to Visbek's criticisms?

If only there was kind of major event in Soviet history between 1930-1959 that might have impacted their demographics...

 

[COTO]

If only there was kind of major event in Soviet history between 1930-1959 that might have impacted their demographics...

There were several.

The total impact of these events and policies resulted in a significantly steeper, longer, and deeper decline than in America. It therefore behooves us to examine which events and policies the two nations didn't share in common during this period, and from this asymmetry draw conclusions about the impact of social policies on birth rates.

A 67% disparity in the decline is a massive difference to account for, especially since the standard of living is much higher today in America than in Russia, which--all other things being equal--suggests that the decline in American birth rates ought to have been far greater than that observed in Russia.

 

[Jredbaron96]

There were several.

Sure, I suppose. But in the end losing 15% of your population, and then a famine that prevents a post-war baby boom, is a pretty plain indicator of why.

You can try to shoehorn in explanations, but you'll need some convincing data to prove that it was policy, not the loss of 27 million people, that was the primary driver behind Soviet disparity in demographics.

 

[Visbek]

Sure, I suppose. But in the end losing 15% of your population, and then a famine that prevents a post-war baby boom, is a pretty plain indicator of why.

You can try to shoehorn in explanations, but you'll need some convincing data to prove that it was policy, not the loss of 27 million people, that was the primary driver behind Soviet disparity in demographics.

Policy has a lot to do with it, but not in the way COTO accepts.

The main policy that impacted birth rates was rapid industrialization. Russia was far more agrarian than the US before WWII, and the Soviets put a huge effort into industrializing (and educating) most of the nation.

We see similar birth rate changes as the USSR in non-Communist nations like Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil....

COTO can only cling to the absurd idea that the USSR was somehow identical to the US in 1918 or 1940, even though it should be glaringly obvious that's not the case.

 

[Visbek]

There were several.

The total impact of these events and policies resulted in a significantly steeper, longer, and deeper decline than in America. It therefore behooves us to examine which events and policies the two nations didn't share in common during this period, and from this asymmetry draw conclusions about the impact of social policies on birth rates.

A 67% disparity in the decline is a massive difference to account for, especially since the standard of living is much higher today in America than in Russia, which--all other things being equal--suggests that the decline in American birth rates ought to have been far greater than that observed in Russia.

lol

Okay then. Infant mortality fell far more in the USSR than the US between 1950 and 2020.

Russia 1950: 125 deaths per 1000 births
Russia 1970: 30 deaths per 1000 births -- a 76% decrease

US: 31 to 21, a 32%

First of all, obviously this plays a part in changes in birth rates. When infant mortality is high, families have more births, because they know that many of the kids won't make it to their 5th birthday. When infant mortality is low, parents don't need to have as many kids, because they know more will survive.

Second, by the way you're measuring things, the USSR was clearly far more successful at reducing infant mortality than the US.

So, I'd say that the larger drop in birth rates is actually a sign of success rather than "misery."

By the way, birth rates dropped nations all around the world. Non-Communist countries like Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil saw similar drops as the USSR. Does that mean those nations also suffered from "widespread misery?"

 

[COTO]

Sure, I suppose. But in the end losing 15% of your population, and then a famine that prevents a post-war baby boom, is a pretty plain indicator of why.

Loss of population doesn't adversely affect birth rates.

Famines do, but if famine was the reason for lower birth rates, the trend wouldn't have persisted for 90 years.

First of all, obviously this plays a part in changes in birth rates. When infant mortality is high, families have more births, because they know that many of the kids won't make it to their 5th birthday. When infant mortality is low, parents don't need to have as many kids, because they know more will survive.

Argue it with Red Baron. He seems to think the drop is due to a post-war famine (an event which significantly increases infant mortality) discouraging childbearing in Russia during America's baby boom. Once you two duke it out and determine who's speculation is more valid, I'll at least have a consistent argument to rebut.

Second, by the way you're measuring things, the USSR was clearly far more successful at reducing infant mortality than the US.

They were.

So, I'd say that the larger drop in birth rates is actually a sign of success rather than "misery."

The misery is independent of the drop in birth rates. I've emphasized this twice now.

A steep and protracted decline in birth rates--to rates that historically have been and continue to be significantly lower than in the US--was one of the consequences of Soviet family policy.

A miserable, cold, unfriendly, unloving populace is another.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Loss of population doesn't adversely affect birth rates.

They absolutely do, especially when they impact gender ratios. It's still visible in Russian demographics today.

Famines do, but if famine was the reason for lower birth rates, the trend wouldn't have persisted for 90 years.

