Doesn’t make any difference if it is the truth. Certainly better than just constructing a figment of imagination based on philosophical claims like you are doing.
Not familiar with your philosophy terms. What exactly do you mean by “grounding”. I explained that humans construct systems in order to develop items like time and space. How do you think these items are developed?
You understand the empirical tradition you vouch for does not allow for circular reasoning, yes?
Humans invented time and space? That's your position now?
Nor does the empirical tradition that I vouch for allow for just making up a “God” based on philosophical jobber-jabber that is nothing more than the juxtaposition of words. When you have some evidence beyond that which can be independently verified in some manner, please let us know.
Her another strawman. That means that you are getting desperate. Get back to me when you are willing to accurately interpret what I said. Sorry, I do not answer strawman trolls.
I explained that humans construct systems in order to develop items like time and space. How do you think these items are developed?
I get your point and I agree, but your analogy is spoken like somone who has never had a bad back.Sit in a chair and then TRY to stand up. That to me is the position agnostics choose to call their own. You can't try to get up, you either do or don't, period, there is no trying. You either believe in gods or you don't, there's no trying.
So you just arbitrarily allow your worldview to be contradicted. I
So do human beings 'construct' systems of time and space, or do they 'develop items' like time and space?
Whatever. I certainly do not accept your figment of philosophical-based imagination. That is the point. And I note that you never answer my questions but expect yours to be answered. Easy to debate when you have a double-standard, I suppose.
A fair argument can be made that the law of identity has never been both strictly and functionally true. The pixels that make up this A are different from the pixels that make up this A, so it's literally not the case that A is identical to A. Even in terms of placeholders or referents, when you and I both think "New York" or anything else, our respective ideas tied to that referent are going to be different, presumably overlapping but definitely not coextensive or identical. And even in terms of physical objects, when you and I both look at a chair we're getting different light in our eyeballs, and different people will have different ideas on whether or not the 'chair' includes the various stains or bacteria or quantum fields within that same volume of space.I understand the theoretical distinction you’re pointing out here, but I might ask you to expand on it.
For example, consider the law of identity. You use A=A, but don’t assume it’s universal or invariant. In your worldview then would you concede that it might fail tomorrow?
Of course, I'm waiting.We agree and I totally accept that some people reject epistemology all together. Happy to have that discussion. As for my argument in the positive - in my defense, I’m usually unable to even get to that point. I guess it’s a dense subject, so fair. I enjoy our exchanges because you’re honest and engaging. I’d be happy to present my argument in the positive if you’re interested.
I'm not sure I understand you here. Our adaptable principle of identity is generally reliable as proven by the fact of successful application and accomplishments from it. That's not an assumption, it's a conclusion from a mountain of evidence. Your argument is that we need to justify these supposed 'universals' that we regularly use, but I'd suggest that almost the opposite is true in that the more we successfully use them the more it has already been proven that they are justified by the metric which matters most.I suppose my problem with the pragmatic approach is that you’re essentially dealing with a pile of ‘what’s’.
I would question why you stop there? You presumably assume/have faith that something like the law of identity will hold, but arbitrarily decide to stop there. There doesn’t seem to be an explanation for why you stop outside of inconvenience or disinterest. You might say that epistemic justification doesn’t add additional utility to its pragmatic effect, but I’d argue the pragmatic use assumes its epistemic grounding in something reliable.
I understand some folks do have a problem standing up from a sitting position and I also knew most people would get the point, as you did. Sorry about your bad back.I get your point and I agree, but your analogy is spoken like somone who has never had a bad back.
There are times when I try to get up and fail and have to grab onto something and try again
Actually we've just demonstrated in quick order that it is you who has the double standard.
Why should I answer your questions when you're so willing to be dishonest and assert contradictions?
Nothing to be sorry about. I lived a very physical, adventurous life in my younger life. I am glad I did. It was worth it. But like all things there is a downside. I broke my back once, and I also worked on a Bering Sea trawler for 5 years, which is brutal on your back, im paying the price a bit these days, but I wouldn't change a thing.I understand some folks do have a problem standing up from a sitting position and I also knew most people would get the point, as you did. Sorry about your bad back.
