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9th Circuit rules in favor of Trump admin in 'sanctuary city' case

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9th Circuit rules in favor of Trump admin in 'sanctuary city' case. While the headline is a bit misleading, I posted in this thread because of the rationale of the panel Majority and the Dissent. The case, Los Angeles v. Barr is important for a few reasons. First, it gave the administration a court victory. Second, it demonstrated that court ideologues will use even disfavored doctrine (Chevron) when it suits their interests. Third, it further erodes the authority of Congress. Finally, it demonstrates that Mitch McConnell is right - the power of appointment can invalidate any other legislative interest.
 
Looks like sanctuary city's will be losing some of their grant money. But not until this moves to an appeal court.

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on Friday ruled in favor of the Trump administration's efforts to prioritize federal dollars for local policing to towns and cities that complied with certain immigration policies.
 
Unfortunately, the bulk of my post got eaten by internet gremlins. I'll be back to post the exposition.
 
The states shouldn't be forced to do the federal governments job. But here we are...again (shades of the fugitive slave act).

Seems out of character for the 9th circuit to make such a ruling. Ahh, no wonder...

9th Cir. Close to Having More Trump Judges Than Any Other (1)

I agree with both points: it seems ideologically inconsistent to allow the federal government to dragoon the State authorities to execute an explicitly federal function; and the decision contrasts sharply with the predilections of those particular jurists. The Ninth Circuit has been a particular target of ideological manipulation (installation of Federalist Society approved jurists), as it has been, historically, the most reasonable bench at the Appellate level. Another recent thread, here, provides an interesting counterpoint that also demonstrates my initial point: When the outcome is ideologically-based, courts tend to follow the line of cases that reach that outcome, even when they are ideologically counter to their "philosophy".
 
I had to cast back in my mind and dig around to find the precedent that I remembered on this point. Not that long ago (1997) the "conservative" position on the subject was that States (because of the Tenth Amendment) could not be dragooned into enforcing federal mandates. The principle case is Printz v. United States, authored by Justice Scalia. Ironic, isn't it, that Judge Bybee, co-author of the book "Powers Reserved for the People and the States: A History of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments" (2006), and a stalwart opponent of Chevron deference would join an opinion trampling on State law enforcement interests based upon Chevron, no?
 
...Second, it demonstrated that court ideologues will use even disfavored doctrine (Chevron) when it suits their interests. Third, it further erodes the authority of Congress. Finally, it demonstrates that Mitch McConnell is right - the power of appointment can invalidate any other legislative interest. ...

I agree... : it seems ideologically inconsistent to allow the federal government to dragoon the State authorities to execute an explicitly federal function; and the decision contrasts sharply with the predilections of those particular jurists. The Ninth Circuit has been a particular target of ideological manipulation (installation of Federalist Society approved jurists), as it has been, historically, the most reasonable bench at the Appellate level. ...

...Not that long ago (1997) the "conservative" position on the subject was that States (because of the Tenth Amendment) could not be dragooned into enforcing federal mandates. The principle case is Printz v. United States, authored by Justice Scalia. Ironic, isn't it, that Judge Bybee, co-author of the book "Powers Reserved for the People and the States: A History of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments" (2006), and a stalwart opponent of Chevron deference would join an opinion trampling on State law enforcement interests based upon Chevron, no?

Shameless Poppycock.

First, in this case the state (the City of L.A.) was not being "dragooned" to do anything. It was applying for one of the competitive grants available from the DOJ for law enforcement. Most cities don't win this periodic competition, and those that do have earned the most points based on more than 20 factors. Applicants needn't have focused on immigration or human trafficking law, but those two factors can earn City points. And, in fact, many cities who DIDNT focus on immigration won.

Therefore Printz v. United States is not relevant to your complaints. In P v. US the federal government MANDATED (commandeered) that all Sheriffs to do background checks on behalf of a federal law, the kind of direct commandeering (mandating) of state officials that had been found unconstitutional in New York v. United States (1992). Moreover, this Court opinion (P v US) stated that the Framers designed the Constitution to allow Federal regulation of international and interstate matters, not internal matters reserved to the State Legislatures. (Note that immigration is not merely an internal matter.)

