1999 war games foresaw problems in Iraq (1 Viewer)

[KidRocks]

AHA!

And now we know why President Clinton wisely chose not to launch a full scale attack on Saddam and Iraq on his watch.

"Fools rush in" and that is exactly what President Bush and his handlers subscribed to as their foreign-policy soon after Bush took office.

But then again, most of the civilized world already knew that but nooooo...

President Bush was determined to set in motion his 'legacy' as our 'protector' way back then, via his 'crusade' against Saddam!

President Bush: You drink, you drive, you lose!








http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-05-iraq-games_x.htm

WASHINGTON — The U.S. government conducted a series of secret war games in 1999 that anticipated an invasion of Iraq would require 400,000 troops, and even then chaos might ensue.
In its "Desert Crossing" games, 70 military, diplomatic and intelligence officials assumed the high troop levels would be needed to keep order, seal borders and take care of other security needs.

The documents came to light Saturday through a Freedom of Information Act request by the George Washington University's National Security Archive, an independent research institute and library...

 

[CurrentAffairs]

AHA!

And now we know why President Clinton wisely chose not to launch a full scale attack on Saddam and Iraq on his watch.

"Fools rush in" and that is exactly what President Bush and his handlers subscribed to as their foreign-policy soon after Bush took office.

But then again, most of the civilized world already knew that but nooooo...

President Bush was determined to set in motion his 'legacy' as our 'protector' way back then, via his 'crusade' against Saddam!

President Clinton chose wisely? :lol: I wonder what all the Sudanese Aspirin Factory employees would say about that? But hey, at least it deflected the Monica story for a while.

 

[Simon W. Moon]

from here:
http://www.debatepolitics.com/breaking-news/15055-post-saddam-iraq-war-game-desert-crossing.html


Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess

The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main war plan for Iraq – OPLAN 1003-98 – tested “worst case” and “most likely” scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam, Iraq. The After Action Report presented its recommendations for further planning regarding regime change in Iraq and was an interagency production assisted by the departments of defense and state, as well as the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others.

The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments.

The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. Role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.

This report was compiled prior to another prescient study of post-invasion Iraq, the Department of State's "Future of Iraq Project" -- see the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 198.
​

(Source URL: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm)

THE ACTUAL DOCS
​

[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference, April 29, 1999[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]
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[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing After Action Report, June 28, 1999[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]
[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing After Action Report Briefing, July 22, 1999[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]
[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Desert Crossing Miscellaneous E-mails, May-August 1999[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]
[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Joint Intelligence Center Central, "Suggested new name for CONPLAN DESERT RESOLVE," November 14, 1999[/FONT]



Very interesting info here. Sorry to see that this as well as the Future of Iraq project were scrapped in favor of more saleable projections. Pennywise and pound foolish I s'pose.

 

[oldreliable67]

Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess

The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main war plan for Iraq – OPLAN 1003-98 – tested “worst case” and “most likely” scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam, Iraq. The After Action Report presented its recommendations for further planning regarding regime change in Iraq and was an interagency production assisted by the departments of defense and state, as well as the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others.

The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments.

The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. Role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.

This report was compiled prior to another prescient study of post-invasion Iraq, the Department of State's "Future of Iraq Project" -- see the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 198.
​

(Source URL: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm)

The above press release is quite self-serving. For one thing, the headline mentions "400,00 troops". In my reading of the referenced documnets, I can only find the following reference to the number of troops:

They recommended that the United States use diplomatic means to convince the Iranians the the U.S. action (involving up to 300,000 ground troops in the region) was not threatening to Iranian sovereignty.

Source: the "After Action Report"

If the number considered in the gaming exercise was actually 400,000, and I simply missed it, perhaps Simon could document that for us.

Very interesting info here. Sorry to see that this as well as the Future of Iraq project were scrapped in favor of more saleable projections. Pennywise and pound foolish I s'pose.

The GWU National Security Archive press release from which this post is extracted appears designed to highlight the failures of administration planning for Iraq in general, and specifically - at least by implication - the role of SecDef Rumsfeld. It is clear now, in good ol' 20/20 hindsight, that our planning for Iraq indeed was terribly flawed, on many counts. The conclusion is clear: the administration placed its reliance on the wrong guy, and he royally screwed up the planning for Iraq.

But we should not draw that conclusion based on the results of the "Desert Crossing" war game. Before we jumping to the conclusion apparently desired by this press release, we should examine the conditions specified by the war game planners. The designers of the game specified that the scenarios considered by the game participants were significantly different from the conditions eventually realized, including the assination of Saddam by his son Uday and the formation of a couner-coup by the other son, Qusay, quickly followed by conditions for widespread chaos. Hardly the conditions extant in 2003.

To be clear: Rumsfeld did a terrible job in supervising the planning for Iraq, and, IMO, Bush should have accepted Rumsfeld's offer of resignation long ago. Nonetheless, the presentation in the press release that is the subject of this thread is demonstrably self-serving: the specific scenarios and conditions under which the game was played, and the conclusions reached, are not an indictment of Rumsfeld at all.

It strikes me that this is just the GWU Nat'l Security Archive trying to blow its own horn. Just my opinion. YMMV.

 

[MSgt]

"Secret War games" is apart of every day life. We conduct war games that focus on China, North Korea, Iran, etc. This is how we train and prepare for what is needed if the day ever comes. This is how we are able to hit the ground running whenever called up to do so. The act of taking out Saddam was never the problem. Fear of what may ensue should never dictate the comfortable terror that encourages stability. The continual ignoring of the uniformed wisdom was the problem. It was forecasted long ago by plenty of experts outside of the military about the problems that would arise following the removal of Saddam. From troop strength, to rebuild, and onto progressive paces...all studies about an occupation was ignored. This has only made a tough situation tougher.