The trend of declining fertility rates is not unique to Russia. The fact that it was more significant decline than other states is not surprising when you factor in the immense demographic upheaval the Soviet Union went through between 1930-1960, which included the loss of 15% of the population, and 80% of males born in 1923.

 

[COTO]

They absolutely do, especially when they impact gender ratios. It's still visible in Russian demographics today.

View attachment 67338546

All this appears to show is that women, on average, live slightly longer than men in Russia.

Insofar as I'm aware, this same phenomenon is observable in most societies, including America.

Even if there was an unusual gender imbalance in Russia, it would have to be extreme in order to start impacting birth rates. I see no extreme asymmetry in the Russian pyramid even if we consider perfect symmetry to be a fair baseline.

The trend of declining fertility rates is not unique to Russia. The fact that it was more significant decline than other states is not surprising when you factor in the immense demographic upheaval the Soviet Union went through between 1930-1960, which included the loss of 15% of the population, and 80% of males born in 1923.

I'm not saying that the decline in Russian birth rates was solely the result of Soviet family policy, and I'm not saying that the relatively greater, deeper, and more protracted decline couldn't possibly be influenced by other factors.

What I am saying is that the decline in Russia is significantly greater, deeper, and more protracted than in the US and that a significant portion of the difference is reasonably attributable to the same Soviet policies that irreparably damaged the Russian family and the Russian psyche.

 

[Jredbaron96]

All this appears to show is that women, on average, live slightly longer than men in Russia.

Insofar as I'm aware, this same phenomenon is observable in most societies, including America.

Even if there was an unusual gender imbalance in Russia, it would have to be extreme in order to start impacting birth rates.

All this shows is you very clearly do not have a firm grasp of populations or demographics.

Women do, on average, live longer than men. It's a simple biological reality. But Russia's gender imbalance is far too vast to chock it up to just that.

Mexico's population pyramid shows this; although there are more elderly women, the difference never exceeds .4.



Germany, on the other hand, does show similar trends.



But even Germany's peak gender imbalance; 0.6, falls short of Russia's imbalance of 1.1.

I'm not saying that the decline in Russian birth rates was solely the result of Soviet family policy, and I'm not saying that the relatively greater, deeper, and more protracted decline couldn't possibly be influenced by other factors.

What I am saying is that the decline in Russia is significantly greater, deeper, and more protracted than in the US and that a significant portion of the difference is reasonably attributable to the same Soviet policies that irreparably damaged the Russian family and the Russian psyche.

So prove it.

If you are so confident in this assertion, then you should provide data to prove it, or any kind of research into how Soviet family policy impacted family formation and fertility rate. I have backed up my assertions by pointing out the correlation between demographic loss as a result of WWII and its impact on Russian demographics which show a clear imbalance that exceeds other nations. Either provide data to back up your claim, or you're just guessing.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Additionally, anyone who has studied the history of the USSR will know that Stalin was a traditionalist by heart and scaled back many of the more Marxist social programs the Bolsheviks began. This included banning abortion and restricting divorce proceedings.

Despite their efforts at social engineering, the USSR had to contend with a very socially conservative peasantry for the duration of its existence.

 

[COTO]

But even Germany's peak gender imbalance; 0.6, falls short of Russia's imbalance of 1.1.

Positing that a 0.5% greater gender imbalance explains a 67% greater decline in birth rates isn't a reasonable hypothesis.

So prove it.

For context:

Marx and Engels asserted that women’s emancipation would follow the abolition of private property, allowing the family to be a union of individuals within which relations between the sexes would be “a purely private affair.” Building on this legacy, Lenin imagined a future when unpaid housework and child care would be replaced by communal dining rooms, nurseries, kindergartens, and other industries. The issue was so central to the revolutionary program that the Bolsheviks published decrees establishing civil marriage and divorce soon after the October Revolution, in December 1917. These first steps were intended to replace Russia’s family laws with a new legal framework that would encourage more egalitarian sexual and social relations.​

(ibid.):

As Janet Evans has argued, “Women appeared to feel exploited by the advent of the ‘new morality’ in the 1920s,” caught off guard by the sudden changes in sexual behavior, in attitudes toward marriage and divorce, and in the devaluing of motherhood that came with the expectation that women’s work outside the home was synonymous with independence. While most letters printed in newspapers during the discussion supported the draft law, the voices of opposition were significant. “It was no coincidence that the Soviet government guaranteed parental responsibility at the same moment that it outlawed abortion,” David Hoffmann has argued in his analysis of Stalinist pronatalism. “They therefore sought to buttress the family as a positive incentive for women to have more children, at the same time that they instituted coercive measures to prevent abortions.” After a limited, temporary increase in the number of births, in 1938 the birthrate began to decline again and did not rise to pre-industrialization levels, calling into question the effectiveness of the decree as a pronatalist measure.​