Second, the majority opinion in LA did not rely on just the Chevron doctrine, and suggested that a stricter standard would not have changed the outcome. While the Chevron doctrine is deservedly disliked by some such as Kennedy and Kavanaugh, the application in this case has nothing to do with the reasons for its falling popularity. The doctrine, in the hands of some agencies, protect utterly incomprehensible text and enshrine ambiguity as only decipherable by the administrative agency; e.g. one of the defenses of Obamacare and, ironically, now used by Trump is some other cases.

Third the predilections of lower court judges notwithstanding, an honorable judge of the lower courts is obliged to follow current doctrine. That is what these judges did, regardless of their personal opinions of Chevron or the 10th amendment. Chevron has not yet been overturned by the Supreme Court, and until it is then no lower court judge has the license to ignore it and invent his/her own doctrine to suit the occasion.

Finally, be reminded that under Bill Clinton and gun regulation the liberal jurists found all sorts of reasons to enthuse over "dragooning". Justice Stevens opined that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution gave the right to the Federal government, under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause for Congress to Dragoon any State or local government to do its bidding. In fact, he extolled the virtues of (mandatory) "cooperative federalism" as in forcing states to do mass inoculation or, ironically, to respond to INTERNATIONAL threats such as terrorism.

Souter was certain that the Founders original intent was to require states to act as auxiliaries to the federal government, and Breyer opined that federalism in foreign governments gave central government power over sub-national jurisdictions, so why not here?

So while you are lecturing on the hypocrisy of the judges, perhaps you could include that when Clinton or Obama was President - the liberal jurists saw no problem with ordering the local government to cooperate. Let Trump use the same principle to enforce federal immigration law, and the histrionics of shock and outrage over federal employment of states to help enforce federal policy is deafening.

Printz v. United States - Wikipedia
 
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Shameless Poppycock.
What a delightfully unenlightened and meaningless phrase! I do appreciate, however, that you have at least attempted to read the decision(s), even if you have deliberately missed my point(s). More on that in a minute.

First, in this case the state (the City of L.A.) was not being "dragooned" to do anything.
Here I'll quibble a bit. There is no question that the new standards of the Attorney General were intended to encourage acceptance of a federal mandate to comply with federal demands (that, by the way, is coercive in nature, but I don't want to go too far down that path). The issue that SHOULD have informed the court was not whether the criteria were coercive, but whether they were consonant with the statute Congress passed - the conservative analytical matrix, I might add. Indeed, contrast the decision with the Supreme Court dissenters in Gundy regarding the "non-delegation" doctrine. No reliance on Chevron there! While I disagree with the decision in Gundy, what's relevant to the discussion here is the inconsistency of analysis (especially for Judge Bybee). While the majority here paid lip service to Chevron, they didn't actually apply the analysis of Chevron.

The central problem here is that the statute was not ambiguous. (My complaint about the Gundy decision is precisely the breadth of the delegation, which had no meaningful limitation, but serious ramifications.) While the Attorney General was given broad authority, the criteria that was established in no way related to the purpose of the COPS program established by the statute. That is the fundamental defect in both the criteria and the decision. The court had to go exceptionally out of its way to find any correlation between the Attorney General's action and the statute. That's not deference, that's obsequiousness.
 
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What a delightfully unenlightened and meaningless phrase! I do appreciate, however, that you have at least attempted to read the decision(s), even if you have deliberately missed my point(s). More on that in a minute.

Rest assured, words in the phrase has meaning. Let me assist:

Shameless means: flagrant · brazen · brash · audacious · outrageous · undisguised · unconcealed · transparent
Poppycock means: nonsense · claptrap · balderdash · blather · moonshine · foolishness · silliness · rubbish · rot · tripe · hogwash · baloney · drivel

The two words mean in a phrase means (for example): undisguised nonsense, brazen claptrap, audacious hogwash, and unconcealed baloney. You're welcome.

