I explained my line of thinking in
posts #323 and #325:
Let's pretend (for the sake of argument) that there is no evidence for a conscious reality; then if (as seems quite clear) there is also no evidence for a non-conscious reality, the two would be on exactly the same footing. Two equally broad and vague options which are mutually exclusive and cover the whole range of possibilities; the plausibility of a conscious reality would be exactly the same as the plausibility of a non-conscious reality, 50/50.
They're
not actually on equal footing of course, for at least three main reasons that I've outlined so far, none of which have been coherently addressed:
1 > We know that consciousness is real - it's literally the most certain thing we possibly can know - whereas your supposed non-conscious 'material' stuff is pure speculation (whose facile 'common sense' plausibility likely derives from our societies' dualist Christian heritage, our materialist capitalist culture, and some biases from our infantile cognitive development). Extrapolating from our certainty that consciousness is real to the likelihood that reality is conscious, while far from certain, is more reasonable than a wild shot in the dark about non-conscious stuff.
2 > Introducing this speculative non-conscious material reality means introducing the unresolved hard problem of consciousness, the question of how observable objective quantitative stuff could even in theory give rise to undetectable subjective qualitative phenomena at all; it means introducing a necessary premise of one's worldview that essentially amounts to "There was non-conscious stuff, then some magic happened and there was consciousness."
3 > Our reality appears to be highly complex and 'finely-tuned', and there are only two observed mechanisms by which complexity can develop from simpler antecedents; biological evolution based on enduring selection of genetic variation, and conscious thought based on enduring selection of 'memetic' variation: So while the highly complex omni-god of traditional Christianity fails the parsimony test as any kind of explanation for our complex reality, extrapolating from our certainty that consciousness is real to the likelihood that reality is conscious also provides a plausible potential answer to some other enduring mysteries we face by allowing an observation-derived simple-to-complex mechanism that applies to reality as a whole (ironically, essentially taking parts of Hume's "infant deity" rhetoric quite seriously).
I'd actually already hinted at a fourth reason also, which I didn't include above because what I'd mentioned of it in a previous post was only a fairly minor point, but on reflection is probably as important as #3 above:
4 > There are plausible though not conclusive counter-examples to the theory that brains are necessary for consciousness even in humans, such as the case of
Pam Reynolds' documented experience of vivid consciousness during an operation involving clinical death and total EEG flatline. Note that while the theory of a conscious reality is perfectly compatible with brains being necessary for consciousness
in humans, evidence that brain activity may not be necessary for consciousness even in humans would pretty much cripple any materialist view. Thus while we obviously don't know whether Pam's experience occurred at the same time period of her operation as the EEG flatline, a proponent of materialism would have to simply
assume blindly that it could not have despite the lack of evidence supporting that assumption. In other words the idea of a non-conscious reality is a closed, exclusionary theory which makes it inherently less plausible than more open theories since it
requires a more exacting set of conditions to hold in order for it to be true, which are often contrary to people's reported observations.