Wowser, my respects to you.Nothing to be sorry about. I lived a very physical, adventurous life in my younger life. I am glad I did. It was worth it. But like all things there is a downside. I broke my back once, and I also worked on a Bering Sea trawler for 5 years, which is brutal on your back, im paying the price a bit these days, but I wouldn't change a thing.
A fair argument can be made that the law of identity has never been both strictly and functionally true. The pixels that make up this A are different from the pixels that make up this A, so it's literally not the case that A is identical to A. Even in terms of placeholders or referents, when you and I both think "New York" or anything else..
...It can be either strictly and uselessly true, or it can be loosely and functionally... adaptable 'principle of identity' by which we individually and collectively recognize those things as themselves as long as they meet enough relevant criteria for our current needs (along the lines of Searle's cluster theory of proper names).
I'm not sure I understand you here. Our adaptable principle of identity is generally reliable as proven by the fact of successful application and accomplishments from it. That's not an assumption, it's a conclusion from a mountain of evidence. Your argument is that we need to justify these supposed 'universals' that we regularly use, but I'd suggest that almost the opposite is true in that the more we successfully use them the more it has already been proven that they are justified by the metric which matters most.
By loose analogy, you could painstakingly explain to me how MacOS supports text-based communication in an online debate forum, and I might be at a total loss justify the manner in which Linux or Windows or Android OS support it... but as long as I am engaging in text-based communication in an online debate forum, unless you can actually rule those other possibilities out you've done absolutely nothing to demonstrate that MacOS needs to be part...
Of course, I'm waiting.
You said it yourself, "stable enough"; being 'reliable' does not entail being universal or invariant... particularly when we know it is not universal or invariant save perhaps in terms of a useless philosophical abstraction, even within our immediate field of experience! We idiomatically describe things as 'certain as the sunrise,' but outside our immediate field of experience the sunrise is not so certain after all. With or without a deity, we have no real basis for asserting that on a black hole or moments after the big bang or in the particles of dark matter "a thing is identical to itself" in any sense that would be useful or meaningful to us even were we able observe them.From my perspective, that’s the problem: if the law of identity could fail tomorrow, or if it’s just a pragmatic convention, what grounds your ability to reason about it failing? To even argue that it’s not universal or invariant, you’re implicitly relying on it being stable enough to make your point intelligible.
So, I’d flip your argument back: if the law of identity isn’t universal or invariant in your worldview, how do you account for the coherence of your own argument? Doesn’t your critique of A=A still depend on A being A in some reliable sense?
No, I'm saying that it works, therefore it's reasonable for us to use it.I’m not denying that the law of identity - or any principle of reason - works pragmatically. My question is why it works, and why it works universally and reliably. You say its justification comes from repeated success, but that’s a description of what happens, not an account of why it’s trustworthy across all contexts - past, present, and future. You’re essentially saying, ‘It works because it works,’ which is circular.
Valid is not the same as sound, and premise #3 is obviously bunk.Therefore, according to S5 modal logic, we can ascribe modal operators to our premises when formally representing our transcendental argument in the following valid deductive syllogism:
- Reason (Y) is possible in some world.
- It’s necessarily true that reason is possible (via S5’s axiom 5).
- It’s necessarily true that if reason is possible, then X (God) must hold.
- From (3) and axiom K, you get that if reason’s possibility is necessary, X’s necessity follows.
- Therefore, X is necessarily true in all possible worlds.
An assertion I've shown to be false. Neither our brains & biological nature, nor our society & parents are presuppositional in nature; they're systems which we have every reason to believe were developed over the course of tens of thousands of years in the latter case and hundreds of millions of years in the former. The tools they've provided us with have proven their efficacy billions of times over in billions of people's lives, so undeniably they are reliable (if imperfect) tools.It asserts that everyone operates with presuppositions (e.g., the reliability of logic, reason, and evidence)
You haven't argued that at all, you've merely asserted it. You haven't even offered any kind of conceptual link between "Suppose a deity exists" and "Therefore rationality is reliable or justified."Thus, I argue that God is the precondition for rationality itself.
You said it yourself, "stable enough"; being 'reliable' does not entail being universal or invariant... particularly when we know it is not universal or invariant save perhaps in terms of a useless philosophical abstraction, even within our immediate field of experience! We idiomatically describe things as 'certain as the sunrise,' but outside our immediate field of experience the sunrise is not so certain after all. With or without a deity, we have no real basis for asserting that on a black hole or moments after the big bang or in the particles of dark matter "a thing is identical to itself" in any sense that would be useful or meaningful to us even were we able observe them.