And, by the way, I wrote seven paragraphs, one or more refuting most of your assertions. However, if you have points that you didn't make you shouldn't rely on others to read your mind.

Here I'll quibble a bit. There is no question that the new standards of the Attorney General were intended to encourage acceptance of a federal mandate to comply with federal demands (that, by the way, is coercive in nature, but I don't want to go too far down that path). The issue that SHOULD have informed the court was not whether the criteria were coercive, but whether they were consonant with the statute Congress passed - the conservative analytical matrix, I might add.

First, imprecise characterizations are not arguments. Blather over "new standards", mind reading of their "intentions", and sematic contradictions like "encouraged mandates" are hopeless, some of it meaningless on their face. For example, a government "mandate" is not "encouragement", its a legal requirement. If a federal policy requires the purchase of cooperation, such as the promise of money to a state, and the state has the ability to decline the money, its not a "mandate to comply". That is a ridiculous syntactical ploy.

Second, there is no consonant (consistency?) legal doctrine by that name. However, the competitive grant's general purpose is consistent with that of the general purpose of the grant Act, that is to enhance the crime prevention in state and local law enforcement and to enhance public safety through community policing. In particular the act states that its purpose is "to expand and improve cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies" and to "address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise enhance public safety". And "Nothing in the Act precludes DOJ from allocating federal funds to state or local governments to focus on problems raised by the presence of illegal aliens within their jurisdictions.8" (opinion of the court).

A footnote in the majority opinion sums it up nicely:

In addition to listing the immigration focus area, the Application Guidelines list multiple other focus areas, including violent crime, traffic and pedestrian problems, and “quality of life policing.” While the Act does not expressly mention any of these focus areas, its gives DOJ broad discretion to identify and rank such a range of goals. Given DOJ’s authority to administer the grant program along these lines, the dissent’s argument that immigration enforcement cannot be a permissible focus area because the Act makes no mention of immigration enforcement, Dissent at 42, is meritless.

In other words, there is nothing in this grant program that is unlike any other competitive grant program for any agency, and in all cases once a law provide general goals and a methodology for providing a competitive grant the technical gaps are, as usual, filled in by the agency's expertise - as intended by the ACT.

I don't have any general objection to a complaint about Congress not doing its job, and in fact feel strongly that the Courts should have routinely slapped Congress and returned incoherent and contradiction filled legislation to Congress as null and void. The sloppiness on Obamacare, for example, was inexcusable. That said, you can't fault the administration or the courts on this particular grant without faulting ALL grants and much other legislation for the same sins - and until you are willing to do that, this 'complaint' is purely "whose ox is gored" grandstanding.

Finally, the ACT is not especially ambiguous and, for the reasons stated, the grant is not in violation of any of its text. And if the text is unambiguous you don't need to go fishing for legislative intentions (or purpose).

PS The comparison to Gundy, which was not by Bybee, seems rather far fetched. Frankly, I found Gorsuch (as I often do) to be difficult to read and unclear. Whereas reading and understanding Alito, Thomas, Roberts, Ginsburg, Bryer and especially Scalia have been pain free, Gorsuch is not the great writer he was reputed to be.

If there was single and precise analytical doctrine in the Gorsuch opinion, I failed to find it.
 
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Oh good Lord! This transient decision is not worth a lot of effort, and you spend a great deal of sturm und drang missing the point, but I was serious when I said I appreciate your trying. Let's skip the claptrap, shall we?

1. What do you think the Chevron standard is? Is it, as here, the end of analysis (complete deference), or is it a framework?

2. Is such complete deference consistent with the bulk of Ikuta's other work, or, more significantly, Bybee's? (Short answer, no. Which is why I noted it.)

3. Eliding the definitional diversion of your opening sentences (love those words, by the way. "Hogwash" seems particularly apropos to most of what followed!), Lets address the following paragraphs of your disquisition: First. Say what? I was trying to skip that inanity. I wasn't asserting that it was as coercive as the scheme in Printz, but that the goal of the Attorney General was to create an incentive to comply. The background is that the Attorrney General's previous effort to simply withhold already granted funds was prohibited by the court. This scheme was an end-around of that decision. That background is important.

