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100 Years Ago on this day, WWI was brought to an end.

Once a continuous front is flanked or breached the entire front is in crisis. This was demonstrated in 1914 (flank) and in May-June 1940 (breach). The 1917 Germans of course did not have the mechanized assets of the 1940 Germans, but they also had less ground to cover to reach Paris, which was the prime objective for more than just symbolic reasons.

The 1918 Germans certainly did not have the capacity to exploit any breach they made. This was shown time and time again during the Spring Offensives. The German Army, for all it's numbers and firepower, simply did not have the mobility to chase down retreating Allied armies. This was made abundantly clear in Operational Michael and subsequent offensives.

And Paris was not an objective, which made any drive towards it equally undo-able. By June the Germans were sitting in an increasingly indefensible salient that they were unable to expand because of the depleted nature of their forces. Even if Huiter succeeds in taking the Matz the Seventh Army is spent as an offensive force; and even without American assistance Magnin's attack on Soissons would still catch Huiter's troops in a bad position and put the entire offensive in jeopardy. I don't see how an already decimated Seventh Army can possibly retain the initiative given the circumstances, much less mount a drive on Paris.
 
LOL and why do you think the governments failed? Oh yes, because of WW1... duh!

The Romanov's were failing well before WWI. In 1905 or so is when the Bolsheviks were formed in order to overthrow the Czar.

So... not really.
 
The Romanov's were failing well before WWI. In 1905 or so is when the Bolsheviks were formed in order to overthrow the Czar.

So... not really.

The Romanovs would have never been thrown out of power if their most loyal army units hadnt been wiped out fighting the Germans, Bodie. The Bolsheviks didnt actually overthrow the Romanovs either, they overthrew a newly formed republic led by Alexander Kerensky.
 
The Romanovs would have never been thrown out of power if their most loyal army units hadnt been wiped out fighting the Germans, Bodie. The Bolsheviks didnt actually overthrow the Romanovs either, they overthrew a newly formed republic led by Alexander Kerensky.

Agreed but that really wasn't my point.... it was that the War is why Stalin gained power. Obviously there were other factors.
 
The Romanovs would have never been thrown out of power if their most loyal army units hadnt been wiped out fighting the Germans...

Which units were these ?

Had WWI never happened, it's entirely possible that the Romanovs would still be monarchs of Russia today.

But the epic defeats the Russians experienced in WWI meant that the Romanovs were doomed.
 
Which units were these ?

Had WWI never happened, it's entirely possible that the Romanovs would still be monarchs of Russia today.

But the epic defeats the Russians experienced in WWI meant that the Romanovs were doomed.

Well no unit in particular was ever disbanded since the Russians usually replenished their armies with replacements, but this very thing did become an issue. When the war started the vast majority of troops serving in the army were career officers and enlisted, these men were killed off by the second year of the war as the Russian casualties were more than 5 million. The officer corps in particular were originally aristocrats and landowners, but as the war progressed their replacements came from rural areas and commoners.

Most of the loyal troops were at the front, while the rearguard troops were then drawn from the peasant stock, and this factor became critical when the first strikes began in Petrograd, Moscow and St Petersburg. These troops guarding the cities were undisciplined and disloyal, and soon joined the strikers. The Romanovs were soon undermined by their own military.

Im speculating that if it were not for the war, the Romanovs would have had enough loyal troops to put down the rebelling ones, and maybe extended their existence for a few more years, at least.
 
No, a German victory at the Marne doesn't solve their problems at all. Ignoring the fact that even without American troops a victory at the Marne is highly unlikely, neither the Seventh Army or the Ninth Army retain any offensive capability to push any farther. As had been demonstrated numerous times by the time of the Marne, the Germans never were able to effectively follow up their successes because the mobility of their forces were so poor.
Contradicted by Erich Ludendorf. See link:

Nine Divisions in Champagne: The Second Battle of Marne

from link:
(Ludendorf): … All [German] divisions [along the Marne] achieved brilliant successes, with the exception of the one division on our right wing. This encountered American units! Here only did the Seventh Army, in the course of the first day of the offensive, confront serious difficulties. It met with the unexpectedly stubborn and active resistance of fresh American troops. While the rest of the divisions of the Seventh Army succeeded in gaining ground and gaining tremendous booty, it proved impossible for us to move the right apex of our line, to the south of the Marne, into a position advantageous for the development of the ensuing fight. The check we thus received was one result of the stupendous fighting between our 10th Division of infantry and American troops.

So even if the Germans do somehow win (how the manage to assault the main French defensive line when it's beyond the range of German artillery), it leaves them with nothing of real value. They have a breach they can't exploit, flanks they can't defend, and a manpower problem that's now even worse.
You have failed to grasp the decisive untility of the breach of an enemy front. Once that occurs the sky is the limit, as it was when penetration by Allied counterattack forced the Germans into an eventual general retreat, and ended the war.

Now, I think I have staked out a sound enough position in this exchage to take my leave, so adios.
 
Contradicted by Erich Ludendorf. See link:

Nine Divisions in Champagne: The Second Battle of Marne

from link:

You are overestimating the success of the offensive based on Ludendorff's quote, a source I would not take well into consideration due to the eccentricity that Ludendorff displayed several times during the Spring Offensives. The reality is that the Germans didn't break through, not because the American divisions stopped them at the critical juncture (not to take away from the heroic stand of the American forces), but they didn't break through anywhere. The reality of the situation was the main French defensive line, which needed to be ruptured to consider the battle a German victory, lay beyond the range of German artillery. When the Germans captured the bridgehead on the Dormans it represented their furthest success in the entire battle, yet they had failed to break the 6th Army as a fighting force. The Germans did gain ground, but only by overrunning the outward trenches of the Allies, not by breaching a hole into the French defenses. Even if they had advanced further, they would've found themselves outside the range of their own artillery, leaving the Strumtruppen to defeat the 6th Army (now being reinforced by the 9th Army) by themselves. Such a task was beyond their capability.

And what should be remembered is the fact that the decisive moment in the 2nd Battle of the Marne was not the stand in Belleau woods by the 3rd Division, but the Allied counterattack on the 18th which was led by 44 French divisions.




You have failed to grasp the decisive untility of the breach of an enemy front. Once that occurs the sky is the limit, as it was when penetration by Allied counterattack forced the Germans into an eventual general retreat, and ended the war.

No, the issue here is you're overestimating the ability of the Germans to exploit the breach. The reality is the Germans had breached the Allied lines before, but every time they had done so they had been unable to follow it up. At Yrpes the German usage of poison gas broke the British lines, but there were no sufficient German reserves to rush in to exploit the gap. In Spring 1918 the Germans had the same problem; they could break through by not exploit it. In Michael they achieved considerable success and ruptured the Allied lines in several locations, only to be bogged down by being unable to sustain their offensive because they kept running out of steam. The Germans were only able to achieve such breakthroughs by throwing together their best troops into their own formations and attacking in full force, but this cost them their best men while the follow up divisions were composed of second rate soldiers. The Germans as a result were losing their best men and their reserves were full of troops of inferior quality. In Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau and Blucher the Germans were able to breach the lines only for their offensive to stall because their troops became too exhausted and their logistics unable to support further advance. Why you feel it would be any different at the Marne is beyond me.
 
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