The crisis snowballs from the failure on the part of the EPA to act and subsequent failure on the part of local officials to know just what should be done as the crisis worsens. No greedy criminal intent here. Slightly elevated lead in the water should not be a matter of immediate concern due to the buffer zones in standards for safety. In other words, if 4ppm of a certain chemical is safe the EPA might set the required limit at 12ppm for a buffer of safety. Government officials know that.
That exposes the root of the problem. Del Toral was a whistleblower at the EPA who was persecuted by the EPA for exposing the EPA failures in the Flint water scandal. The problem was primarily the fault of the EPA to properly direct the state workers in corrective procedures and yet NOT ONE EPA OFFICIAL HAS BEEN CHARGED in the case. That is a gross miscarriage of justice.
You misunderstand the roles and scope of the crisis, and as such reach some errant conclusions.
First, numerous employees and officials were grossly incompetent. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality is primarily responsible (along with Flint City) to ensure safe drinking water - regardless of whether or not procedures are technically compliant with the EPA. As it turned out it was the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) that chose to interpret the Lead and Copper Rule improperly. They did not consult with the EPA on the application of the rule, and prior to the Flint River water source switch the “MDEQ staff instructed the City of Flint water treatment staff that corrosion control treatment was not necessary until two six-month monitoring periods had been conducted" which led to "directly to the contamination of the Flint water system.” (Task Force Finding).
Additionally, the MDEQ failed to proceed in accordance with the Lead rule. At the end of the first 6 month testing period the lead levels exceeded the 5ppb limit which should have triggered an action plan for remediation - instead, they chose to do another 6 month test (it requires two consecutive months at or below 5ppb to avoid an action plan, which would have been impossible as the first 6 month test was over the limit).
Additionally it should be noted that the department ignored common-sense and required protocols (e.g. using the same sampling sites for each of the two testing periods, failure to concern itself with whether or not the homes surveyed even had lead pipes, failure to identify the most vulnerable areas, throwing away five high lead samples, etc.).
Moreover, the EPA and the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services were also incompetent: the EPA was fully aware of the limitations of its own recommended water testing procedure but ignored it in consultation with the MDEQ (and ignored Del Toral's warnings), and the MDHHS data analysis of lead in children was both simplistic and flawed, and it took a local doctors own research to expose this agencies very poor data understanding.
Second, these and other partys were guilty of gross negligence. “We believe that in the Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance (ODWMA) at MDEQ, a culture exists in which 'technical compliance' is considered sufficient to ensure safe drinking water in Michigan. This minimalist approach to regulatory and oversight responsibility is unacceptable and simply insufficient to the task of public protection.
It led to MDEQ’s failure to recognize a number of indications that switching the water source in Flint would – and did – compromise both water safety and water quality.” (Task Force). In sum, individuals and offices had no interest in finding out IF PEOPLE WERE ACTUALLY BEING POISIONED, they ONLY had an interest in delaying remediation as long as possible (hoping the new pipeline would be completed). (For example they, and the EPA, pretended that Toral's memo was not to be considered important in mutual discussions because it was "not officially reviewed and released".
Cont.