Second. Consonant is a perfectly legitimate word, not a legal standard, nor was I creating one, so I really don't understand why you're so het up about that. Instead, let's turn to the nub of the court's error. What is the purpose of the COPS program? Is it to I federal law enforcement programs? No. I agree when you say (paraphrased) "the statue is not particularly vague." It's not. Nowhere in the statute or its legislative history is there any mention of such intention. The closest is creating capability to coordinate with federal anti-terror efforts. The entire gravamen of the program is to enhance local police jurisdictions' ability to pursue their own community policing programs (it's in the name). One can quibble with whether that is a legitimate federal goal, but you can't deny that is the program's purpose, and not the Attorney General's.

Instead, the Attorney General used admittedly vague and overbroad language (virtually the same language used in Gundy, hence the reference) to create, out of whole cloth, a new purpose for the funds [while also using the power of the purse to punish those jurisdictions that defied him]. Is that within his authority? No, but "honey badger don't care," and neither did the panel. The footnote and accompanying section of the opinion do not change that, they're just an elaborate and obvious effort to paper over the reality. That there are other, authorized, criteria is meaningless when "One of these things is not like the others." Nor is the imperfect fit between the AG's intent and the result (but it's at least a close fit... most of the jurisdictions got the message).

Ironically, you and I probably would agree on the general lack of merit in both the Gundy majority opinion and this opinion if it weren't for the ideological purpose it serves. That, in a nutshell, is my complaint. "Chevron deference" is a tool used by judges to approve ideological results that comport with their desired outcomes, but ignored when it suits their judicial activist whims. Scalia was notorious for that. It's the hypocrisy I detest. (By the way, I don't disagree about Gorsuch. That was never my point.)
 
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9th Circuit rules in favor of Trump admin in 'sanctuary city' case. While the headline is a bit misleading, I posted in this thread because of the rationale of the panel Majority and the Dissent. The case, Los Angeles v. Barr is important for a few reasons. First, it gave the administration a court victory. Second, it demonstrated that court ideologues will use even disfavored doctrine (Chevron) when it suits their interests. Third, it further erodes the authority of Congress. Finally, it demonstrates that Mitch McConnell is right - the power of appointment can invalidate any other legislative interest.

During the Kavanaugh hearings-what were the claims concerning BK concerning the Chevron Doctrine?
 
I appreciated reading Justice Kavanaugh's piece, as it illustrated a point I tried to make, perhaps inartfully, earlier. As Justice (then Judge) Kavanaugh put it "courts should seek the best reading of the statute by interpreting the words of the statute, taking account of the context of the whole statute, and applying the agreed-upon semantic canons." That really is the gist of my complaint. The panel, instead, used the most convenient reading to reach their goal, rather than the obvious, or best, reading. By using Chevron as they did, they succumbed to the vice Kavanaugh warned of: "the current situation in statutory interpretation, as I see it, is more akin to a situation where umpires can, at least on some pitches, largely define their own strike zones."

In an earlier post, our friend maxparrish noted that Printz v. United States "stated that the Framers designed the Constitution to allow Federal regulation of international and interstate matters, not internal matters reserved to the State Legislatures. (Note that immigration is not merely an internal matter.)" And this is exactly where the court went off the rails. The "best reading" of the COPS statute is that it is intended to bolster the "internal matters" of local jurisdictions (community policing). Immigrating enforcement, as noted, is not an "internal matter" at all, but exclusively a federal matter, as the Court ruled in Arizona (cited earlier), so it had no place in the criteria the Attorney General created for the grant program. The Attorney General had (over) broad discretion, but it wasn't actually that broad. Indeed, in the panel's view, there would be no limits on the Attorney General's discretion at all, and that alone would preclude application of Chevron, which is predicated on the Legislature having given guidance to the agency sufficient to identify the parameters of that discretion.
 
Oh good Lord! This transient decision is not worth a lot of effort, ...