(ibid.):

Like Fedotova, many letter writers addressed the financial hardship caused by the laws regarding alimony, which they considered to be unfair. Soviet family law in the Stalin era allowed for the very real possibility that an alimony suit brought against a relative could cause the financial ruin of families. This was due in part to the fact that alimony law was written explicitly in favor of abandoned single mothers, shifting the burden of proof to their male lovers—and unintentionally burdening the other members of these men’s families. Fedotova concluded her letter with a warning: “It has reached the point that men have begun to avoid women, in each of whom they see the inclination toward alimony.” Presenting Soviet alimony law as a force favoring single women, destroying men’s trust in women, and therefore undermining families, Fedotova narrated a scenario in which registered marriages and legitimate children were threatened by alimony-hunting single mothers.​

If you don't want to read the entire article, it fairly summarizes how the early Soviet policies (pre-Stalinist era) took a hatchet to families with progressive social policies, and that in spite of decades of subsequent attempts to repair the damage (i.e. "buttress the family") by repealing the policies--even subsiding childbirth--many of the most damaging laws remained in effect until well after Khrushchev.

See also: Glowaki et al.

 

[Jredbaron96]

Positing that a 0.5% greater gender imbalance explains a 67% greater decline in birth rates isn't a reasonable hypothesis.

The demographics reveal a gender imbalance of over 50% in some instances. To pretend like that wouldn't impact fertility rates is ridiculous.

For context:

Marx and Engels asserted that women’s emancipation would follow the abolition of private property, allowing the family to be a union of individuals within which relations between the sexes would be “a purely private affair.” Building on this legacy, Lenin imagined a future when unpaid housework and child care would be replaced by communal dining rooms, nurseries, kindergartens, and other industries. The issue was so central to the revolutionary program that the Bolsheviks published decrees establishing civil marriage and divorce soon after the October Revolution, in December 1917. These first steps were intended to replace Russia’s family laws with a new legal framework that would encourage more egalitarian sexual and social relations.​

(ibid.):

As Janet Evans has argued, “Women appeared to feel exploited by the advent of the ‘new morality’ in the 1920s,” caught off guard by the sudden changes in sexual behavior, in attitudes toward marriage and divorce, and in the devaluing of motherhood that came with the expectation that women’s work outside the home was synonymous with independence. While most letters printed in newspapers during the discussion supported the draft law, the voices of opposition were significant. “It was no coincidence that the Soviet government guaranteed parental responsibility at the same moment that it outlawed abortion,” David Hoffmann has argued in his analysis of Stalinist pronatalism. “They therefore sought to buttress the family as a positive incentive for women to have more children, at the same time that they instituted coercive measures to prevent abortions.” After a limited, temporary increase in the number of births, in 1938 the birthrate began to decline again and did not rise to pre-industrialization levels, calling into question the effectiveness of the decree as a pronatalist measure.​

(ibid.):

Like Fedotova, many letter writers addressed the financial hardship caused by the laws regarding alimony, which they considered to be unfair. Soviet family law in the Stalin era allowed for the very real possibility that an alimony suit brought against a relative could cause the financial ruin of families. This was due in part to the fact that alimony law was written explicitly in favor of abandoned single mothers, shifting the burden of proof to their male lovers—and unintentionally burdening the other members of these men’s families. Fedotova concluded her letter with a warning: “It has reached the point that men have begun to avoid women, in each of whom they see the inclination toward alimony.” Presenting Soviet alimony law as a force favoring single women, destroying men’s trust in women, and therefore undermining families, Fedotova narrated a scenario in which registered marriages and legitimate children were threatened by alimony-hunting single mothers.​

If you don't want to read the entire article, it fairly summarizes how the early Soviet policies (pre-Stalinist era) took a hatchet to families with progressive social policies, and that in spite of decades of subsequent attempts to repair the damage (i.e. "buttress the family") by repealing the policies--even subsiding childbirth--many of the most damaging laws remained in effect until well after Khrushchev.

See also: Glowaki et al.

I'm impressed; despite this impressive treasure trove of information, it still doesn't actually prove your point, because a simple examination of the evidence reveals the truth.



The killers of Russian fertility occurred during WWI/Russian Civil War, actually rose in the 1920s, then plummeted during the Soviet famine in the 1930s, then once more during WWII.