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Yet again, when confronted with a situation in which he appears unable to extract unilateral concessions from Israel, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has reportedly threatened to resign. Haaretz reported:
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas informed U.S. envoy George Mitchell last week that the renewal of settlement construction will not only bring about the collapse of peace talks but it will also induce his resignation from the post of Palestinian Authority president...
Palestinian sources say that with Abbas's resignation and the collapse of the PA, the Palestinians will demand that the civil authority in the entire West Bank, including zones A and B, be returned to Israel or transferred to the United Nations.
Israel should not yield to this latest threat. President Abbas is not irreplaceable. Moreover, his past record of squandering a historic final settlement offer and frequent boycotts of negotiations raise questions as to whether he is sufficiently committed to peace and a final settlement of the historic dispute to reach a peace agreement.
Payment for re-starting negotiations only rewards and encourages intransigence. It provides short-term benefit of a resumption in talks at the long-term cost of added intransigence that makes reaching agreement even more difficult. Hence, Israel would do well not to capitulate to Abbas' latest precondition nor his threat to resign if his precondition is not satisfied. The negotiations are in the interests of the Palestinian people as much as they are in those of Israel's people. Those mutual interests, alone, should guide the Palestinian leadership.
It should also be noted that Israel is not obligated to reassert control over Zones A and B in the West Bank were the Palestinian leadership to abandon its responsibilities and abidcate authority. In fact, due to perceptions of "occupation," Israel would do well to avoid such responsibility. Instead, it should limit its involvement toward assuring the flow of humanitarian aid and safeguarding its own security interests. There is no compelling evidence that the President Abbas' resignation and the Palestinian Authority's departure would lead to a near-complete resignation of all local officials. In fact, it is not implausible that some younger reformers, not to mention hardliners, might try to leverage the opportunity to play a larger role.
Were President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to abdicate--and that is not anything close to being certain, as President Abbas has backed away on repeated past occasions after having issued similar threats--Israel should make clear that it remains willing and eager to discuss peace with whomever succeeds President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority e.g., it would be willing to work with local Palestinian officials, Prime Minister Fayyad if he retains his position, among others. In addition, were the UN to assume control over Zones A and B under such circumstances, Israel should be receptive to negotiating a framework agreement for a Palestinian state with the UN. There's little reason everything should be completely frozen should President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority abdicate.
Were President Abbas to launch a new boycott of negotiations (which would be evidenced by his failure to participate in the next round of talks in Paris)--probably more likely than abdication given his past history--both Israel and the U.S. should indicate their eagerness for a resumption of peace talks while adopting a new approach that they won't try to push the Palestinian leaders into talks. Instead, they would commit to resuming negotiations once the Palestinian leadership approached them for a resumption of talks. In short, the Palestinian leaders would need to make the effort to ask for negotiations. Hence, the U.S. and Israel would wait until there is a credible signal of a desire for peace from the Palestinians.
Finally, whether President Abbas chooses abdication or a boycott of talks, Israel should not put the lives of its citizens on hold. It should pursue the infrastructure improvements necessary to accommodate the needs arising from a natural growth of population within the existing boundaries of settlements e.g., school construction. New settlements/settlement outposts, though, should not be initiated.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas informed U.S. envoy George Mitchell last week that the renewal of settlement construction will not only bring about the collapse of peace talks but it will also induce his resignation from the post of Palestinian Authority president...
Palestinian sources say that with Abbas's resignation and the collapse of the PA, the Palestinians will demand that the civil authority in the entire West Bank, including zones A and B, be returned to Israel or transferred to the United Nations.
Israel should not yield to this latest threat. President Abbas is not irreplaceable. Moreover, his past record of squandering a historic final settlement offer and frequent boycotts of negotiations raise questions as to whether he is sufficiently committed to peace and a final settlement of the historic dispute to reach a peace agreement.
Payment for re-starting negotiations only rewards and encourages intransigence. It provides short-term benefit of a resumption in talks at the long-term cost of added intransigence that makes reaching agreement even more difficult. Hence, Israel would do well not to capitulate to Abbas' latest precondition nor his threat to resign if his precondition is not satisfied. The negotiations are in the interests of the Palestinian people as much as they are in those of Israel's people. Those mutual interests, alone, should guide the Palestinian leadership.
It should also be noted that Israel is not obligated to reassert control over Zones A and B in the West Bank were the Palestinian leadership to abandon its responsibilities and abidcate authority. In fact, due to perceptions of "occupation," Israel would do well to avoid such responsibility. Instead, it should limit its involvement toward assuring the flow of humanitarian aid and safeguarding its own security interests. There is no compelling evidence that the President Abbas' resignation and the Palestinian Authority's departure would lead to a near-complete resignation of all local officials. In fact, it is not implausible that some younger reformers, not to mention hardliners, might try to leverage the opportunity to play a larger role.
Were President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to abdicate--and that is not anything close to being certain, as President Abbas has backed away on repeated past occasions after having issued similar threats--Israel should make clear that it remains willing and eager to discuss peace with whomever succeeds President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority e.g., it would be willing to work with local Palestinian officials, Prime Minister Fayyad if he retains his position, among others. In addition, were the UN to assume control over Zones A and B under such circumstances, Israel should be receptive to negotiating a framework agreement for a Palestinian state with the UN. There's little reason everything should be completely frozen should President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority abdicate.
Were President Abbas to launch a new boycott of negotiations (which would be evidenced by his failure to participate in the next round of talks in Paris)--probably more likely than abdication given his past history--both Israel and the U.S. should indicate their eagerness for a resumption of peace talks while adopting a new approach that they won't try to push the Palestinian leaders into talks. Instead, they would commit to resuming negotiations once the Palestinian leadership approached them for a resumption of talks. In short, the Palestinian leaders would need to make the effort to ask for negotiations. Hence, the U.S. and Israel would wait until there is a credible signal of a desire for peace from the Palestinians.
Finally, whether President Abbas chooses abdication or a boycott of talks, Israel should not put the lives of its citizens on hold. It should pursue the infrastructure improvements necessary to accommodate the needs arising from a natural growth of population within the existing boundaries of settlements e.g., school construction. New settlements/settlement outposts, though, should not be initiated.
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