1. What do you think the Chevron standard is? Is it, as here, the end of analysis (complete deference), or is it a framework?

2. Is such complete deference consistent with the bulk of Ikuta's other work, or, more significantly, Bybee's? (Short answer, no. Which is why I noted it.)

I see no reason to open the door to an argument over of the Chevron standard when you have yet to explain what the specific differences in theory and usage are between analysis by "framework" vs. "complete deference". Moreover, you have not demonstrated that the recent decision solely relied on one of those as yet undefined standards for their opinion nor that its use in this opinion was inconsistent with Ikuta or Bybee's other bench opinions (as opposed to their writings). (And, by the way, have you looked at the dissenting judge and her "consistency"?).

As I stated earlier, whatever the judicial beliefs are of jurists, lower court judges are expected to follow current doctrine - which, for example, is why Bork never had any of his hundreds of appeals court rulings overturned. On the other hand, we know from his legal writings that had he been on the Supreme Court his judicial philosophy would not be so constrained, and would have overturned several doctrines. Would you complain that he stayed within doctrine as a lower court judge?

By the way, I make it a policy to not reply to characterizations unless the person doing the characterizing has provided an objective definition and explanation of what they actually mean.

... I wasn't asserting that it was as coercive as the scheme in Printz, but that the goal of the Attorney General was to create an incentive to comply. The background is that the Attorrney General's previous effort to simply withhold already granted funds was prohibited by the court. This scheme was an end-around of that decision. That background is important.

If the issue is not motivation, but the process used for determining grant funding, then background on motivation is irrelevant. The first attempt was to deny grant money after the applicant had complied and won, clearly a different process than the second which awarded based on upfront factors considered for competitive approval. Hence the motivations are moot.

... What is the purpose of the COPS program? Is it to I federal law enforcement programs? No. I agree when you say (paraphrased) "the statue is not particularly vague." It's not. Nowhere in the statute or its legislative history is there any mention of such intention. The closest is creating capability to coordinate with federal anti-terror efforts. The entire gravamen of the program is to enhance local police jurisdictions' ability to pursue their own community policing programs (it's in the name). ...One can quibble with whether that is a legitimate federal goal, but you can't deny that is the program's purpose, and not the Attorney General's.

Instead, the Attorney General used admittedly vague and overbroad language to create, out of whole cloth,... a new purpose for the funds [while also using the power of the purse to punish those jurisdictions that defied him]. Is that within his authority?

First, the purpose of law is a secondary consideration, used when there is unresolved generally understood meaning in the text. A judge should first looks the text for what it says. If it is unambiguous in what it does and does not authorize, and does not conflict with other law or with previously accepted legal doctrine, nor create impossible results, then the reputed purpose becomes less important - even irrelevant.

Second, I don't see a conflict in text, authorization, or purpose. For example, it is unambiguous in that it explicitly authorizes that:


"SEC. 1701. AUTHORITY TO MAKE PUBLIC SAFETY AND COMMUNITY POLICING
GRANTS.
``(a) Grant Authorization.--The Attorney General may make grants to States, units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other
public and private entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional consortia thereof to increase police presence, to expand and improve
cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and members of the community to address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise to enhance public safety." [cont]

Cont...
 
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Cont...

``(d) Additional Grant Projects.--Grants made under subsection (a)
may include programs, projects, and other activities to--

``(5) develop and implement innovative programs to permit members of the community to assist State and local law enforcement
agencies in the prevention of crime in the community,...

``(7) establish and implement innovative programs to increase and enhance proactive crime control and prevention programs
involving law enforcement officers and young persons in the community;...

``(8) develop and establish new administrative and managerial systems to facilitate the adoption of community-oriented policing
as an organization-wide philosophy;

``(9) establish, implement, and coordinate crime prevention and control programs (involving law enforcement officers working with
community members) with other Federal programs that serve the community and community members to better address the comprehensive
needs of the community and its members;...

You may quibble that you don't like policing and coordination that includes federal concerns that may or may not match local concerns, or that Congress intentionally permitted the AG to define the methodology and expert considerations, but like almost all administrative authorization statutes, so it was granted. If the majority opinion is wrong, then 90 percent of the administrative state legislation is wrong.