No, I'm saying that it works, therefore it's reasonable for us to use it.
You are making the blind unwarranted assumption that there is a universal, invariant, immaterial "law of identity," and then making a god-of-the-gaps argument that if I or others cannot justify your assumption by other means, it must somehow become justified by invoking a deity.
Valid is not the same as sound, and premise #3 is obviously bunk.
An assertion I've shown to be false.
Neither our brains & biological nature, nor our society & parents are presuppositional in nature; they're systems which we have every reason to believe were developed over the course of tens of thousands of years in the latter case and hundreds of millions of years in the former. The tools they've provided us with have proven their efficacy billions of times over in billions of people's lives, so undeniably they are reliable (if imperfect) tools.
You haven't argued that at all, you've merely asserted it. You haven't even offered any kind of conceptual link between "Suppose a deity exists" and "Therefore rationality is reliable or justified."
Moreover while the limited and imperfect cognitive tools we find ourselves equipped with fits very nicely with an ad-hoc, trial and error process of biological and societal evolution, on face value at least it makes very little sense that cognitive tools 'grounded in' a universal God would be so limited and flawed.
You said it yourself, "stable enough"; being 'reliable' does not entail being universal or invariant... particularly when we know it is not universal or invariant save perhaps in terms of a useless philosophical abstraction, even within our immediate field of experience! We idiomatically describe things as 'certain as the sunrise,' but outside our immediate field of experience the sunrise is not so certain after all. With or without a deity, we have no real basis for asserting that on a black hole or moments after the big bang or in the particles of dark matter "a thing is identical to itself" in any sense that would be useful or meaningful to us even were we able observe them.
No, I'm saying that it works, therefore it's reasonable for us to use it.
You are making the blind unwarranted assumption that there is a universal, invariant, immaterial "law of identity," and then making a god-of-the-gaps argument that if I or others cannot justify your assumption by other means, it must somehow become justified by invoking a deity.
Valid is not the same as sound, and premise #3 is obviously bunk.
An assertion I've shown to be false. Neither our brains & biological nature, nor our society & parents are presuppositional in nature; they're systems which we have every reason to believe were developed over the course of tens of thousands of years in the latter case and hundreds of millions of years in the former. The tools they've provided us with have proven their efficacy billions of times over in billions of people's lives, so undeniably they are reliable (if imperfect) tools.
You haven't argued that at all, you've merely asserted it. You haven't even offered any kind of conceptual link between "Suppose a deity exists" and "Therefore rationality is reliable or justified."
Moreover while the limited and imperfect cognitive tools we find ourselves equipped with fits very nicely with an ad-hoc, trial and error process of biological and societal evolution, on face value at least it makes very little sense that cognitive tools 'grounded in' a universal God would be so limited and flawed.
That’s what I said. I just didn’t use quite so many words.
Not really. The arguments are distinct.
He's appealing to pragmatism for the most part, although I'd consider the biological naturalism piece to be very weak.
You appeal to some objective criterion you can't define and when you do attempt to refine it, we find that it's self refutational and incoherent.
Which is why Humean pragmatism is probably the best argument for atheism. This makes perfect sense when we understand that when all is said and done, intellectuals in the empirical tradition haven't really been able to resolve or move past Hume's arguments 500 years ago.
His basic arguments are the same as mine
And it is quite hilarious that you criticize philosophical arguments from the past because there has never been one regarding a “God” that has not been effectively refuted by other philosophers
No they aren't. Like at all.
I have a hard time believing you're familiar with where the discourse is on the subject when you struggle to grasp 100 level philosophy.
Yes, my arguments and those of Mithras in that particular post are basically the same . If I wanted to, I cohld o back and lift lots of sentences that are equivalent to what I have said in the last, but why waste my time when you appear to have made up your mind.
is at least the third chatter who does indeed know philosophy who has destroyed your claims. Just as I have.
They're distinct in important ways.
We idiomatically describe things as 'certain as the sunrise,' but outside our immediate field of experience the sunrise is not so certain after all. With or without a deity, we have no real basis for asserting that on a black hole or moments after the big bang or in the particles of dark matter "a thing is identical to itself" in any sense that would be useful or meaningful to us even were we able observe them.
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