No, but "honey badger don't care," and neither did the panel. The footnote and accompanying section of the opinion do not change that, they're just an elaborate and obvious effort to paper over the reality. That there are other, authorized, criteria is meaningless when "One of these things is not like the others." Nor is the imperfect fit between the AG's intent and the result (but it's at least a close fit... most of the jurisdictions got the message).

Oh now, that's just frustrated blather. The footnote clearly showed that scoring was based on those factors that the AG office thought was important, and that was the framework and design of the legislation. Declaring it "unauthorized" requires an interpretational scheme that precludes general authorization in the text. What might that be? A judge's freelancing divination of "subjective intent" on specifics?

Ironically, you and I probably would agree on the general lack of merit in both the Gundy majority opinion and this opinion if it weren't for the ideological purpose it serves. That, in a nutshell, is my complaint. "Chevron deference" is a tool used by judges to approve ideological results that comport with their desired outcomes, but ignored when it suits their judicial activist whims. Scalia was notorious for that. It's the hypocrisy I detest. (By the way, I don't disagree about Gorsuch. That was never my point.)

Actually I have no idea if we would agree BECAUSE I am unclear on Gorsuch's reasoning. Obviously I'd like to agree with Gorsuch and I'd like the separation of powers to force Congress to take control of legislation, rather than pawn off excessive rule making to the nomenklatura. HOWEVER Gorsuch is unclear to me on how that is determined...I don't see an objective methodology that defines when rules do or do not take "all legislative power" from Congress.

We may agree on desired outcome in Grundy, but in my view the ends do not justify the legal means. Till I figure out Gorsuch's litmus test, those means remain suspect.
 
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9th Circuit rules in favor of Trump admin in 'sanctuary city' case. While the headline is a bit misleading, I posted in this thread because of the rationale of the panel Majority and the Dissent. The case, Los Angeles v. Barr is important for a few reasons. First, it gave the administration a court victory. Second, it demonstrated that court ideologues will use even disfavored doctrine (Chevron) when it suits their interests. Third, it further erodes the authority of Congress. Finally, it demonstrates that Mitch McConnell is right - the power of appointment can invalidate any other legislative interest.

It's been a loooooong time since I dealt with anything related to Chevron deference, but it's "disfavored" now? Really?

I recall it being one of the pillars of administrative law. At least, if we're talking about Chevron v. NRDC: defer to an agency's interpretation so long as congress hasn't spoken to the issue. I mean...executive agencies basically don't work if, for example, congress would have to speak directly to everything before the agency could apply an interpretation. The entire point is that congress critters cannot become experts in every last thing they legislate on, so they delegate some legislative/judicial authority to an agency, which then fills in the blanks in law via rulemaking, enforced in later adjudications.

I thought it was narrowed over time, not generally disfavored. Something about only deferring to interpretations resulting from following various APA's mandated procedures re: rulemaking/adjudication.



Kind of a tangent but I'm curious why you used "disfavored" specifically. As far as I know, it's there and very much favored...it's just not as broad anymore.
 
Kind of a tangent but I'm curious why you used "disfavored" specifically. As far as I know, it's there and very much favored...it's just not as broad anymore.
I meant, really, disfavored by the conservative judiciary that want to interfere with agency actions. That is, really, my complaint here. "Chevron deference" is exactly the kind of interpretive legerdemain that Judge Kavanaugh was prone to rail against in his earlier career when it is used, as here, as a "cop out" from considering the merits of a claim - that is, when it allows a judge to manipulate the playing field. That is a separate issue, substantially, from the one I have been discussing with Max about the legislative intent and language of the statute.
 
I read the lawsuit and it said the grant has expired which rendered L.A.'s lawsuit moot. The court decided to go ahead make a ruling anyway because they figured this kind of case was bound to come up again.

I'm not sure L.A. had standing because other cities that said they would follow federal rules on immigration and didn't get a grant whereas other cities made no mention of immigration and they did a grant.
 
I'm not sure L.A. had standing because other cities that said they would follow federal rules on immigration and didn't get a grant whereas other cities made no mention of immigration and they did a grant.
I don't want to get into speculative areas, here (I speculate enough) about whether there were other manipulations of the process, but the pertinent portion of the majority opinion is this:
From a total applicant pool of 90 large jurisdictions and 1,029 small jurisdictions, DOJ awarded grant funds to 30 of the large jurisdictions and 149 of the small jurisdictions. An applicant did not need to select the illegal immigration focus or submit the Certification to receive funds. Of the seven applicants that chose illegal immigration as a focus area, only one large jurisdiction and one small jurisdiction received an award. Of the successful applicants, only 19 of the 30 large jurisdictions and 124 of the 149 small jurisdictions received bonus points for submitting the Certification.
It is significant that the majority did not mention of how many applicants overall (successful and not), submitted the "certification", which was the DOJ's primary goal in changing the criteria - but the dissent did.
Approximately 39% of the large jurisdictions and 47% of the small jurisdictions submitted the Cooperation Certification.
THAT is the relevant analysis, as it is what informs most discrimination claims (differential effect). [I hadn't delved deeply into the opinion because I didn't plan to do an in-depth analysis, I was just struck by the contrast in approach/lineup between the LA and Gundy decisions. That's what "tripped my trigger."]

So, 124 of 149 successful small-jurisdictions did - 83% compliance (vs 47% overall); and for large jurisdictions that ratio is 63% vs 39%. THAT is the relevant calculation, in my opinion.

It is significant that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that got grants were "cooperative". Los Angeles' claim was
that when it applied for a grant, it was disadvantaged relative to other applicants that were able to choose the illegal immigration focus area or complete the Certification, and this inability to compete on an even playing field constitutes a concrete and particularized injury.
Especially as "DOJ did not offer applicants equal points for conduct comparable to agreeing to the Certification". In the context of "sanctuary cities" it would be relevant to know whether any of the so-called sanctuary cities actually received any grants, as presumably they would not have submitted the certification. But, that determination was apparently beyond the scope of the court's analysis.

Overall, I agree with Judge Laidlaw's approach and conclusion (as is apparent) that "DOJ exceeded its statutory authority specifically by giving preference to jurisdictions willing to partner with federal immigration enforcement authorities." That this criteria affected the award of grants is statistically demonstrable - jurisdictions that provided the certification nearly doubled their chances to be awarded a grant. Moreover, as the dissent noted, DOJ's added criteria actually runs counter to the fundamental purpose of the COPS program (community policing):
The Seventh Circuit has similarly recognized that the Cooperation Certification’s notice and access requirements could result in under-reported crime and thereby undermine public safety:
[P]ersons who are here unlawfully—or who have friends or family members here unlawfully—might avoid contacting local police to report crimes as a witness or a victim if they fear that reporting will bring the scrutiny of the federal immigration authorities to their home. . . . [T]he reluctance to report . . . could be magnified in communities where reporting could turn a misdemeanor into a deportation. And the failure to obtain . . . cooperation could both hinder law enforcement efforts and allow criminals to freely target communities with a large undocumented population, knowing that their crimes will be less likely to be reported.
City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 280.

[But then, that is what many of the Trump administration's efforts are aimed at - terrorizing immigrant (legal and not) communities. E.g., the announcement of "ICE raids"; indefinite detention in inhumane (and illegal) conditions; asking citizenship questions to alter the census count. This is just another example of that.]
 
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9th Circuit rules in favor of Trump admin in 'sanctuary city' case. While the headline is a bit misleading, I posted in this thread because of the rationale of the panel Majority and the Dissent. The case, Los Angeles v. Barr is important for a few reasons. First, it gave the administration a court victory. Second, it demonstrated that court ideologues will use even disfavored doctrine (Chevron) when it suits their interests. Third, it further erodes the authority of Congress. Finally, it demonstrates that Mitch McConnell is right - the power of appointment can invalidate any other legislative interest.

SMH...here's to not looking to the future.

The just gave a future, liberal president the means to push policy through. And you on the right are going to scream and cry foul and try to pretend forget that you wanted this....
 
... It is significant that the majority did not mention of how many applicants overall (successful and not), submitted the "certification", which was the DOJ's primary goal in changing the criteria - but the dissent did.

THAT is the relevant analysis, as it is what informs most discrimination claims (differential effect)... I was just struck by the contrast in approach/lineup between the LA and Gundy decisions.

Overall, I agree with Judge Laidlaw's approach and conclusion...that "DOJ exceeded its statutory authority specifically by giving preference to jurisdictions willing to partner with federal immigration enforcement authorities." ...jurisdictions that provided the certification nearly doubled their chances to be awarded a grant. ...DOJ's added criteria actually runs counter to the fundamental purpose of the COPS program (community policing):

Your points and my response to each can be distilled to the following:

1) You noticed the contrast between LA and Gundy decisions

So did I. LA was a dispute over the legitimacy of grant criteria. Gundy was about a dispute over the separation of power, whether or not Congress has effectively (and unconstitutionally) transferred legislative power by giving the AG the power to make criminal infractions at his option.

2) The jurisdictions who were willing to partner with federal immigration authorities had double the chance of approval, and that differentials makes it telling.

Differentials in preferential outcome are not, in themselves, unlawful or unfair. People and the law discriminates (makes preferential choices) all the time (e.g. the income tax code). In the case of the grant legislation, the point system granting extra points for federal cooperation on issues of public safety concern to both state and the federal government, reflects some priority in policing that, in the opinion of the AG needs addressed.

3) The criteria involving such cooperation actually runs counter to the fundamental purpose of the COPS program. That is a matter of policy and political opinion, of which the judge should not be deciding for Congress or the delegated authority to the AG, at least not without a methodology clearer than judicial "I don't agree".

Earlier you brought up two questions on Chevron doctrine, and used two terms that I have not noticed in the literature. I asked for a definition, and you have not replied to my request or to the post. Therefore, I'll characterize my views using terms that I am familiar with:

I do not believe Chevron should be unbounded, but I do believe it is the only doctrine that is and will be accepted for years to come. Therefore I believe that it needs, in practice, to be modified.

First, before the two step procedure, the court should determine if an agency has been delegated (explicitly or implicitly) the power to resolve ambiguities. Ambiguity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for deference. "Where it is unlikely or implausible that Congress would have delegated interpretive authority to an administrative agency, there should be no Chevron deference". (Adler)

Second, where the text is silent is not, in and of itself, an ambiguity giving deference. To grant deference on that basis would presume that whatever is not forbidden is allowed.

Third, the magnitude or consequence of a policy question may be such that a court should be extra cautious before presuming Congress has delegated a question to the agency.

Four, Congress rarely, if ever, implicitly or explicitly delegates the authority to agencies to resolve legislative contradictions or mistakes. It is one thing to argue that a gap or an ambiguity was an implicit delegation to fill in the details, but quite different to conclude that when Congress has sloppily enacted clearly conflicting and contradictory provisions , it delegated to the agency the power to choose which provision should control. "Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does not make sense.”93 [Adler]

Last, the courts and congress must do their job. The courts job is interpret the law where it can be reasonably certain that the ambiguities can be resolved confidently. However, it is not the job of the court's to fix broken legislation. Therefore I would favor a much more assertive stance that routinely strikes down parts or the whole of legislation that is too ambiguous, contradictory, or confusing to justly call "the law".

Congress has not been accountable for their law making, and a series of slap-downs based on their poor job is overdue... ACA having been one of them.

"Restoring Chevron's Domain" by Jonathan Adler
 
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I appreciate the detailed and polite back-and-forth over the issue. I suspect, when I have the opportunity to delve more deeply into the decisions, posts and other material, I'll have more to share. Unfortunately, my time for intellectual fancies is presently constricted by guests and a good deal of "home projects" this week. Not intending to ignore anyone. I hope it did not appear so.
 
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